Jim Auer states the obvious: that the Iraq deployment is all about securing Japan against the North Korean threat. He states another obvious point--that Washington thinks that loose lips in Japan about a Japanese nuclear breakout are an attempt to encourage the Chinese to lean hard on the North Koreans.
But I think Okumura-san goes to far in saying Japanese security specialists share Auer's and Washington's belief.
As evidence, I offer the Sankei Shimbun's front page article of December 25 disclosing the contents of a secret government report prepared this summer. That the article appeared on Christmas Day is the likely reason it has not been more widely discussed.
核弾頭試作に３年以上 費用２０００～３０００億円 政府内部文書
「日本が小型核弾頭を試作するまでには少なくとも３～５年かかる」とする政府の内部文書が２４日明らかになった。「核兵器の国産可能性について」と題した文書によると、日本にはウラン濃縮工場や原発の使用済み核燃料の再処理技術・設備はあるが、技術上の制約から核兵器にただちに転用できないとしている。北朝鮮の核実験を機に日本国内では一部に「非核三原則」の見直しや核武装論が出ているが、日本が仮に核武装する決心をしてもほぼゼロからの開発にならざるをえない、という現実を確認したことになる。
政府内部文書はことし９月２０日付で作成された。１０月９日の北朝鮮核実験に先立ってひそかに政府機関の専門家が調査し、まとめた。小型核弾頭試作までに３年以上の期間、２０００億～３０００億円の予算と技術者数百人の動員が必要という。これでは仮に日本が核武装宣言しても、ただちに独力で北朝鮮からの「核の脅威」抑止には間に合わない。
核兵器の材料は、いわゆる広島型原爆材料の高濃縮ウランか長崎型のプルトニウムの２種類。日本原燃の六ケ所村（青森県）原子燃料サイクル施設や日本原子力研究開発機構東海事業所（茨城県）に、ウラン濃縮や原子力発電所の使用済み核燃料再処理工場がある。
しかし、いずれも軽水炉用で、核兵器級の原料をつくるのには適さない。濃縮工場は純度３％程度の低濃縮ウランを製造するが、そのため稼働している遠心分離機は故障続きで、短期間での大規模化は困難である。
政府内部文書では、日本が核武装するためには、結局、プルトニウム２３９を効率的に作り出すことができる黒鉛減速炉の建設と減速炉から生じる使用済み核燃料を再処理するラインを設置する必要があると結論づける。さらに小型核弾頭をつくるためには日本にとって未知の技術開発に挑戦しなければならない。（編集委員 田村秀男）
Translation:
Government internal report says Japan over three years away from a miniaturized warhead at a cost of 200 to 300 billion yen
It became public knowledge on December 24 that an internal government document exists stating, “It will take at least 3 to 5 years until Japan can go into trial production of a miniaturized warhead.” According to the document, entitled, “As regards the possibility of national production of atomic weapons” while Japan does have uranium enrichment facilities and the technology and equipment for reprocessing spent nuclear fuel, there are technical barriers that prevent the immediate conversion of these [capabilities]. Although a debate has emerged in one segment of Japanese society on the occasion of North Korea’s nuclear test regarding the need for nuclear armaments or a review of the “Three Non Nuclear Principles”, it has been confirmed that even if a decision were made to proceed with arming Japan with nuclear weapons, Japan will be basically starting from zero.
The internal government document was completed on September 20. Well before the October 9 nuclear test by North Korea, specialists within various branches of the government quietly conducted a survey and compiled [the report]. It says that to produce a prototype miniaturized warhead will take more than 3 years, a budget of 200 billion to 300 billion and several hundred technicians. If Japan were to declare itself a nuclear weapons state in the interim, Japan could not immediately by itself check the ‘nuclear threat’ posed by North Korea
As for the materials to be made into nuclear weapons, they will be either of two types, namely, HEU used in the Hiroshima atomic bomb or Nagasaki-type plutonium. There are nuclear fuel cycle processing facilities at Japan's nuclear fuels manufacturing center of Rokkasho (in Aomori Prefecture) and uranium enrichment and a nuclear power station spent fuel reprocessing plant at the Tokai civilian nuclear research group facility (in Ibaraki Prefecture).
However, neither is appropriate for production the nuclear materials out of the fuel designed for use in light water reactors. The uranium enrichment facility can produce 3% LEU. Operating the centrifuges in order to produce [HEU] would lead to constant breakdowns. It would essentially be impossible to scale up over the short term.
The internal government document concludes that in order for Japan to arm itself with nuclear weapons, it would, in the end, have to construct a graphite moderated nuclear reactor for the efficient production of Pu 239. It would also be necessary to establish a reprocessing line for this reactor. Furthermore, Japan will have to push itself to aquire the technological knowledge required for the manufacture of miniaturized warheads.
(Editor: Tamura Hideo)
Now to me, the leaking of the contents of this report to the Sankei Shimbun...
1) Reassures the Chinese that the smart folks in Japan know that breakout is impossible.
2) Slams the door on the knuckles of certain right wing pundits both here and in the United States who have been arguing for Japan's entry into the nuclear weapons club.
3) Drives a stake through the heart of the "Japan is at most 6 months away from being a nuclear power" canard.
4) Indicates there are at least a few individuals inside the government who think that politicians discussing Japan's possibly becoming a nuclear weapons state needs to be exposed for the nonsense it is.
(Some of this material cross-posted from Arms Control Wonk and Global Talk 21)
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