Over at 38North, the place for all things DPRK, Dr. Sheila Smith has up a long post on the new Abe Cabinet-DPRK agreement to reopen the investigation into the fates of Japanese either kidnapped or purportedly kidnapped by North Koreans or Japanese Red Army terrorists in the 1970s. (Link)
Four points to help fill out her narrative:
- What ultimately sank the Koizumi initiative on normalization was not a loss of public support for engagement with Pyongyang. It was the Japanese government's reneging on the agreement to return the living abductees to North Korea after a series of family visits. By keeping the five, deprogramming them and allowing the abductee lobby to use them as cudgels against the DPRK (and against any post-Abe government that tried to circumvent the abductee lobby to engage Pyongyang) Japan taught the DPRK a lesson in bloody-minded double-crossing -- something that Kim Jong-il thought he knew everything about.
- After Iijima Isao paid his very public visit to Pyongyang (Link) the chattering classes in Washington and New York mocked him, saying he had been used as a propaganda tool of the North Koreans to no gain. For that derision there has been no apology, nor will there be any. Furthermore, Iijima's lesson on how one gets the ball rolling with the DPRK will be ignored.
- While support for the abductees is wide, one should not be too certain of its depth. Like the current emnity for Chinese and South Koreans (distinct from emnity felt toward the Xi and Park governments) outrage over the abductees is mostly a pose, a feeling one is supposed to feel. A maudlin minority of miscontents and dupes shows up at abductee events. In public opinion polls, the majority of voters express inextinguishable anger. Altogether, though these items do not add up to much in the way of a public movement.
- Ergo: there is no public to punish the Abe 2.0 Cabinet if this initiative fails to bear fruit. The abductees issue is private business, owned by a coterie of Diet members of which Abe Shinzo is a charter member. The issue has been managed for the purpose of humiliating and boxing in administrations, this in order to pave the way for a return of a revisionist government. That the person in charge of that government is Abe Shinzo, the man the abductee issue first made prime minister, pretty much guarantees that when the Pyongyang investigators find nothing new, the response in Japan will be a dull thud.
Showing posts with label DPRK. Show all posts
Showing posts with label DPRK. Show all posts
Monday, June 02, 2014
Sunday, April 06, 2014
When He Says, "Training," He Means, "For Real"

Minister of Defense Onodera Itsunori has issued a secret directive ordering a Maritime Self Defense Forces vessel to sea prepared to shoot down any North Korean missile launch threatening Japan. (Link)
In a manner of speaking.
It would make zero sense to have SM-3 equipped Aegis vessels sailing the oceans without authorization to shoot down ballistic missiles threatening Japan. When seconds separate possible intercept and a pointless miss, the system cannot possibly rely on a call the Prime Minister's Residence and/or the Defense Minister to receive authorization.
So if authorization is standard, what has Onodera done?
According to The Asahi Shimbun, Onodera ordered the MSDF Kirishima (Photo) to sea on a training mission lasting from April 3 to April 25 -- a training mission where the captain has been given special authorization to engage in anti-missile combat activities, if he thinks circumstances merit them (Link). Had he addressed the crew before departure, Onodera's message would have been, "Sailors and officers of the Kirishima, no 'defense of Japan' stuff while you are out there -- unless. of course, it's absolutely necessary. Bon Voyage."
Bon voyage, indeed.
For those keeping score, yet another instance of extraordinary casuistry deployed by Japanese security officials in the course of conducting their daily tasks.
As you were.
Later - On Twitter Andrea Ortolani writes that the ship-to-shore communications mentioned above would like be via fax, not voice.
Wednesday, December 11, 2013
From The Nonsense Party, More Nonsense
Fast on the heels of Pyongyang frequent flyer and professional wrestler Inoki Antonio's trip to the DPRK in defiance of a Diet ruling (Link), an act that led to a punishment of historic proportions (Link), a star Japan Restoration Party Diet member has further burnished the JRP's reputation as the party of not-ready-for-kindergarten dilettantes. Higashikokubaru Hideo, the former Miyazaki Governor (a post he served in without getting arrested, which, given the history of the Miyazaki governor’s chair, is amazing) and professional comedian yesterday told JRP co-leader and fellow television personality Hashimoto Toru he is resigning his House of Representatives seat.
The reason Higashikokubaru offered for giving up his Kinki Bloc proportional seat, after less than a year in office? "There are limits as to what I can do as a member of the Diet." (Link - J)
The Sankei Shimbun, which occasionally gets a story right, has Higashikokubaru resigning from the Diet in order to run for the post of governor of the Tokyo Metropolitan District (Link - J). This explanation gibes both with Higashikokubaru's elliptical reason for resigning and the fact that he was a candidate for Tokyo governor in 2011, running against and losing to the JRP's other co-leader, then incumbent governor Ishihara Shintaro, who himself resigned his governorship after only a year and a halfway into a four year term in order to run once again for a Diet seat.
Higashikokubaru's plan to win public office in yet a third major region of the country (Kyushu, done; Kansai, done. Why the heck not see if the Kanto is game as well?) is complicated by the grim tenacity of Inose Naoki, Ishihara's former Passepartout who took over after Ishihara's departure. Inose is hanging on to his desk at the Tocho despite everybody's trying to pressure him to resign for accepting an interest-free, no repayment-schedule loan of 50 million yen* from the Tokushukai hospital empire, whose family owners/directors were all arrested this fall for massive voting laws violations in pursuit of a House of Representatives seat for the family dauphin Tokuda Takeshi in the same election that sent Ishihara and Higashikokubaru to the Diet. (Link)
Yes, it is a complicated, intertwined cobweb of mutual back rubbing, raging narcissism, hypocrisy and yes, lots and lots of money.
Anyway, until a member of the Japan Restoration Party does or even says something remotely respectable, the JRP remains the nonsense party -- which, given the absurdities pouring out of late from the Your Party and the Liberal Democratic Party (which, by mercilessly hounding Governor Inose, is trying to make everyone forget that Tokuda, the cash dispenser, is one of its princelings) is saying something.
------
* Inose took his loan in the form of cash. I had a chance yesterday to find out the mass and dimensions of the loan, if it were handed over in its most likely form of bundles of just-off-the presses 10,000 yen bills. The stack of bills would be 38 centimeters wide, 16 centimeters deep, 10 centimeters high and weigh 5 kilograms.
The reason Higashikokubaru offered for giving up his Kinki Bloc proportional seat, after less than a year in office? "There are limits as to what I can do as a member of the Diet." (Link - J)
The Sankei Shimbun, which occasionally gets a story right, has Higashikokubaru resigning from the Diet in order to run for the post of governor of the Tokyo Metropolitan District (Link - J). This explanation gibes both with Higashikokubaru's elliptical reason for resigning and the fact that he was a candidate for Tokyo governor in 2011, running against and losing to the JRP's other co-leader, then incumbent governor Ishihara Shintaro, who himself resigned his governorship after only a year and a halfway into a four year term in order to run once again for a Diet seat.
Higashikokubaru's plan to win public office in yet a third major region of the country (Kyushu, done; Kansai, done. Why the heck not see if the Kanto is game as well?) is complicated by the grim tenacity of Inose Naoki, Ishihara's former Passepartout who took over after Ishihara's departure. Inose is hanging on to his desk at the Tocho despite everybody's trying to pressure him to resign for accepting an interest-free, no repayment-schedule loan of 50 million yen* from the Tokushukai hospital empire, whose family owners/directors were all arrested this fall for massive voting laws violations in pursuit of a House of Representatives seat for the family dauphin Tokuda Takeshi in the same election that sent Ishihara and Higashikokubaru to the Diet. (Link)
Yes, it is a complicated, intertwined cobweb of mutual back rubbing, raging narcissism, hypocrisy and yes, lots and lots of money.
Anyway, until a member of the Japan Restoration Party does or even says something remotely respectable, the JRP remains the nonsense party -- which, given the absurdities pouring out of late from the Your Party and the Liberal Democratic Party (which, by mercilessly hounding Governor Inose, is trying to make everyone forget that Tokuda, the cash dispenser, is one of its princelings) is saying something.
------
* Inose took his loan in the form of cash. I had a chance yesterday to find out the mass and dimensions of the loan, if it were handed over in its most likely form of bundles of just-off-the presses 10,000 yen bills. The stack of bills would be 38 centimeters wide, 16 centimeters deep, 10 centimeters high and weigh 5 kilograms.
Labels:
DPRK,
election laws,
Hashimoto Toru,
Inose Naoki,
Ishihara Shintaro,
JRP
Thursday, December 05, 2013
A Brief Note On Japanese Political Vocabulary
I have completed a few more orbits of the Sun than I want to acknowledge. I have made a rather larger number of those orbits whilst standing upon Japanese soil.
It has not been until this autumn, however, that I have come to understand the functions of two nouns -- one a common noun and the other a proper noun -- in Japanese political discourse. The usage of these two nouns has always caused my ears to tingle and my breath to halt. However, until this fall's Potemkin debate on the raising of the consumption tax and the lurching, blood-spewing path the execrable* Official Secrets Bill (my latest read: the ruling coalition will pass the bill amid chaos on Friday, giving the public the reason it has been seeking to hate the Liberal Democratic Party all over again) has taken toward passage, I could not put my finger on why.
Now I can.
Here are the two nouns whose political meanings I have come to understand:
Taisaku- 対策
The dictionary defines taisaku as "countermeasures" - the changes you have to make to your operations in order to cope with a new situation. In Japanese political speech, however, taisaku has a more limited meaning. Rather than being "countermeasures" in a general sense, the taisaku drawn up by bureaucrats and politicians should be understood as "dubious government actions intended to countermand the entirely predictable deleterious side effects of earlier and equally dubious government actions, primarily in the sphere of economics."
The escalating rounds of countermeasures leading up to the decision to go forward with the rise in the consumption tax illustrates this special meaning of taisaku. First we had the bungled Bank of Japan response to the Plaza Accords, which led to asset price bubble. After the piercing of the bubble and the consequent collapse of economic activity, elected officials responded with fiscal stimulus package after fiscal stimulus package, each one too puny to halt economic contraction because of Finance Ministry fears of jacking up the national debt. The too puny fiscal stimulus packages and tentative monetary easings of the 1990s, coupled with Japa'’s long-recognized aging, created an unsustainable level of national debt via-a-vis the nation's pension/health care obligations. Meeting these obligations requires more revenues, which means higher taxes. Higher taxes, especially regressive taxes like the consumption tax, decreases economic activity. So the government has to cobble together a stimulus packages, either cutting back on tax receipts from other areas or borrowing money, which further increases the debt burden, which means the creation of expectations of further tax increases in the future, which diminishes the desire to spend, which...
The main reason why Japan's bureaucrats, politicians and even its big businessman have not ever thought of stepping off the ascending spiral staircase of taisaku is that halting the process would force members of the Establishment say, out loud:
"You know, we screwed up. We pretended to be omniscient, transcendent higher beings when what we were really was cowards and frauds. Sorry."
Which establishments never say. Ever.
Except, of course, when they say, "Taisaku."
Yokota Megumi - 横田めぐみ
Yokota Megumi was a 13 year-old girl, walking home from a badminton practice at her middle school in the heart of Niigata City, Niigata Prefecture on November 15, 1977. On the way, she seems to have crossed the path of North Korean agents. For reasons that will likely never be explained, the agents took her as a captive and spirited her away to North Korea, where she grew up a prisoner, employed as a trainer for North Korean spies hoping to pass as Japanese citizens. She purportedly committed suicide in 1994, and is survived by a former husband and a daughter, both of whom are prisoners of the DPRK regime.
While tragic, Ms. Yokota's story is not unique. A couple dozen other Japanese nationals, hundreds of South Korean nationals and a smattering of citizens of other nations have all been kidnapped and held captive by the irretrievably evil government of the DPRK. Ms. Yokota's story and that of Soga Hitomi, a young woman whose was kidnapped from Sado Island in 1978, indicate that her gender and youth were factors in her survival. They also indicate that the kidnapping of Japanese citizens to become teachers of Japanese mores and culture -- Megumi's eventual role in North Korean society -- was an ad hoc justification for what was a fairly pointless and marginal facet of North Korea's ever-evolving program of extortion through random acts of terror.
In Japanese political diction, however, mention of "Yokota Megumi" is the refuge of the intellectually unsound. Like references to Hitler in English-language discussions of politics, the brandishing of "Yokota Megumi" is supposed to stun the listener into silence. Why does Japan need a national security council? "Yokota Megumi." Why does Japan need such a draconian new official secrets law? "Yokota Megumi." Why does Japan have to revise Article 9 of the 1947 Constitution? "Yokota Megumi." Why does Japan have to …“SHUT UP! SHUT UP! I CAN’T HEAR YOU! YOU SEE MY FINGERS IN MY EARS, YOU CHINA-LOVING, DPRK-CODDLING DUPE? I HAVE NO RATIONAL REASON FOR CURTAILING CIVIL LIBERTIES, TURNING A BLIND EYE TOWARD XENOPHOBIA AND RAISING JAPAN’S MILITARY POSTURE SO YOKOTA MEGUMI, YOKOTA MEGUMI, YOKOTA MEGUMI!!!"
Here is prime example of Yokota Megumi being dragged in in order to supposedly prove a point, drawn from a major political tract by a famous author:
A flimsy free association of various humiliations of Japan occurring in the autumn of 1977, including the purported Kume kidnapping, which has never been acknowledged by the DPRK, if Kume's disappearance was even a kidnapping. The spinelessness of the Fukuda government toward the Dhaka hijackers leads to the disappearance of Kume in Ishikawa which leads to the release of the police's top person of interest in the Kume disappearance which leads to kidnapping of "Megumi-san" two months later in Niigata City.
Indubitably.
The passage includes a sarcastic quotation from the preamble of the Constitution ("We, the Japanese people, desire peace for all time and are deeply conscious of the high ideals controlling human relationship, and we have determined to preserve our security and existence, trusting in the justice and faith of the peace-loving peoples of the world"). The quote seems a demonstration of an adolescent desire for applause for cleverness. While feeling contempt toward Constitution and its naïve faith in the good intentions of peace-loving peoples of the world is a valid emotional reaction, this contempt should be expressed openly, not hinted at by the snide use of quotation marks.
So why should I or anyone else be give a damn about this snarky connect-the-dots bit of weirdness reminiscent of the histrionic performances of American embarrassment Glenn Beck, one culminating in the author's making a maudlin appeal to sympathy for Ms. Yokota in an absurd bit of speculative history? Because you will find it on page 252 of Toward a New Country (Atarashii kuni e) -- a book published earlier this year by a certain Mr. Abe Shinzo, prime minister of Japan.
Now I understand what my body has been telling me all these years: when in an argument with someone over the appropriateness of the Japanese government's taking a new position as regards security, or its plans to adopt an unprecedented new mode of operation, at the very first utterance of "Yokota Megumi" I should relax, smile and go prepare to go home.
The argument is over. Indeed, there was never any argument on the other side at all.
----------------------------------
* On November 8, the Tokyo Shimbun reprinted the entire working text of the official secrets bill, highlighting the 36 times the lazy authors of the bill had ended their sentences with "and so on and so forth, et cetera" (sono ta).
It has not been until this autumn, however, that I have come to understand the functions of two nouns -- one a common noun and the other a proper noun -- in Japanese political discourse. The usage of these two nouns has always caused my ears to tingle and my breath to halt. However, until this fall's Potemkin debate on the raising of the consumption tax and the lurching, blood-spewing path the execrable* Official Secrets Bill (my latest read: the ruling coalition will pass the bill amid chaos on Friday, giving the public the reason it has been seeking to hate the Liberal Democratic Party all over again) has taken toward passage, I could not put my finger on why.
Now I can.
Here are the two nouns whose political meanings I have come to understand:
Taisaku- 対策
The dictionary defines taisaku as "countermeasures" - the changes you have to make to your operations in order to cope with a new situation. In Japanese political speech, however, taisaku has a more limited meaning. Rather than being "countermeasures" in a general sense, the taisaku drawn up by bureaucrats and politicians should be understood as "dubious government actions intended to countermand the entirely predictable deleterious side effects of earlier and equally dubious government actions, primarily in the sphere of economics."
The escalating rounds of countermeasures leading up to the decision to go forward with the rise in the consumption tax illustrates this special meaning of taisaku. First we had the bungled Bank of Japan response to the Plaza Accords, which led to asset price bubble. After the piercing of the bubble and the consequent collapse of economic activity, elected officials responded with fiscal stimulus package after fiscal stimulus package, each one too puny to halt economic contraction because of Finance Ministry fears of jacking up the national debt. The too puny fiscal stimulus packages and tentative monetary easings of the 1990s, coupled with Japa'’s long-recognized aging, created an unsustainable level of national debt via-a-vis the nation's pension/health care obligations. Meeting these obligations requires more revenues, which means higher taxes. Higher taxes, especially regressive taxes like the consumption tax, decreases economic activity. So the government has to cobble together a stimulus packages, either cutting back on tax receipts from other areas or borrowing money, which further increases the debt burden, which means the creation of expectations of further tax increases in the future, which diminishes the desire to spend, which...
The main reason why Japan's bureaucrats, politicians and even its big businessman have not ever thought of stepping off the ascending spiral staircase of taisaku is that halting the process would force members of the Establishment say, out loud:
"You know, we screwed up. We pretended to be omniscient, transcendent higher beings when what we were really was cowards and frauds. Sorry."
Which establishments never say. Ever.
Except, of course, when they say, "Taisaku."
Yokota Megumi - 横田めぐみ
Yokota Megumi was a 13 year-old girl, walking home from a badminton practice at her middle school in the heart of Niigata City, Niigata Prefecture on November 15, 1977. On the way, she seems to have crossed the path of North Korean agents. For reasons that will likely never be explained, the agents took her as a captive and spirited her away to North Korea, where she grew up a prisoner, employed as a trainer for North Korean spies hoping to pass as Japanese citizens. She purportedly committed suicide in 1994, and is survived by a former husband and a daughter, both of whom are prisoners of the DPRK regime.
While tragic, Ms. Yokota's story is not unique. A couple dozen other Japanese nationals, hundreds of South Korean nationals and a smattering of citizens of other nations have all been kidnapped and held captive by the irretrievably evil government of the DPRK. Ms. Yokota's story and that of Soga Hitomi, a young woman whose was kidnapped from Sado Island in 1978, indicate that her gender and youth were factors in her survival. They also indicate that the kidnapping of Japanese citizens to become teachers of Japanese mores and culture -- Megumi's eventual role in North Korean society -- was an ad hoc justification for what was a fairly pointless and marginal facet of North Korea's ever-evolving program of extortion through random acts of terror.
In Japanese political diction, however, mention of "Yokota Megumi" is the refuge of the intellectually unsound. Like references to Hitler in English-language discussions of politics, the brandishing of "Yokota Megumi" is supposed to stun the listener into silence. Why does Japan need a national security council? "Yokota Megumi." Why does Japan need such a draconian new official secrets law? "Yokota Megumi." Why does Japan have to revise Article 9 of the 1947 Constitution? "Yokota Megumi." Why does Japan have to …“SHUT UP! SHUT UP! I CAN’T HEAR YOU! YOU SEE MY FINGERS IN MY EARS, YOU CHINA-LOVING, DPRK-CODDLING DUPE? I HAVE NO RATIONAL REASON FOR CURTAILING CIVIL LIBERTIES, TURNING A BLIND EYE TOWARD XENOPHOBIA AND RAISING JAPAN’S MILITARY POSTURE SO YOKOTA MEGUMI, YOKOTA MEGUMI, YOKOTA MEGUMI!!!"
Here is prime example of Yokota Megumi being dragged in in order to supposedly prove a point, drawn from a major political tract by a famous author:
After the Dhaka Incident of September 1977, Kume Yutaka of Ishikawa Prefecture was kidnapped and taken to the Democratic Republic of North Korea. The police authorities of the time arrested the perpetrator. However, knowing that the perpetrator was involved in a covert operations organization of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, the police let him go out of fear of a dispute arising with 'peace-loving peoples of the world.'
Because of this, what occurred? Two months later, in November, Yokota Megumi was kidnapped from the seaside of Niigata Prefecture. Had the Government of Japan at the time [of the Kume disappearance] chosen the path of confronting the Government of the DPRK, would not Megumi-san still be living her life in Japan?"
In the end, Japan's postwar system, as symbolized by the Constitution of Japan, could not safeguard the life of a 13 year-old girl. And for us, even now, this problem remains [unresolved].
A flimsy free association of various humiliations of Japan occurring in the autumn of 1977, including the purported Kume kidnapping, which has never been acknowledged by the DPRK, if Kume's disappearance was even a kidnapping. The spinelessness of the Fukuda government toward the Dhaka hijackers leads to the disappearance of Kume in Ishikawa which leads to the release of the police's top person of interest in the Kume disappearance which leads to kidnapping of "Megumi-san" two months later in Niigata City.
Indubitably.
The passage includes a sarcastic quotation from the preamble of the Constitution ("We, the Japanese people, desire peace for all time and are deeply conscious of the high ideals controlling human relationship, and we have determined to preserve our security and existence, trusting in the justice and faith of the peace-loving peoples of the world"). The quote seems a demonstration of an adolescent desire for applause for cleverness. While feeling contempt toward Constitution and its naïve faith in the good intentions of peace-loving peoples of the world is a valid emotional reaction, this contempt should be expressed openly, not hinted at by the snide use of quotation marks.
So why should I or anyone else be give a damn about this snarky connect-the-dots bit of weirdness reminiscent of the histrionic performances of American embarrassment Glenn Beck, one culminating in the author's making a maudlin appeal to sympathy for Ms. Yokota in an absurd bit of speculative history? Because you will find it on page 252 of Toward a New Country (Atarashii kuni e) -- a book published earlier this year by a certain Mr. Abe Shinzo, prime minister of Japan.
Now I understand what my body has been telling me all these years: when in an argument with someone over the appropriateness of the Japanese government's taking a new position as regards security, or its plans to adopt an unprecedented new mode of operation, at the very first utterance of "Yokota Megumi" I should relax, smile and go prepare to go home.
The argument is over. Indeed, there was never any argument on the other side at all.
----------------------------------
* On November 8, the Tokyo Shimbun reprinted the entire working text of the official secrets bill, highlighting the 36 times the lazy authors of the bill had ended their sentences with "and so on and so forth, et cetera" (sono ta).
Friday, October 25, 2013
Yet Another Blown Auction Of Chosen Soren Headquarters
Why does it seem to be impossible for those ostensibly in charge of this blessed land to hold an auction where all those submitting bids present a bank line of credit proving they have access to enough money to pay for the building in question (Link) -- or, in the latest ridiculous round of in the saga of the sale of the headquarters building of the D.P.R.K.'s de facto embassy in Tokyo, where the winner is an actually existing legal person? (Link)
Perhaps I should submit a bid under the aegis "Shisaku Ltd., PDQ, TPP, ROTFLOL" and see how far I get.
Failing to do due diligence prior to a sensitive sale once is carelessness...but failing to do it twice?
One hopes the executors of this sale are all looking for another profession, one perhaps they have some skill in executing.
Perhaps I should submit a bid under the aegis "Shisaku Ltd., PDQ, TPP, ROTFLOL" and see how far I get.
Failing to do due diligence prior to a sensitive sale once is carelessness...but failing to do it twice?
One hopes the executors of this sale are all looking for another profession, one perhaps they have some skill in executing.
Saturday, August 31, 2013
A Minor Contrarian Note On The Abductees Obsession
No postings in a time of turmoil and change -- bad, bad, bad. Excuses few have I save the lassitude of the final week of a long, hot August.
I have, however, been thinking about Japan's policy moves as regards the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.
Japanese government mewling about the fate of those abducted by the DPRK in the 1970s and 80s is probably one of the most frustrating and annoying diplomatic shows on Earth, at least among those put on by the diplomatic corps of the advanced industrialized countries. Japan's representatives performed a lacrimosa on behalf of the abductees and their families yet again this week -- with the twist being that this time it was to an international panel responsible for actually listening to the stories. (Link and Link)
Japan's official obsession with the abductees, rather than generating sympathy, likely has turned opinion against Japan on the issue. The world's diplomats and employees of international organizations must dread Japanese presentations, as morose tales and demands for resolution of the abductees issue clog the agendas and fritter away precious time at every international gathering.
Then again, being annoying might be the whole point of the exercise. Given the way the DPRK regimes operates, which is to give crumbs in returns for huge sums of money, and the price the North Koreans will demand from Japan for any further moves on the abductees issue, given that Japan stiffed the North Koreans in 2004 by both keeping its citizens and their loved ones and halting all moves toward normalization, the next round of action, which will be a last one since freedom of travel for Yokota Megumi's daughter Kim Eun Gyong is the only card the North Koreans have left, will likely come at a price which will give the rest of the world, particularly Japan's ally the United States -- which has just hit another wall as regards to one of its own citizens held in the DPRK (Link) -- serious heartburn.
At which point having annoyed the rest of the world to tears over the abductees will reveal itself as a brilliant strategy rather than an obtuse surrender to trivial domestic political pressures. The rest of the world might gag at Japan's paying off the indefensible DPRK regime in return for what will seem truly risible humanitarian gestures. However, if whatever Pyongyang coughs up gets the Japanese government to shut up once and for all about the abductee issue, the sighs of relief in diplomatic circles will be embarrassingly audible.
--
Nota bene - Normally I would not link to Karajan. But for a performance featuring Price, Pavarotti and Ghiurov, I will make an exception.
I have, however, been thinking about Japan's policy moves as regards the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.
Japanese government mewling about the fate of those abducted by the DPRK in the 1970s and 80s is probably one of the most frustrating and annoying diplomatic shows on Earth, at least among those put on by the diplomatic corps of the advanced industrialized countries. Japan's representatives performed a lacrimosa on behalf of the abductees and their families yet again this week -- with the twist being that this time it was to an international panel responsible for actually listening to the stories. (Link and Link)
Japan's official obsession with the abductees, rather than generating sympathy, likely has turned opinion against Japan on the issue. The world's diplomats and employees of international organizations must dread Japanese presentations, as morose tales and demands for resolution of the abductees issue clog the agendas and fritter away precious time at every international gathering.
Then again, being annoying might be the whole point of the exercise. Given the way the DPRK regimes operates, which is to give crumbs in returns for huge sums of money, and the price the North Koreans will demand from Japan for any further moves on the abductees issue, given that Japan stiffed the North Koreans in 2004 by both keeping its citizens and their loved ones and halting all moves toward normalization, the next round of action, which will be a last one since freedom of travel for Yokota Megumi's daughter Kim Eun Gyong is the only card the North Koreans have left, will likely come at a price which will give the rest of the world, particularly Japan's ally the United States -- which has just hit another wall as regards to one of its own citizens held in the DPRK (Link) -- serious heartburn.
At which point having annoyed the rest of the world to tears over the abductees will reveal itself as a brilliant strategy rather than an obtuse surrender to trivial domestic political pressures. The rest of the world might gag at Japan's paying off the indefensible DPRK regime in return for what will seem truly risible humanitarian gestures. However, if whatever Pyongyang coughs up gets the Japanese government to shut up once and for all about the abductee issue, the sighs of relief in diplomatic circles will be embarrassingly audible.
--
Nota bene - Normally I would not link to Karajan. But for a performance featuring Price, Pavarotti and Ghiurov, I will make an exception.
Saturday, July 27, 2013
Nut, Meet Bags

Over at the East Asia Forum, Professor Daiki Shibuichi introduces the Zaitokukai, the xenophobic haters who have been harassing Korean enclaves within the major cities, including the students and teachers at the North Korean schools (Link) These Web-enabled and organized miscreant losers are a brand new phenomenon, unpredictable and dangerous due to their lack of links to organized crime and/or politicians.
Whilst on the subject of depressing facts regarding xenophobia, Shinpu Party leader Suzuki Nobuyuki, whose rancid and somehow entirely legal campaign posters called for the expulsion of Koreans from Japan, received 74,465 votes in last Sunday's House of Councillors election for the Tokyo District -- more than even the Green Breeze party's candidate (Link - J). The concept that 1.4% of voting age adults in Tokyo would be willing to vote for a person declaring open war upon residents of Korean ancestry has still failed to find its place inside my head.
Labels:
DPRK,
Japan-South Korea relations,
July 2013 elections,
TMD,
xenophobia
Friday, May 17, 2013
Is Today The Day For The DPRK?

Yesterday Abe Shinzo envoy and symbol manipulator extraordinaire Iijima Isao (the bald gentleman above) met with President of the Presidium of the Supreme People's Assembly Kim Yong-nam (the other...errr...gentleman above).
Now it is true that the government of North Korea could just be trotting out its #2 leader for a meeting that goes nowhere, releasing footage of Iijima and Kim in The Big Chairs in front of The Big Painting only to metaphorically pull the chair out from under Iijima-san's massive posterior, humiliating both him and his prime minister.
However, does one need the #2 in the leadership to take time out of his busy schedule of evildoing in order to humiliate Iijima, whose formal title is the decidedly modest one of Special Advisor to the Cabinet (naikaku kambo sanyo)? Would not ordering a driver to take Iijima all around greater Pyongyang, permitting him meet no one of consequence, have done the trick? Yes, some commentators have suggested that the meetings Iijima has had with top government officials are designed to make South Korean and U.S. officials worried that Japan is about to cut a deal undermining ongoing denuclearization and military pull back efforts. (Link)
But a breakthrough, even a lousy one, should be welcomed, right?
As I noted earlier, the complete lack of coordination between the Government of Japan and the governments of the United States, South Korea and seemingly China...and the only-Abe-could-get-away-with-this keeping in the dark of the families of the abducted are indicators that Abe has something in the works similar to, if not commensurate with, the Nixon Shock (Nikuson shokku).
If Iijima has secured a deal in Pyongyang regarding a resolution of the abductees issue then that deal could be put to the Cabinet for Cabinet Decision (kakugi kettei) during the its regularly scheduled meeting today (Friday). Prime Minister Abe could then call a special press conference starting at, if experience is any guide, 18:00 local time.
We shall see.
Image courtesy: Sankei News
Labels:
abduction issue,
Abe Cabinet,
Abe Shinzo,
Cabinet decision,
DPRK,
Iijima Isao
Wednesday, May 15, 2013
A Comment On The Number Of Permanent Residents
Found a mistake in Yuka Hayashi's report on the xenophobes making life miserable for the residents of Shin-Okubo:
In 2011, which is the most recent year for which there are comprehensive figures, Japan had 2,078,508 non-Japanese residents. Of these, 987,525 had permanent residence status. Of these, 598,440 were "permanent residents" and another 389,085 were "special permanent residents."
Of the "permanent residents" 60,262 were citizens of either the Republic of Korea or the Democratic Republic of Korea. Of the "special permanent residents" 385,232 were either ROK or DPRK passport holders.
So it is not true that ethnic Koreans "make up 99% of foreign permanent residents in Japan."
What is true is that 99% of the holders of special permanent resident status are ethnic Koreans -- many of whom cannot speak Korean and who lost their Japanese citizenship in 1945 or are the children or grandchildren or great-grand children of such persons.
But then, being an ethnic Korean who lost Japanese citizenship or whose ancestors lost their Japanese citizenship is ostensibly what "special permanent resident" status means.
The total number of Koreans (ROK+DPRK) of all statuses living in Japan in 2011 was 545,401. This puts Koreans in second place among nationalities, below the Chinese at 674,879 and way ahead of the Brazilians at 210,032 (who themselves just barely pipped the Filipinos, who numbered 209,376 in 2011 and who likely have since passed the Brazilians to take over the #3 spot).
I suspect that an editor's zeal was involved in the error.
Then again, if not for the error, I would not have looked up the official figures. And I would have remained ignorant as to the most recent statistics on foreign residents.
So it is all to the good.
Anti-Korean Voices Grow in Japan(Link)
The Wall Street Journal
As Japanese nationalism is fueled by friction with neighbors over territories and World War II legacy issues, hostile demonstrations against the country's Korean residents are gathering steam, raising concerns among political leaders and setting off soul-searching among Japan's largely homogeneous population.
While attendance at the rallies is small and such extreme actions are far from entering the mainstream of Japanese politics, the demonstrations of nationalist activists using hate speech and intimidation have grown in size and frequency in recent months. One target has been the central Tokyo neighborhood of Shin-Okubo, known for Korean restaurants and shops selling South Korean pop-culture goods. Starting in February, groups of 200 or so demonstrators have descended on its busy weekend streets, waving Japanese flags and carrying signs that read "Roaches" and "Go Back to Korea." They shouted in unison: "Let's Kill Koreans," language that passersby told local television they found shocking.
[snip]
Many of the virulent rallies are organized by a conservative group called Zaitokukai and organizations that are sympathetic to it. The group was formed in 2006 to protest against "special privileges," such as welfare payments, that it says are abused by ethnic Koreans, who make up 99% of foreign permanent residents in Japan. Its membership has grown to 13,000 from 10,000 two years ago, according to its website. Unlike Japan's traditional right-wing organizations that have gathered members through grass-root groups, Zaitokukai relies on the Internet to attract members. Videos of its rallies and speeches are made available on YouTube and used as a recruitment tool...
In 2011, which is the most recent year for which there are comprehensive figures, Japan had 2,078,508 non-Japanese residents. Of these, 987,525 had permanent residence status. Of these, 598,440 were "permanent residents" and another 389,085 were "special permanent residents."
Of the "permanent residents" 60,262 were citizens of either the Republic of Korea or the Democratic Republic of Korea. Of the "special permanent residents" 385,232 were either ROK or DPRK passport holders.
So it is not true that ethnic Koreans "make up 99% of foreign permanent residents in Japan."
What is true is that 99% of the holders of special permanent resident status are ethnic Koreans -- many of whom cannot speak Korean and who lost their Japanese citizenship in 1945 or are the children or grandchildren or great-grand children of such persons.
But then, being an ethnic Korean who lost Japanese citizenship or whose ancestors lost their Japanese citizenship is ostensibly what "special permanent resident" status means.
The total number of Koreans (ROK+DPRK) of all statuses living in Japan in 2011 was 545,401. This puts Koreans in second place among nationalities, below the Chinese at 674,879 and way ahead of the Brazilians at 210,032 (who themselves just barely pipped the Filipinos, who numbered 209,376 in 2011 and who likely have since passed the Brazilians to take over the #3 spot).
I suspect that an editor's zeal was involved in the error.
Then again, if not for the error, I would not have looked up the official figures. And I would have remained ignorant as to the most recent statistics on foreign residents.
So it is all to the good.
Non Verbal In Pyongyang
Iijima Isao, Koizumi Jun'ichiro's public relations wizard brought back into the Prime Minister's Residence by a suitably chastened Abe Shinzo, whose previous turn as Prime Minister shuddered from one P.R. disaster to the next, arrived in Pyongyang, luggage in hand (a kahuna who carries his own bags, wonderful!) for a big time official meeting with North Korean officials.
How do we know that this is a big time official visit?
Look at the lapel.

Iijima has his Prime Minister's Residence service badge on.
Oh, Iijima could have forgotten to take the badge off before leaving the plane. However, such an oversight is unlikely, given that the symbolism master was traveling to Pyongyang -- where the lapel badge is EVERYTHING.
An aside, but for a bald, fat dude, Iijima rocks the two-toned dress shirt look.
In all seriousness, Prime Minister Abe Shinzo spent a significant chunk of time during his exceedingly brief Diet Policy Speech promising a resolution of the North Korean abductees issue. With Iijima on the case in and heads rolling in Pyongyang, perhaps Abe was not, as I assumed at the time of the policy speech, just blowing smoke about a resolution of the abduction conundrum.
Prepare to be surprised. Nay, astonished.
Later - An earlier version of this post was published without the photo image. Apologies.
Screen grab courtesy: NHK
How do we know that this is a big time official visit?
Look at the lapel.

Iijima has his Prime Minister's Residence service badge on.
Oh, Iijima could have forgotten to take the badge off before leaving the plane. However, such an oversight is unlikely, given that the symbolism master was traveling to Pyongyang -- where the lapel badge is EVERYTHING.
An aside, but for a bald, fat dude, Iijima rocks the two-toned dress shirt look.
In all seriousness, Prime Minister Abe Shinzo spent a significant chunk of time during his exceedingly brief Diet Policy Speech promising a resolution of the North Korean abductees issue. With Iijima on the case in and heads rolling in Pyongyang, perhaps Abe was not, as I assumed at the time of the policy speech, just blowing smoke about a resolution of the abduction conundrum.
Prepare to be surprised. Nay, astonished.
Later - An earlier version of this post was published without the photo image. Apologies.
Screen grab courtesy: NHK
Labels:
abduction issue,
Abe Cabinet,
Abe Shinzo,
DPRK,
Iijima Isao,
Koizumi Jun'ichiro
Wednesday, April 10, 2013
Another North Korean Success Story
It is difficult to see what, if any, successes North Korea can secure out of its current course of actions. The unilateral withdrawal from the armistice, the positioning of large missiles mounted on mobile launchers, declaration of U.S. targets and targets around the Pacific, and the closure of Kaesong all seem to injure the North’s negotiating position.
Let us assume, therefore, that a Musudan rocket/missile firing, or a double shot, is not being prepared with the intent to eke some advantage out of successful test launches. Let us assume instead that the primary goal is failure – that the DPRK government or some part of it wants the U.S. and its allies to shoot the Musudans down.
What would be the ideal scenario, for all the interested parties?
At some point just around 10:00 a.m. a Musudan missile is fired from a location on North Korea's west coast. Assuming the missile flies – which is a question (Link) -- it climbs up into the sky and veers south-southeast.
The U.S. government is momentarily stunned by the launch, the known missile having being spotted on North Korea’s east coast. Given the prior North Korean threats of attacks on Okinawa and Guam and the surprise of a west coast launch, the order is given for a shoot down. By previous agreement, a U.S. Arleigh Burke class missile destroyer, with a Japanese Kongo class destroyer providing assistance, takes the first shot with its SM-3 missiles.
The North Korean missile is intercepted and falls in pieces over the East China Sea and Eastern Pacific.
The national security councils of affected nations are assembled. In Tokyo, the Cabinet is convened (luckily it was a Tuesday/Friday morning).
From Pyongyang – silence.
An hour and 15 minutes later, a second Musudan, the known one on North Korea's east coast, launches, with a course nearly due east. With missile's course taking it over Honshu and in the direction of the United States, the conditions are met for a Japanese shoot down. The Kirishima, a Kongo-class destroyer, in cooperation with a U.S. destroyer, fires an SM-3.
The intercept is again successful with the pieces of this second missile falling into the North Pacific.
Now it is the allies turn to fall silent, as they wait, on hair trigger, for what the North Koreans do next.
What the North Koreans do next is…nothing. Instead, inside Pyongyang, all hell is breaking loose, with the various ministries, offices and commands all yelling at each other, urging to further escalate, to pull back, to sue for peace, to demand total war, to flee to shelters…setting the stage for the young prince, wise beyond his years, to declare the prevailing war policy laudable in spirit but misguided and insufficient in practice – requiring a new way of thinking and acting.
Let us assume, therefore, that a Musudan rocket/missile firing, or a double shot, is not being prepared with the intent to eke some advantage out of successful test launches. Let us assume instead that the primary goal is failure – that the DPRK government or some part of it wants the U.S. and its allies to shoot the Musudans down.
What would be the ideal scenario, for all the interested parties?
At some point just around 10:00 a.m. a Musudan missile is fired from a location on North Korea's west coast. Assuming the missile flies – which is a question (Link) -- it climbs up into the sky and veers south-southeast.
The U.S. government is momentarily stunned by the launch, the known missile having being spotted on North Korea’s east coast. Given the prior North Korean threats of attacks on Okinawa and Guam and the surprise of a west coast launch, the order is given for a shoot down. By previous agreement, a U.S. Arleigh Burke class missile destroyer, with a Japanese Kongo class destroyer providing assistance, takes the first shot with its SM-3 missiles.
The North Korean missile is intercepted and falls in pieces over the East China Sea and Eastern Pacific.
The national security councils of affected nations are assembled. In Tokyo, the Cabinet is convened (luckily it was a Tuesday/Friday morning).
From Pyongyang – silence.
An hour and 15 minutes later, a second Musudan, the known one on North Korea's east coast, launches, with a course nearly due east. With missile's course taking it over Honshu and in the direction of the United States, the conditions are met for a Japanese shoot down. The Kirishima, a Kongo-class destroyer, in cooperation with a U.S. destroyer, fires an SM-3.
The intercept is again successful with the pieces of this second missile falling into the North Pacific.
Now it is the allies turn to fall silent, as they wait, on hair trigger, for what the North Koreans do next.
What the North Koreans do next is…nothing. Instead, inside Pyongyang, all hell is breaking loose, with the various ministries, offices and commands all yelling at each other, urging to further escalate, to pull back, to sue for peace, to demand total war, to flee to shelters…setting the stage for the young prince, wise beyond his years, to declare the prevailing war policy laudable in spirit but misguided and insufficient in practice – requiring a new way of thinking and acting.
Sunday, March 31, 2013
B2 Or Not B2
The United States practice bombing runs by a pair of B-2 Spirit stealth bombers (Link) have sent the rhetoric of the government of the Democratic Republic of Korea soaring into the stratosphere (Link). If the U.S. government goal had been a warning to the DPRK government to calm down or else, sending the B-2s on their expensive (Link) and roundabout training flights was a big flop.
However, as Max Fisher, blogging at the Washington post suggests, the flight by the B-2s most likely had the simultaneous purpose of demonstrating to South Korea the reliability of U.S. extended nuclear deterrence. (Link)
There has been a lot of talk in South Korea of late regarding the desirability of restarting a program toward an independent nuclear deterrent (Link), talk that the U.S. government would prefer to be too wacky for polite society in the best of times.
These are not the best of times -- and not just because the Kim regime in Pyongyang is going through a prolonged period of internal strife due to a premature transition of power.
The U.S. and South Korea are trying to nail down a renewal of the “123 agreement” on U.S. nuclear power generation technology. Without a 123 agreement South will find itself in a tough spot as regards its ambitious civilian nuclear power program. (Link)
What is holding up the agreement's renewal is the South Korean government insistence that South Korea have the right to use the U.S. technology it has licensed to reprocess its spent nuclear fuel and enrich uranium.
South Korea has 23 operating reactors and 4 more under construction (Link). It has another 7 nuclear power stations on the drawing board. Long term storage of spent fuel is a critical problem, as it is in Japan.
South Korea corporations also want to construct nuclear power stations in third countries. Having U.S. permission to enrich uranium -- another pathway to nuclear weapons status – would enable South Korean bids to be one of a full nuclear power package, rather than just a building with no fuel in it. (Link)
It must be galling for the South Korean government officials and possibly the public at large to know that their country, a staunch U.S. military ally, has been denied the use of U.S. technology for reprocessing and enrichment, when an ambiguous ally like Japan and non-allies like India are allowed them, with the international community clapping (unhappily, most of the time) at the scene.
The Obama Administration is highly reticent to approve either reprocessing or enrichment in the new 123 agreement. It has very little to show for its supposed rock hard commitment (Hello, Nobel Prize Committee!) to global nuclear disarmament. Permitting South Korean reprocessing and/or enrichment would seem like the utmost hypocrisy.
(Which is why it is not surprising that U.S. Republicans and U.S. Republicans-associated think tanks would be tilting in favor of a U.S.-South Korea agreement allowing reprocessing and enrichment.)
Sending the B-2s would be a decent preamble for a U.S. announcement that the new 123 agreement will not allow South Korean reprocessing or enrichment. The message to South Korea would be long but simple: "Look, you are doing fine in terms of access to fuel, you have sold reactors overseas without fuel enrichment, reprocessing spent nuclear fuel for civilian use is a hopeless nightmare (Link) and there is no doubting our extended nuclear deterrent. So what do you need?"
The B-2 flights have an ancillary benefit, of course, of reinforcing the U.S. extended deterrent promised to other non-NATO allies – most particularly in this instance, Japan. Seeking reassurance of the U.S. capability to deliver nuclear weapons in way that does not light up Russian and Chinese early warning radars – the problem with a strategic-missiles-only-deterrent-for-East-Asia-allies -- has led Japanese officials to take trips down some back alleys they later had to recant in convoluted fashion.
So the B-2 flights are not as stupid as they seem – and given the boost they have provided to the DPRK government's already histrionic war paranoia, they sure do seem stupid. The flights have provided a new, truly threatening subject for DPRK propagandists to harp on. They have also transmitted to the governments of South Korea and Japan messages those two governments probably needed to hear.
Tips of the hat to Our Man in Abiko and Robert Koehler for directions.
However, as Max Fisher, blogging at the Washington post suggests, the flight by the B-2s most likely had the simultaneous purpose of demonstrating to South Korea the reliability of U.S. extended nuclear deterrence. (Link)
There has been a lot of talk in South Korea of late regarding the desirability of restarting a program toward an independent nuclear deterrent (Link), talk that the U.S. government would prefer to be too wacky for polite society in the best of times.
These are not the best of times -- and not just because the Kim regime in Pyongyang is going through a prolonged period of internal strife due to a premature transition of power.
The U.S. and South Korea are trying to nail down a renewal of the “123 agreement” on U.S. nuclear power generation technology. Without a 123 agreement South will find itself in a tough spot as regards its ambitious civilian nuclear power program. (Link)
What is holding up the agreement's renewal is the South Korean government insistence that South Korea have the right to use the U.S. technology it has licensed to reprocess its spent nuclear fuel and enrich uranium.
South Korea has 23 operating reactors and 4 more under construction (Link). It has another 7 nuclear power stations on the drawing board. Long term storage of spent fuel is a critical problem, as it is in Japan.
South Korea corporations also want to construct nuclear power stations in third countries. Having U.S. permission to enrich uranium -- another pathway to nuclear weapons status – would enable South Korean bids to be one of a full nuclear power package, rather than just a building with no fuel in it. (Link)
It must be galling for the South Korean government officials and possibly the public at large to know that their country, a staunch U.S. military ally, has been denied the use of U.S. technology for reprocessing and enrichment, when an ambiguous ally like Japan and non-allies like India are allowed them, with the international community clapping (unhappily, most of the time) at the scene.
The Obama Administration is highly reticent to approve either reprocessing or enrichment in the new 123 agreement. It has very little to show for its supposed rock hard commitment (Hello, Nobel Prize Committee!) to global nuclear disarmament. Permitting South Korean reprocessing and/or enrichment would seem like the utmost hypocrisy.
(Which is why it is not surprising that U.S. Republicans and U.S. Republicans-associated think tanks would be tilting in favor of a U.S.-South Korea agreement allowing reprocessing and enrichment.)
Sending the B-2s would be a decent preamble for a U.S. announcement that the new 123 agreement will not allow South Korean reprocessing or enrichment. The message to South Korea would be long but simple: "Look, you are doing fine in terms of access to fuel, you have sold reactors overseas without fuel enrichment, reprocessing spent nuclear fuel for civilian use is a hopeless nightmare (Link) and there is no doubting our extended nuclear deterrent. So what do you need?"
The B-2 flights have an ancillary benefit, of course, of reinforcing the U.S. extended deterrent promised to other non-NATO allies – most particularly in this instance, Japan. Seeking reassurance of the U.S. capability to deliver nuclear weapons in way that does not light up Russian and Chinese early warning radars – the problem with a strategic-missiles-only-deterrent-for-East-Asia-allies -- has led Japanese officials to take trips down some back alleys they later had to recant in convoluted fashion.
So the B-2 flights are not as stupid as they seem – and given the boost they have provided to the DPRK government's already histrionic war paranoia, they sure do seem stupid. The flights have provided a new, truly threatening subject for DPRK propagandists to harp on. They have also transmitted to the governments of South Korea and Japan messages those two governments probably needed to hear.
Tips of the hat to Our Man in Abiko and Robert Koehler for directions.
Wednesday, March 27, 2013
Two Can Play At This Game
Chosen Soren, the General Association of Korean Residents in Japan, the de facto embassy of North Korea in Japan, had its headquarters seized by the government last year. The court-ordered seizure represented what was nominally an attempt to wrench out of the organization, which at its height controlled 38 banks and credit unions, the public funds used to bail out these financial institutions after they went belly up post-Bubble.
The actual goal, and it is not an ignoble one, was to bankrupt, defenestrate and extirpate Chosen Soren. Like the national government it unofficially represents, Chosen Soren is a front for an extortion racket, prying donations out of the hands of North Korean residents of Japan in return for DPRK regime promises to spare the lives and livelihoods of relatives still stuck inside North Korea.
Bidding on the building and the attached land, situated north of the Imperial Palace in Chiyoda Ward, began on March 13, with Chosen Soren banned from participating in the auction. (Link)
That's the way to drive an evil organization out of the nation's heart!
Not exactly.
The winning bidder in the Chosen Soren headquarters auction? The Shingon School Buddhist, Kagoshima-based temple Saifuku-ji, a religious corporation boasting not just a national congregation, not just a website, not just ties to celebrities (including, according the organization, Nagashima "Mr. Giants" Shigeo and former prime minister Koizumi Jun'ichiro) not just a fabulous YouTube intro video (Link - J) but its own YouTube channel.
Journalists caught up with Saifuku-ji abbot Ikeguchi Eikan yesterday at a branch temple on Ennoshima, in Kanagawa Prefecture.
Surprise, surprise: Ikeguchi is a Pyongyang frequent flyer, with close ties to the ruling Kim regime. (Link - J)
Asked about his organization's plans for the decrepit and quake-damaged structure, Ikeguchi improbably declared the building will be used as a religious training center and, more cryptically, as a center for "ethnic reconciliation" (minzoku yuwa).
Asked to elaborate, the abbot said that the central committee of the North Korean Worker's Party had told him it was willing to use the building as is. He said he was open to the idea of renting out the building to Chosen Soren... (Link - J)
Nice work at covering all the bases, Government of Japan.
Later - For fun, put "在日本朝鮮人総連合会中央本部" into the Google Maps search window and drop down into Google Street View to see the police guard with barricade and the armored police bus parked across the street from the building.
The actual goal, and it is not an ignoble one, was to bankrupt, defenestrate and extirpate Chosen Soren. Like the national government it unofficially represents, Chosen Soren is a front for an extortion racket, prying donations out of the hands of North Korean residents of Japan in return for DPRK regime promises to spare the lives and livelihoods of relatives still stuck inside North Korea.
Bidding on the building and the attached land, situated north of the Imperial Palace in Chiyoda Ward, began on March 13, with Chosen Soren banned from participating in the auction. (Link)
That's the way to drive an evil organization out of the nation's heart!
Not exactly.
The winning bidder in the Chosen Soren headquarters auction? The Shingon School Buddhist, Kagoshima-based temple Saifuku-ji, a religious corporation boasting not just a national congregation, not just a website, not just ties to celebrities (including, according the organization, Nagashima "Mr. Giants" Shigeo and former prime minister Koizumi Jun'ichiro) not just a fabulous YouTube intro video (Link - J) but its own YouTube channel.
Journalists caught up with Saifuku-ji abbot Ikeguchi Eikan yesterday at a branch temple on Ennoshima, in Kanagawa Prefecture.
Surprise, surprise: Ikeguchi is a Pyongyang frequent flyer, with close ties to the ruling Kim regime. (Link - J)
Asked about his organization's plans for the decrepit and quake-damaged structure, Ikeguchi improbably declared the building will be used as a religious training center and, more cryptically, as a center for "ethnic reconciliation" (minzoku yuwa).
Asked to elaborate, the abbot said that the central committee of the North Korean Worker's Party had told him it was willing to use the building as is. He said he was open to the idea of renting out the building to Chosen Soren... (Link - J)
Nice work at covering all the bases, Government of Japan.
Later - For fun, put "在日本朝鮮人総連合会中央本部" into the Google Maps search window and drop down into Google Street View to see the police guard with barricade and the armored police bus parked across the street from the building.
Friday, March 08, 2013
Please Everyone Just Calm Down
On March 5, in anticipation of the United Nations Security Council approving a new round of economic sanctions on the already sanction-blessed Democratic People's Republic of Korea, the Korean People's Army released a statement on its plans for meeting the UN's challenge.
Since the Korea Central News Agency presents information in a fashion that does not allow linking, I present the KPA statement here in all its superheated glory:
Question: is there anything so terribly striking, new or frightening about the March 5 statement and its follow up statements?
Here are some of the purportedly torrid lines from the statement and my take on them:
It might just as just likely be an admission that the leadership itself does not know when the next violation of the Armistice Agreement will take place. By announcing a violation in advance it can take credit for whatever unapproved incident that occurs (note to local commanders: you will not get the credit for your show of initiative).
OK, so the Kim regime and the KPA are angry at the world for being angry at them for their pursuit of a credible nuclear threat that they can then wave at the United States.
Considering that the DPRK's guarantor of extended deterrence is China, can one blame the members of the DPRK ruling regime for pursuing an independent deterrent? Given the weakness of the Chinese nuclear response guarantee, is not the current pace of the DPRK's nuclear and rocketry development programs rather desultory?
(Poverty promotes lassitude, folks.)
As for the the DPRK, running as it is looking over its shoulder at the dust broom of history, let us be real: right now is a lousy time to be an anti-capitalist, anti-American dictator -- and an even worse time to be the anti-capitalist, anti-american dictator's default candy store.
El Commandante has just checked out. The Colonel met death in a culvert; the Al-Tikrit Gang have met the rope. Assad Family Syria (the only one of North Korea's customers to shell out for a nuclear reactor) is teetering on the brink. Myanmar seems to have lost the tyranny script entirely.
Authoritarianism and lawlessness both look like they are in for the long haul. Dictatorship...looks ever so 20th century.
With its twin to the south going from strength to strength and its best customers going belly up, can we just keep calm at DPRK Incorporated's desperate releases of implausible declarations that
a) things are going great, and
b) they are only getting better?
Of late, we have been hearing a lot from the Eastern Seaboard of the United States about Japan and China having a need to cool it over the Senkakus. (Link)
Sound advice.
Can those keeping a careful eye on the pathetic, dysfunctional irritant that is North Korea "cool it" too?
Since the Korea Central News Agency presents information in a fashion that does not allow linking, I present the KPA statement here in all its superheated glory:
On Dec. 12 last year the DPRK legitimately and successfully launched a satellite for peaceful purposes, ensuring international transparency, going beyond practice, and choosing a comparatively mild situation for it.The issuance of this statement has led to demands from U.S. (Link), South Korean (Link) and Japanese (Link - J) quarters for a more severe international response.
Seizing the DPRK's satellite launch as an occasion for stifling it from the outset, the U.S. and its allies deliberately negated the DPRK's sovereignty over its satellite launch. They finally prodded the UN Security Council into adopting a "resolution on sanctions" before opting for high-handed hostile acts against the DPRK.
These hostile acts are still going on.
Under this situation the DPRK was compelled to take practical counteractions to defend the security and sovereignty of the country. On Feb. 12 it admirably and successfully conducted the third underground nuclear test for self-defence at the highest level as part of those counteractions.
However, the U.S. imperialists and their allied forces including south Korea are making more persistent and desperate efforts to slap new tougher "sanctions" against the DPRK, far from drawing a due lesson.
Not content with this, they kicked off again the Key Resolve and Foal Eagle joint military exercises to stifle the DPRK by force of arms by mobilizing huge armed forces of aggression. They will reportedly last for two months from March 1.
Unlike last year the current joint military exercises will be participated in by super-large nuclear-powered carrier task force carrying at least 100 nuclear warheads, B-52H strategic bombers and other means of the U.S. imperialist aggression forces for making ground, sea and air nuclear strikes and its allied forces including south Korea, U.K. and Australia.
From this point of view, the exercises cannot be construed otherwise than the most dangerous nuclear war maneuvers targeted against the DPRK and the most undisguised military provocation to be made by a group of all hues of hostile forces.
This serious situation clearly indicates that the actions of the U.S., south Korea and other hostile forces to infringe upon the sovereignty of the DPRK are now leading to a military offensive for aggression, going beyond the level of outrageous economic "sanctions."
In view of the prevailing situation, the Supreme Command of the KPA which is responsible for the national defence and security of the country and the destiny of the nation sent a meaningful warning message to the U.S. imperialist aggressor forces through the KPA Panmunjom mission on February 23. It warned them that if they ignite a war of aggression in the end, from that moment their fate will be hung by a thread with every hour.
But, the joint military exercises have persisted and the U.S. and the south Korean puppet forces have become all the more undisguised in their base moves to kick up their "sanctions."
Looking back on history, the Korean people have neither shot even a single arrow nor thrown a single stone at the land of the U.S.
The U.S. is, however, working with bloodshot eyes to swallow up the DPRK, not content with having incurred the pent-up grudge of the Korean people which can never be settled.
What matters is that the south Korean puppet forces steeped in worship and sycophancy toward the U.S. are dancing to its tune.
Of late Kim Kwan Jin, puppet minister of Defense, and Jong Sung Jo, chairman of the joint chiefs of staff, inspected frontline army corps, fleet command and guided missile units where they blustered that a sort of military provocation is expected from the north and cried out for making "deadly strikes" and "preemptive strikes" at the "bases for provocations."
As far as these guys are concerned, they are a group of traitors who pushed the inter-Korean relations to a collapse together with traitor Lee Myung Bak who knows nothing about politics and military affairs. They are military gangsters who go reckless, unaware of what their master U.S. has in mind, what is the intention of the neighbouring countries and what all fellow countrymen and nation desire.
The puppet authorities, too, are crying out for the dismantlement of nukes and halt to provocation as dictated by their master, without knowing what is precious wealth for the nation. They move like a robot and repeat anything like a parrot.
The sovereignty and dignity of the nation are violated and the supreme interests of the country are seriously threatened by the U.S., the sworn enemy of the Korean people, and maniacs of confrontation with fellow countrymen grouping worst traitors. The army and people of the DPRK can never remain a passive onlooker to this fact.
The spokesman for the KPA Supreme Command is authorized to declare the following important measures:
First, it will take the second and third strong practical counteractions in succession to cope with the high-
handed war acts of the U.S. and all other hostile forces as it had already declared.
The army and people of the DPRK never make an empty talk.
It is the mettle of Songun Korea to do what it is determined to do.
It won victories in the two wars and has advanced along the road of victory despite manifold difficulties.
The army groups on the front, ground forces, the navy, air and anti-air units, strategic rocket units of the KPA, the Worker-Peasant Red Guards and the Young Red Guards have launched an all-out action according to the operational plan finally signed by the dear respected Supreme Commander Kim Jong Un.
Now that the U.S. imperialists seek to attack the DPRK even with nuclear weapons, it will counter them with diversified precision nuclear strike means of Korean style.
Those means are bound to be launched once their buttons are pressed, and the enemies' strongholds be turned into a sea in flames.
This land is neither the Balkans nor Iraq and Libya.
The army and people of the DPRK have everything including lighter and smaller nukes unlike what they had in the past.
Second, the KPA Supreme Command will make the Korean Armistice Agreement totally nullified.
The war maneuvers being staged by the U.S. imperialists and the south Korean puppet forces are a vivid expression of their systematic violation of the AA.
Accordingly, the Supreme Command of the KPA will completely declare invalid the AA, which has existed for form's sake from March 11, the day when the war maneuvers will enter into a full-dress stage.
The DPRK will make a strike of justice at any target anytime as it pleases without limit, not bound to the AA, and achieve the great cause of the country's reunification, the cherished desire of the nation.
Third, the KPA Supreme Command will totally stop the activities of the Panmunjom mission of the KPA which was tentatively established and operated by it as a negotiating body for establishing a peace-keeping mechanism on the Korean Peninsula.
In this regard it will simultaneously make a decision to cut off the Panmunjom DPRK-U.S. military telephone.
Our choice has become clear now that the moves of all hostile forces to encroach upon the sovereignty and dignity of the DPRK are reaching a dangerous phase.
It is the unshakable stand of the army and people of the DPRK and the mode of counteraction of Mt. Paektu style to counter enemies coming in attack with a dagger with a sword, a rifle with an artillery piece and nukes with precision nuclear strike means of Korean style more powerful than them.
The U.S. imperialists and their allies should not forget even a moment that they are standing at the crossroads of their life and death.
A final victory is in store for the army and people of the DPRK who are all out to protect its sovereignty.
Question: is there anything so terribly striking, new or frightening about the March 5 statement and its follow up statements?
Here are some of the purportedly torrid lines from the statement and my take on them:
"First, it will take the second and third strong practical counteractions in succession to cope with the high-handed war acts of the U.S. and all other hostile forces as it had already declared."This seems to be a declaration of at least two more tests will take place that the UN will not like, either of long-range rockets or nuclear devices, sometime in the current calendar year.
"The army and people of the DPRK never make an empty talk."This is an admission that the Kim regime and KPA have a credibility problem. If they did not have a habit of indulging in empty talk, they would be so determined to explain the seriousness of their threats.
"Now that the U.S. imperialists seek to attack the DPRK even with nuclear weapons, it will counter them with diversified precision nuclear strike means of Korean style."This seems to only reconfirming that the DPRK rocket and nuclear weapons development programs will not be abandoned or delayed, as "precision nuclear strike means of Korean style" seems to be DPRK-talk for a nuclear weapon-bearing intercontinental ballistic missile.
"This land is neither the Balkans nor Iraq and Libya."The Kim Dynasty and the KPA have learned lessons from those conflicts and will use all means possible in an attempt to thwart regime change. Duh.
"The army and people of the DPRK have everything including lighter and smaller nukes unlike what they had in the past."When the KPA is claiming to have these smaller nuclear warheads one should probably assume it in fact does not have them. It would, however, make sense to for the KPA to claim greater capabilities when it is trying to influence the contents of sanctions resolutions.
"Second, the KPA Supreme Command will make the Korean Armistice Agreement totally nullified.This could be a threat warning of an imminent incident.
The war maneuvers being staged by the U.S. imperialists and the south Korean puppet forces are a vivid expression of their systematic violation of the AA.
Accordingly, the Supreme Command of the KPA will completely declare invalid the AA, which has existed for form's sake from March 11, the day when the war maneuvers will enter into a full-dress stage.
The DPRK will make a strike of justice at any target anytime as it pleases without limit, not bound to the AA, and achieve the great cause of the country's reunification, the cherished desire of the nation."
It might just as just likely be an admission that the leadership itself does not know when the next violation of the Armistice Agreement will take place. By announcing a violation in advance it can take credit for whatever unapproved incident that occurs (note to local commanders: you will not get the credit for your show of initiative).
"It is the unshakable stand of the army and people of the DPRK and the mode of counteraction of Mt. Paektu style to counter enemies coming in attack with a dagger with a sword, a rifle with an artillery piece and nukes with precision nuclear strike means of Korean style more powerful than them."From the list of comparatives, one can assume that, as noted before, a "precision nuclear strike means of Korean style" is the current operating euphemism for a nuclear-tipped ICBM.
OK, so the Kim regime and the KPA are angry at the world for being angry at them for their pursuit of a credible nuclear threat that they can then wave at the United States.
Considering that the DPRK's guarantor of extended deterrence is China, can one blame the members of the DPRK ruling regime for pursuing an independent deterrent? Given the weakness of the Chinese nuclear response guarantee, is not the current pace of the DPRK's nuclear and rocketry development programs rather desultory?
(Poverty promotes lassitude, folks.)
As for the the DPRK, running as it is looking over its shoulder at the dust broom of history, let us be real: right now is a lousy time to be an anti-capitalist, anti-American dictator -- and an even worse time to be the anti-capitalist, anti-american dictator's default candy store.
El Commandante has just checked out. The Colonel met death in a culvert; the Al-Tikrit Gang have met the rope. Assad Family Syria (the only one of North Korea's customers to shell out for a nuclear reactor) is teetering on the brink. Myanmar seems to have lost the tyranny script entirely.
Authoritarianism and lawlessness both look like they are in for the long haul. Dictatorship...looks ever so 20th century.
With its twin to the south going from strength to strength and its best customers going belly up, can we just keep calm at DPRK Incorporated's desperate releases of implausible declarations that
a) things are going great, and
b) they are only getting better?
Of late, we have been hearing a lot from the Eastern Seaboard of the United States about Japan and China having a need to cool it over the Senkakus. (Link)
Sound advice.
Can those keeping a careful eye on the pathetic, dysfunctional irritant that is North Korea "cool it" too?
Saturday, February 16, 2013
More On The North Korean Nuclear Test
Pacific Forum CSIS has posted Muthiah Alagappa's February 13 essay "North Korean Nuclear Test: Implications for Asian Security" (Link). Over at the Foreign Affairs, Dr. Jennifer Lind, who made her reputation studying war apologies, joins with two arms experts to deliver a similar message -- that continuing to pursue CVID (complete, verifiable and irreversible dismantlement) of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea's nuclear program is a pipe dream, as the DPRK is hell bent on developing a nuclear deterrent. (Link)
I agree wholeheartedly with the above authors in calls for pragmatism. The North Koreans are not going to give up their nuclear and missile development programs no matter the incentives.
However, both essays are seriously flaws in their rage at arms control experts. Dr. Muthiah's rubbishing of the non-proliferation regime, its architects and its managers, is borderline deranged:
Not only will the acceptance of North Korea as a nuclear weapons state not disrupt the non-proliferation regime, but the non-proliferation regime has been ineffective, and it's unfair, but unfair is not all bad, and it's not Asia aware...whaaaaaat?
As for Dr. Lind's essay, she and her co-authors attack a straw man. None but a fool -- and the folks who tackle the proliferation of nuclear weapons and rocket systems are not fools -- would argue that the DPRK's nuclear test program is a bargaining chip. It is a complex knot of drives, aspirations and hard science -- immensely useful for the DPRK and immensely difficult to halt precisely because it is not just one thing.
Yes, arms control experts are annoying in their rectitude -- but it is because arms control experts have to be. They are trying to keep a lid on the most dangerous objects humankind has ever made.
I am still looking for the essay offering the synthesis -- one acknowledging that the DPRK's pursuit of a nuclear deterrent is intrinsic to geo-strategic and political situation of North Korea and insisting that non-proliferation and disarmament are fundamental to the human project.
Later - This post has been edited for clarity.
I agree wholeheartedly with the above authors in calls for pragmatism. The North Koreans are not going to give up their nuclear and missile development programs no matter the incentives.
However, both essays are seriously flaws in their rage at arms control experts. Dr. Muthiah's rubbishing of the non-proliferation regime, its architects and its managers, is borderline deranged:
Nonproliferation enthusiasts contend that accepting the DPRK as a nuclear weapon state would further undermine the NPT regime.This simplistic argument does not bear scrutiny. Throughout its history the NPT regime increased the cost and slowed the spread but did not prevent the acquisition of nuclear weapons by determined states. Further, there is no rationale for some states to have nuclear weapons and for others to be denied that capability. This is not to argue that “more is better” or that every state that desires it must be free to develop such capability. Those interested in preventing the spread of nuclear weapons must address the demand side of the equation (insecurity) and not just the supply side as is the case with the present NPT. Like all other armaments, nuclear weapons are symptomatic of insecurity not the cause of it.
Accepting reality of nuclear Asia
Contrary to conventional wisdom, nuclear weapons have increased security and stability in Asia though there are also dangers and insecurities that should be addressed. Rather than hide behind the NPT regime and persist with a failed approach, it is time to confront the reality that, broadly defined, Asia has seven of the nine nuclear-weapon states (US, Russia, China, India, Pakistan, Israel, and North Korea). A
determined Iran could well become the eighth nuclear weapon state in Asia and the tenth member of the world nuclear club. The Asian nuclear era is fundamentally different from that of the Cold War.
Not only will the acceptance of North Korea as a nuclear weapons state not disrupt the non-proliferation regime, but the non-proliferation regime has been ineffective, and it's unfair, but unfair is not all bad, and it's not Asia aware...whaaaaaat?
As for Dr. Lind's essay, she and her co-authors attack a straw man. None but a fool -- and the folks who tackle the proliferation of nuclear weapons and rocket systems are not fools -- would argue that the DPRK's nuclear test program is a bargaining chip. It is a complex knot of drives, aspirations and hard science -- immensely useful for the DPRK and immensely difficult to halt precisely because it is not just one thing.
Yes, arms control experts are annoying in their rectitude -- but it is because arms control experts have to be. They are trying to keep a lid on the most dangerous objects humankind has ever made.
I am still looking for the essay offering the synthesis -- one acknowledging that the DPRK's pursuit of a nuclear deterrent is intrinsic to geo-strategic and political situation of North Korea and insisting that non-proliferation and disarmament are fundamental to the human project.
Later - This post has been edited for clarity.
Friday, February 15, 2013
Holding The Line In North Korea
The Democratic People's Republic of Korea's detonation of a nuclear test device on Tuesday caught folks off guard. The test itself was, of course, not unexpected -- the preparations having been visible from space for weeks. Not inexplicable either was the timing of the test -- just hours before President Barack Obama's State of the Union Address, where an act of North Korean defiance would have maximum impact on the U.S. national conversation, and a safe few days before the anniversary of the birth of leader Kim Jong-un's father, Kim Jong-il (a.k.a., the Day of the Shining Star).
As for the detonation, my feelings are congratulatory -- as in "Congratulations, DPRK. You have replicated the technological sophistication of the United States of the late 1940s, at the cost of only the loss of membership in the family of humankind and most of the basic necessities of human life."
In order to keep a sense of proportion about the North Korean regime, one needs to adopt an attitude of sad resignation. Fearful of the outside world and of each other, the North Koreans pursue a weapons capability with the very reasonable goal of putting their enemies at a risk level equal to the one the DPRK faces. Of course, each step in the direction of such a capability boxes the leadership in more and more. Eventually the DPRK will produce, Amaterasu knows when, a nuclear-tipped long-range ballistic missile. What is certain is by that time they do they will be working on it by candlelight, chewing on leather for the flavor.
Japan and its U.S. ally are demanding a reversal of the programs building toward a North Korean nuclear-tipped ICBM. Given the fundamental insecurity of the DPRK regime, both on psychological and politico-economic grounds, such demands are ludicrous. The best anyone could hope for is a suspension of ongoing research & development -- and the only way that could happen would be if all in the United States collectively declared themselves utterly terrified by the awesome capabilities of the mighty and legitimate Kim regime.
Of course, for reasons of both politics and sanity, the United States cannot play the role of the elephant terrified of the mouse. Instead the U.S. plays the role of the exasperated adult, scolding the misbehaving child:
"...the Government of North Korea should abandon and dismantle its provocative ballistic missile and nuclear weapons programs, cease its proliferation activities, and come into immediate compliance with all United Nations Security Council resolutions and its commitments under the 2005 Joint Statement of the Six-Party Talks"Yes, the DRPK should do these things, in order that the world might be more convenient for a hyperpower with a short attention span. Funny thing, though, the leaders of the DPRK will not do what they should, and moreover would not be leaders for very long if they did.
My thinking on the need for greater realism as to North Korea's nuclear and missile programs is best reflected in the recent essay by Dr. Muthiah Alagappa, "North Korean Nuclear Test: Implications for Asian Security," published by PacNet (no URL for the essay yet - but the PacNetters assure me that there will be one soon). At the same time, I am sympathetic to the Nth country problem outlined by Dr. Jeffrey Lewis in his essay "Friends with Benefits" published by Foreign Policy last week (Link -- the South Koreans did what in 2000?!?). Indeed, I am on record at the same publication for concern pre-election about Japan's capacity to become a Nth nation, a view which earned me the scorn, probably deserved, of Dr. Michael Green. (Link)
And the above image? It is a shot through the glass at the Perry Hall in Kurihama (Link - J) of an 1854 woodcut showing a fearful and tear-stained Commodore Matthew C. Perry and his similarly awe-stricken and crying officers cringing in terror as they present a letter from U.S. king Millard Fillmore to the mighty magistrate (bugyo) of Uraga.
When it comes to surrealist, seemingly delusional misrepresentations of one's country's stature in international affairs (Link) pretty much everyone's been there, done that.
Just remember what happened to the bakufu that greenlighted the above representation of Japan's place in the world.
Tuesday, January 29, 2013
What Does Abe Know That We Do Not Know?
The most peculiar moment in the prime minister's policy speech yesterday?
The one that starts at the 16:22 mark of the exceedingly brief (18:55 - with applause) address, the text of which I repost and translate below. When watching the video (Link) pay close attention to what happens after Abe finishes his last sentence.
The abductees issue is Abe's signature issue -- the pole he has used to vault over his more experienced and politically savvy rivals in the party. The stick, if you will, that props him up.
One would have thought that the reactionary Friends of Shinzo, many of whom owe their seats and prominence to incessant thumping of rostrums about the abductees, would have prepared a coordinated explosion of applause and shouting at Abe's declaration of unwielding will.
One would have thought that...and been wrong.
I am not sure I understand the politics of including this paragraph in the speech, without support. The promises made are impossible to realize -- unless Abe knows something nobody else knows. Neither those in the chamber nor the public needed a reminder that Abe is Abductee Man.
So what was the point of making outlandish promises? To highlight the differences between his approach and the approaches of the last three Democratic Party of Japan prime ministers? When there cannot be any differences, either in approach or in outcomes?
The one that starts at the 16:22 mark of the exceedingly brief (18:55 - with applause) address, the text of which I repost and translate below. When watching the video (Link) pay close attention to what happens after Abe finishes his last sentence.
そして何よりも、拉致問題の解決です。全ての拉致被害者の御家族が御自身の手で肉親を抱きしめる日が訪れるまで、私の使命は終わりません。北朝鮮に「対話と圧力」の方針を貫き、全ての拉致被害者の安全確保及び即時帰国、拉致に関する真相究明、拉致実行犯の引渡しの三点に向けて、全力を尽くします。Notice the oddity? After Abe thunders out his determination, he is not greeted with a chorus of hooting or sustained applause. Just embarrassed-sounding shouts from a few members, quickly abandoned.
And then, more than anything, a resolution of the abductees problem. Until the day is upon us when all of the families of the abducted can hold their relations in their arms, my mission will not have ended. I will not swerve from the plan of employing "dialogue and pressure" upon the DPRK. I will exert every effort to meet the three goals of confirming the safety of and securing the immediate return of all of the abducted, clearing up the mystery surrounding the abductions and having those responsible for the abductions handed over to our custody.
The abductees issue is Abe's signature issue -- the pole he has used to vault over his more experienced and politically savvy rivals in the party. The stick, if you will, that props him up.
One would have thought that the reactionary Friends of Shinzo, many of whom owe their seats and prominence to incessant thumping of rostrums about the abductees, would have prepared a coordinated explosion of applause and shouting at Abe's declaration of unwielding will.
One would have thought that...and been wrong.
I am not sure I understand the politics of including this paragraph in the speech, without support. The promises made are impossible to realize -- unless Abe knows something nobody else knows. Neither those in the chamber nor the public needed a reminder that Abe is Abductee Man.
So what was the point of making outlandish promises? To highlight the differences between his approach and the approaches of the last three Democratic Party of Japan prime ministers? When there cannot be any differences, either in approach or in outcomes?
Thursday, December 13, 2012
Three Cheers For the North Koreans!
Sure that title will get me into trouble. But one has to cut through the harrumphing verbiage and look on the bright side:
- By firing off its rocket when the Chinese specifically told it not to the Kim regime has humilated the new Chinese leadership lineup. Suffice it to say that the Chinese government may not be too solicitous of the mewling of its cat's paw on the Korean peninsula.
- By successfully testing a multi-stage, long-range rocket, a prototype for a nuclear-tipped ICBM (if the North Koreans can develop a small enough nuclear warhead), the DPRK has put the United States in the same boat as its South Korean and Japanese allies.
North Korean artillery threatens South Korea with massive loss of life and destruction of its capital. North Korea's well-tested Nodong missiles threaten Japanese cities with similar damage. Now U.S. cities are targetable.
Until yesterday, there was ambiguity over whether or not basing large numbers of U.S. forces in the theater made tactical sense. Now it does not matter where U.S. East Asian rapid reaction forces are based: the DPRK can now hit them.
- By thumbing its nose at its ostensible master, the DPRK has exposed the fallacy of China's growing ability to cow countries in the region. If any regime should jump when Beijing says, "Jump!" it is neophyte Kim Jong-eun's.
This has been a lousy year for theCCP-enabling and ally-betraying Sino-centric world order crowd. The DPRK is disobedient; Myanmar has gone off its own sweet way; and Cambodia's clumsy service as China's lapdog has reminded ASEAN of its origins in fighting the influence of China in Southeast Asia.
Take that, Hugh White (Link) and the "over most of human history China has been a benign hegemon" flunkies!
So raise a glass (of orange juice) or a mug (of coffee) to the North Koreans today. The launch of their big birthday celebration rocket is a shot for liberty.
- By firing off its rocket when the Chinese specifically told it not to the Kim regime has humilated the new Chinese leadership lineup. Suffice it to say that the Chinese government may not be too solicitous of the mewling of its cat's paw on the Korean peninsula.
- By successfully testing a multi-stage, long-range rocket, a prototype for a nuclear-tipped ICBM (if the North Koreans can develop a small enough nuclear warhead), the DPRK has put the United States in the same boat as its South Korean and Japanese allies.
North Korean artillery threatens South Korea with massive loss of life and destruction of its capital. North Korea's well-tested Nodong missiles threaten Japanese cities with similar damage. Now U.S. cities are targetable.
Until yesterday, there was ambiguity over whether or not basing large numbers of U.S. forces in the theater made tactical sense. Now it does not matter where U.S. East Asian rapid reaction forces are based: the DPRK can now hit them.
- By thumbing its nose at its ostensible master, the DPRK has exposed the fallacy of China's growing ability to cow countries in the region. If any regime should jump when Beijing says, "Jump!" it is neophyte Kim Jong-eun's.
This has been a lousy year for the
Take that, Hugh White (Link) and the "over most of human history China has been a benign hegemon" flunkies!
So raise a glass (of orange juice) or a mug (of coffee) to the North Koreans today. The launch of their big birthday celebration rocket is a shot for liberty.
Labels:
China,
DPRK,
DPRK missile program,
fear of China,
rising China
Monday, December 10, 2012
China Acts Out Of Self-Interest
The news today has reports that the DPRK rocket test has been postponed (Link). This makes last week's hysterical full deployment of the Self Defense Forces anti-missile capacity (Link) a very nice, robust rehearsal for an actual crisis.
There were important technical arguments for the DPRK scientists not attempting to launch a large, liquid fuel rocket from an outdoor pad in mid-December.
It seems, however, that the DPRK's decision was political rather than technical. Consider this remarkable statement from the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs' December 6 press conference:
"We maintain that the DPRK has the sovereign right to shoot off rockets until, of course, it should ever try to exercise that right. As for you other participants in the Six-Party talks, you owe us for this, big time."
I hope that despite the election-enervated state of this blessed land, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs sends the Chinese Embassy a nice bouquet, a big box of Belgian chocolates or a culturally sensitive equivalent.
As for how this turn of developments will play out on the campaign trail, I do not think it likely that either Liberal Democratic Party president Abe Shinzo, Japan Restoration Association leader Ishihara Shintaro or Democratic Party of Japan leader Noda Yoshihiko will be yelling, "Hey! Thank you, China!" to the crowds.
I do not think the PRC government expects them to do so either.
A hat tip to Chris Nelson for pointing out the relevant passage in Hong Lei's press conference.
There were important technical arguments for the DPRK scientists not attempting to launch a large, liquid fuel rocket from an outdoor pad in mid-December.
It seems, however, that the DPRK's decision was political rather than technical. Consider this remarkable statement from the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs' December 6 press conference:
Q: The DPRK has completed the installation of its rocket and is likely to launch a satellite next week. What is China's comment?Translated into plain speech, that would come out:
A: The Chinese side has made clear its position several times on the DPRK's plan to launch a satellite. As a sovereign country, the DPRK has the right of peaceful use of the outer space. However, given the situation on the Korean Peninsula and the restrictions of relevant UN Security Council resolutions, the Chinese side hopes that the DPRK could act prudently with the larger interests of peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula in mind. We also hope that other parties to the Six-Party Talks can take a long-term and calm approach and avoid taking actions that may further escalate the situation.
(Link)
"We maintain that the DPRK has the sovereign right to shoot off rockets until, of course, it should ever try to exercise that right. As for you other participants in the Six-Party talks, you owe us for this, big time."
I hope that despite the election-enervated state of this blessed land, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs sends the Chinese Embassy a nice bouquet, a big box of Belgian chocolates or a culturally sensitive equivalent.
As for how this turn of developments will play out on the campaign trail, I do not think it likely that either Liberal Democratic Party president Abe Shinzo, Japan Restoration Association leader Ishihara Shintaro or Democratic Party of Japan leader Noda Yoshihiko will be yelling, "Hey! Thank you, China!" to the crowds.
I do not think the PRC government expects them to do so either.
A hat tip to Chris Nelson for pointing out the relevant passage in Hong Lei's press conference.
Thursday, December 06, 2012
Japan's Anti-Missile Defenses -- Where They Are
To intercept an off course DPRK rocket-that-is-actually-a-long-range-ballistic-missile™ (roketto jijitsujo no chokyori dando misairu) or the an off-course jettisoned first stage of said rocket-that-is-actually-a-long-range-ballistic-missile™:
Patriot PAC-3 Missile Batteries
Protecting the Capital Area = 3
1) Ichigaya, Tokyo Metropolitan District
Grounds of the Ministry of Defense
2) Asaka City, Saitama Prefecture
GSDF Camp Asaka
3 Narashino City, Chiba Prefecture
GSDF Camp Narashino
Protecting the Nansei Islands and Okinawa = 4
1 and 2) Okinawa, Okinawa Prefecture
3) Miyakojima, Okinawa Prefecture
4) Ishigakijima, Okinawa Prefecture
Aegis Destroyers Equipped with SM-3 Missiles
Sea of Japan = 1
1) MSDF Myoko (DDG 175)
Left Maizuru Port on December 6, 2012
East China Sea = 2
2) MSDF Kongo (DDG 173)
Left Sasebo Port on December 6, 2012
3) MSDF Chokai (DDG 176)
Left Sasebo Port on December 6, 2012
Deploying three SM-3 equipped Aegis destroyers is a wee bit of overkill. For a comparative, three SM-3 equipped Aegis destroyers would be sufficient to protect all of Europe. But a) you can never be too sure and b) it is election season.
Later - The above will, of course, be supplemented by U.S. Navy anti-missile missile-bearing ships (Link).
Suffice it to say that Japan and South Korea will be over-protected from a rocket (or pieces of thereof) attempting to lift a satellite or a dummy payload weighing as much as a nuclear device.
Sources:
Fuji Terebi
http://www.fnn-news.com/news/headlines/articles/CONN00236607.html
The Asahi Shimbun
http://www.asahi.com/politics/update/1206/TKY201212060449.html
Mainichi Shimbun
http://mainichi.jp/select/news/20121206k0000m040091000c.html
Patriot PAC-3 Missile Batteries
Protecting the Capital Area = 3
1) Ichigaya, Tokyo Metropolitan District
Grounds of the Ministry of Defense
2) Asaka City, Saitama Prefecture
GSDF Camp Asaka
3 Narashino City, Chiba Prefecture
GSDF Camp Narashino
Protecting the Nansei Islands and Okinawa = 4
1 and 2) Okinawa, Okinawa Prefecture
3) Miyakojima, Okinawa Prefecture
4) Ishigakijima, Okinawa Prefecture
Aegis Destroyers Equipped with SM-3 Missiles
Sea of Japan = 1
1) MSDF Myoko (DDG 175)
Left Maizuru Port on December 6, 2012
East China Sea = 2
2) MSDF Kongo (DDG 173)
Left Sasebo Port on December 6, 2012
3) MSDF Chokai (DDG 176)
Left Sasebo Port on December 6, 2012
Deploying three SM-3 equipped Aegis destroyers is a wee bit of overkill. For a comparative, three SM-3 equipped Aegis destroyers would be sufficient to protect all of Europe. But a) you can never be too sure and b) it is election season.
Later - The above will, of course, be supplemented by U.S. Navy anti-missile missile-bearing ships (Link).
Suffice it to say that Japan and South Korea will be over-protected from a rocket (or pieces of thereof) attempting to lift a satellite or a dummy payload weighing as much as a nuclear device.
Sources:
Fuji Terebi
http://www.fnn-news.com/news/headlines/articles/CONN00236607.html
The Asahi Shimbun
http://www.asahi.com/politics/update/1206/TKY201212060449.html
Mainichi Shimbun
http://mainichi.jp/select/news/20121206k0000m040091000c.html
Labels:
Chiba,
DPRK,
DPRK missile program,
GSDF,
missile defense,
MSDF,
Okinawa,
Saitama,
TMD
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