As is our wont, Timothy Langley and I sat down and talked about a hot topic in Japanese politics. Last week we reviewed the Cabinet Statement on the 70th Anniversary.
The video is hard for me to look at due to my necktie's being askew. So I cannot recommend a viewing. However, the conversation is decidedly listenable, except for when I call Chairman of the National Safety Commission Yamatani Eriko "Minister Nakatani." Nakatani Gen is this blessed land's Defense Minister.
For those wanting to read about the Statement, I cannot recommend any analysis more highly than Kent Calder's essay reproduced in The Japan Times. He homes in on the most important failure: the Statement's lack of agency (Link). Interestingly this week Kitaoka Shin'ichi, the second-in-command of the 21st Century Commission that provided the prime minister with a framework for the Statement, complained that he wanted the Statement to be in the first person rather than in the passive voice. (Link - J)
Showing posts with label nuclear weapons. Show all posts
Showing posts with label nuclear weapons. Show all posts
Wednesday, September 02, 2015
Sunday, March 31, 2013
B2 Or Not B2
The United States practice bombing runs by a pair of B-2 Spirit stealth bombers (Link) have sent the rhetoric of the government of the Democratic Republic of Korea soaring into the stratosphere (Link). If the U.S. government goal had been a warning to the DPRK government to calm down or else, sending the B-2s on their expensive (Link) and roundabout training flights was a big flop.
However, as Max Fisher, blogging at the Washington post suggests, the flight by the B-2s most likely had the simultaneous purpose of demonstrating to South Korea the reliability of U.S. extended nuclear deterrence. (Link)
There has been a lot of talk in South Korea of late regarding the desirability of restarting a program toward an independent nuclear deterrent (Link), talk that the U.S. government would prefer to be too wacky for polite society in the best of times.
These are not the best of times -- and not just because the Kim regime in Pyongyang is going through a prolonged period of internal strife due to a premature transition of power.
The U.S. and South Korea are trying to nail down a renewal of the “123 agreement” on U.S. nuclear power generation technology. Without a 123 agreement South will find itself in a tough spot as regards its ambitious civilian nuclear power program. (Link)
What is holding up the agreement's renewal is the South Korean government insistence that South Korea have the right to use the U.S. technology it has licensed to reprocess its spent nuclear fuel and enrich uranium.
South Korea has 23 operating reactors and 4 more under construction (Link). It has another 7 nuclear power stations on the drawing board. Long term storage of spent fuel is a critical problem, as it is in Japan.
South Korea corporations also want to construct nuclear power stations in third countries. Having U.S. permission to enrich uranium -- another pathway to nuclear weapons status – would enable South Korean bids to be one of a full nuclear power package, rather than just a building with no fuel in it. (Link)
It must be galling for the South Korean government officials and possibly the public at large to know that their country, a staunch U.S. military ally, has been denied the use of U.S. technology for reprocessing and enrichment, when an ambiguous ally like Japan and non-allies like India are allowed them, with the international community clapping (unhappily, most of the time) at the scene.
The Obama Administration is highly reticent to approve either reprocessing or enrichment in the new 123 agreement. It has very little to show for its supposed rock hard commitment (Hello, Nobel Prize Committee!) to global nuclear disarmament. Permitting South Korean reprocessing and/or enrichment would seem like the utmost hypocrisy.
(Which is why it is not surprising that U.S. Republicans and U.S. Republicans-associated think tanks would be tilting in favor of a U.S.-South Korea agreement allowing reprocessing and enrichment.)
Sending the B-2s would be a decent preamble for a U.S. announcement that the new 123 agreement will not allow South Korean reprocessing or enrichment. The message to South Korea would be long but simple: "Look, you are doing fine in terms of access to fuel, you have sold reactors overseas without fuel enrichment, reprocessing spent nuclear fuel for civilian use is a hopeless nightmare (Link) and there is no doubting our extended nuclear deterrent. So what do you need?"
The B-2 flights have an ancillary benefit, of course, of reinforcing the U.S. extended deterrent promised to other non-NATO allies – most particularly in this instance, Japan. Seeking reassurance of the U.S. capability to deliver nuclear weapons in way that does not light up Russian and Chinese early warning radars – the problem with a strategic-missiles-only-deterrent-for-East-Asia-allies -- has led Japanese officials to take trips down some back alleys they later had to recant in convoluted fashion.
So the B-2 flights are not as stupid as they seem – and given the boost they have provided to the DPRK government's already histrionic war paranoia, they sure do seem stupid. The flights have provided a new, truly threatening subject for DPRK propagandists to harp on. They have also transmitted to the governments of South Korea and Japan messages those two governments probably needed to hear.
Tips of the hat to Our Man in Abiko and Robert Koehler for directions.
However, as Max Fisher, blogging at the Washington post suggests, the flight by the B-2s most likely had the simultaneous purpose of demonstrating to South Korea the reliability of U.S. extended nuclear deterrence. (Link)
There has been a lot of talk in South Korea of late regarding the desirability of restarting a program toward an independent nuclear deterrent (Link), talk that the U.S. government would prefer to be too wacky for polite society in the best of times.
These are not the best of times -- and not just because the Kim regime in Pyongyang is going through a prolonged period of internal strife due to a premature transition of power.
The U.S. and South Korea are trying to nail down a renewal of the “123 agreement” on U.S. nuclear power generation technology. Without a 123 agreement South will find itself in a tough spot as regards its ambitious civilian nuclear power program. (Link)
What is holding up the agreement's renewal is the South Korean government insistence that South Korea have the right to use the U.S. technology it has licensed to reprocess its spent nuclear fuel and enrich uranium.
South Korea has 23 operating reactors and 4 more under construction (Link). It has another 7 nuclear power stations on the drawing board. Long term storage of spent fuel is a critical problem, as it is in Japan.
South Korea corporations also want to construct nuclear power stations in third countries. Having U.S. permission to enrich uranium -- another pathway to nuclear weapons status – would enable South Korean bids to be one of a full nuclear power package, rather than just a building with no fuel in it. (Link)
It must be galling for the South Korean government officials and possibly the public at large to know that their country, a staunch U.S. military ally, has been denied the use of U.S. technology for reprocessing and enrichment, when an ambiguous ally like Japan and non-allies like India are allowed them, with the international community clapping (unhappily, most of the time) at the scene.
The Obama Administration is highly reticent to approve either reprocessing or enrichment in the new 123 agreement. It has very little to show for its supposed rock hard commitment (Hello, Nobel Prize Committee!) to global nuclear disarmament. Permitting South Korean reprocessing and/or enrichment would seem like the utmost hypocrisy.
(Which is why it is not surprising that U.S. Republicans and U.S. Republicans-associated think tanks would be tilting in favor of a U.S.-South Korea agreement allowing reprocessing and enrichment.)
Sending the B-2s would be a decent preamble for a U.S. announcement that the new 123 agreement will not allow South Korean reprocessing or enrichment. The message to South Korea would be long but simple: "Look, you are doing fine in terms of access to fuel, you have sold reactors overseas without fuel enrichment, reprocessing spent nuclear fuel for civilian use is a hopeless nightmare (Link) and there is no doubting our extended nuclear deterrent. So what do you need?"
The B-2 flights have an ancillary benefit, of course, of reinforcing the U.S. extended deterrent promised to other non-NATO allies – most particularly in this instance, Japan. Seeking reassurance of the U.S. capability to deliver nuclear weapons in way that does not light up Russian and Chinese early warning radars – the problem with a strategic-missiles-only-deterrent-for-East-Asia-allies -- has led Japanese officials to take trips down some back alleys they later had to recant in convoluted fashion.
So the B-2 flights are not as stupid as they seem – and given the boost they have provided to the DPRK government's already histrionic war paranoia, they sure do seem stupid. The flights have provided a new, truly threatening subject for DPRK propagandists to harp on. They have also transmitted to the governments of South Korea and Japan messages those two governments probably needed to hear.
Tips of the hat to Our Man in Abiko and Robert Koehler for directions.
Saturday, September 22, 2012
On Sino-American Nuclear Talks
For further relief from the Sturm und Drang views of East Asian issues, Jeffrey Lewis (full disclosure: I had dinner under the tracks of the Yamanote Line with Dr. Lewis a few years back) offers his eminently readable take on the issue of strategic stability in between the United States and China.
Dr. Lewis always writes on the bright side of life, an attitude that has served him well save in one instance -- that funny box on the Euphrates that turned out to be a North Korean-built Syrian nuclear reactor (with the current violence and chaos in Syria, is anyone sending the Israelis chocolate or flowers thanking them for having bombed that absurdity out of existence?).
Dr. Lewis should come to Tokyo more often and get better press. With the jousting over the Senkakus and yes-we-will-no-we-won't dispute over nuclear power phaseout, a lot of uninformed nonsense about nuclear weapons is issuing from the mouths of individuals who really should be keeping their thoughts to themselves.
Dr. Lewis always writes on the bright side of life, an attitude that has served him well save in one instance -- that funny box on the Euphrates that turned out to be a North Korean-built Syrian nuclear reactor (with the current violence and chaos in Syria, is anyone sending the Israelis chocolate or flowers thanking them for having bombed that absurdity out of existence?).
Dr. Lewis should come to Tokyo more often and get better press. With the jousting over the Senkakus and yes-we-will-no-we-won't dispute over nuclear power phaseout, a lot of uninformed nonsense about nuclear weapons is issuing from the mouths of individuals who really should be keeping their thoughts to themselves.
Thursday, August 02, 2012
To The Nuclear Non-Option, An Addendum
After linking to the Associated Press' decidedly unsatisfactory report on discussions of Japan's nuclear reactors and the latent nuclear weapons capability they represent, it is only fair and proper to link to a worthwhile read.
This would be the update from the Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI) on Japan's civilian highly-enriched uranium (HEU) programs.
Civilian HEU: Japan
Now this is the real deal. Plutonium is nasty stuff and difficult to transform into big bang weapons (just ask the North Koreans). HEU is nasty stuff and way too easy to transform into big bang weapons.
Where does Japan have its HEU? The update page lists four locations.
Yes, I too hope these sites are well guarded.
This would be the update from the Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI) on Japan's civilian highly-enriched uranium (HEU) programs.
Civilian HEU: Japan
Now this is the real deal. Plutonium is nasty stuff and difficult to transform into big bang weapons (just ask the North Koreans). HEU is nasty stuff and way too easy to transform into big bang weapons.
Where does Japan have its HEU? The update page lists four locations.
Yes, I too hope these sites are well guarded.
Wednesday, August 01, 2012
The Nuclear Non-Option
Yuri Kageyama has an interesting article out about the relationship between Japan's currently crippled civilian nuclear power program and Japan's need for a virtual nuclear weapon capability:
Part of "interesting" is, sadly, sarcasm. The writing is often higgledy-piggledy, like the last paragraph quoted above. Until nuclear power plants grow arms and eyes, I would find it hard for any of them could develop any technology. Nuclear weaponry does not need fuel. And, as the Iranian nuclear fuel technology programs...oh forget, the paragraph is a lost cause.
Later in the article is the howler: "Japan has 45 tons of separated plutonium, enough for several Nagasaki-type bombs." As a commenter to the article has noted, 45 tons of separated plutonium can be converted in a bit more than "several" Nagasaki-type bombs.
As for the presumption behind the article, that defense and security commentators have heretofore been quiet about drawing a direct line between the operation of nuclear power plants and a nuclear deterrent, this is simply not true. Indeed, the article itself points out that an "outspoken" Ishihara Shintaro and Abe Shinzo have been asking for Japan to make more vigorous use of its virtual deterrent (Note to self: do not include in any argument evidence that contradicts the thesis).
The article concludes with this weird quote:
The end quote indicates the story that Kageyama has missed: that talking about a civilian nuclear power program as a virtual nuclear deterrent is just nuts.
In isolation, the position sounds rational: Japan is surrounded by nuclear weapons states; Japan needs a backstop should the U.S. withdraw its nuclear umbrella; North Korean threatens Japan so Japan should be able to pose an equal and opposite threat to North Korea; the international non-proliferation system, with its nuclear and non-nuclear states, is not only unequal, it has outliers and rogues like Israel, India and Pakistan who remain solidly encased in the international community.
However, the position cannot be put forward in isolation. When one tries to map out step-by-step scenarios where the U.S. abandons Japan, or where Japan unilaterally declares itself a nuclear weapons state, or where Japan pulls a South Africa/Israel assembled-in-secret trick -- and then one takes the further step of imagining how regional actors and the international community would react, one realizes one has fallen off the edge of the world.
To put in another way, Herman Kahn may have asked you to think the unthinkable, and you can flatter yourself thinking yourself up to that task. However, Aesop's much older Fables should remind us all that while, yes, having a bell on the cat would be nice...
Japan’s muted pro-bomb voices become louder as nation debates phasing out nuclear power(Link)
Associated Press
TOKYO — A contentious debate over nuclear power in Japan is bringing another question out of the shadows: Should Japan keep open the possibility of making nuclear weapons — even if only as an option?
It may seem surprising in the only country devastated by atomic bombs, particularly as it marks the 67th anniversary of the bombings of Hiroshima on Aug. 6 and Nagasaki three days later. The Japanese government officially renounces nuclear weapons, and the vast majority of citizens oppose them.
But as Japan weighs whether to phase out nuclear power, some conservatives, including some influential politicians and thinkers, are becoming more vocal about their belief that Japan should have at least the ability to make nuclear weapons.
The two issues are intertwined because nuclear plants can develop the technology and produce the fuel needed for weaponry, as highlighted by concerns that Iran is advancing a nuclear power program to mask bomb development...
Part of "interesting" is, sadly, sarcasm. The writing is often higgledy-piggledy, like the last paragraph quoted above. Until nuclear power plants grow arms and eyes, I would find it hard for any of them could develop any technology. Nuclear weaponry does not need fuel. And, as the Iranian nuclear fuel technology programs...oh forget, the paragraph is a lost cause.
Later in the article is the howler: "Japan has 45 tons of separated plutonium, enough for several Nagasaki-type bombs." As a commenter to the article has noted, 45 tons of separated plutonium can be converted in a bit more than "several" Nagasaki-type bombs.
As for the presumption behind the article, that defense and security commentators have heretofore been quiet about drawing a direct line between the operation of nuclear power plants and a nuclear deterrent, this is simply not true. Indeed, the article itself points out that an "outspoken" Ishihara Shintaro and Abe Shinzo have been asking for Japan to make more vigorous use of its virtual deterrent (Note to self: do not include in any argument evidence that contradicts the thesis).
The article concludes with this weird quote:
"If people keep saying (nuclear energy) is for having nuclear weapons capability, that is not good,” Suzuki said. “It's not wise. Technically it may be true [my emphasis - MTC], but it sends a very bad message to the international community."When something is technically true, saying the opposite is technically false. Technically.
The end quote indicates the story that Kageyama has missed: that talking about a civilian nuclear power program as a virtual nuclear deterrent is just nuts.
In isolation, the position sounds rational: Japan is surrounded by nuclear weapons states; Japan needs a backstop should the U.S. withdraw its nuclear umbrella; North Korean threatens Japan so Japan should be able to pose an equal and opposite threat to North Korea; the international non-proliferation system, with its nuclear and non-nuclear states, is not only unequal, it has outliers and rogues like Israel, India and Pakistan who remain solidly encased in the international community.
However, the position cannot be put forward in isolation. When one tries to map out step-by-step scenarios where the U.S. abandons Japan, or where Japan unilaterally declares itself a nuclear weapons state, or where Japan pulls a South Africa/Israel assembled-in-secret trick -- and then one takes the further step of imagining how regional actors and the international community would react, one realizes one has fallen off the edge of the world.
To put in another way, Herman Kahn may have asked you to think the unthinkable, and you can flatter yourself thinking yourself up to that task. However, Aesop's much older Fables should remind us all that while, yes, having a bell on the cat would be nice...
Monday, July 16, 2012
Blue Ocean, Blue Skies?
Today is Ocean Day, a national holiday. It is a day where we are expected to reflect upon the ocean, what great gifts she has given us and how much she means to us (as one wag once put it to me, the national goal is "Let's Ocean!"). Of course, having three-day weekend just days before the school year's summer break is daft -- but then July did not have a national holiday of its own...
Sakamoto Ryuichi and Oe Kenzaburo are leading an anti-nuclear demonstration today in Yoyogi Park. Organizers hope to draw 100,000 persons to the event. (Poster - J)
I might attend, on proliferation and radioactive waste disposal grounds. No one has ever found reasonable solutions to those two problems.
Of course, if I were the GE gas turbine division chief or the gas turbine division chief of any of the Heavies, I would require my employees to attend, with the division providing the sushi, beer, non-alcoholic alternatives and mandatory sky-blue tarp.
Photo image: the Geo-Cosmos globe at the Miraikan, Koto City, Tokyo Metropolitan District.
Image courtesy: MTC
Wednesday, December 14, 2011
Strategic Industries In Peril from What?
On a trip up the hill to the offices of the Diet members, I mistakenly took the route in between the Finance Ministry and the Foreign Ministry. I say mistakenly because it took me in between two sets of protestors: a tiny tent housing the handful of anti-nuclear activists camped out in front of the Ministry of Economics, Trade and Industry and an ear-splitting multitude of right wing nutjobs hyperpatriots bearing Hinomaru flags and a barrage of portable loudspeakers. In between the two groups was an army of police officers, struggling in a bored sort of way to keep the right wingers from rushing at the pathetic little anti-nuclear protest.
Apparently, from the hyperpatriots shrieks and grunts of "Zainichi, zettai zainichi" ("Korean residents, definitely Korean residents") and all kinds of imprecations of leaving Japan open to attacks from the DPRK, they were convinced that the anti-nuclear movement was a Korean plot. "How is this country going to survive, you idiots!" yelled one of the hyperpatriots at the knot of anti-nuclear protestors.
Later, my walking companion and I were treated to a very fine explanation from a very nice old lady that Japan is full of DPRK spies, this as she and the multitude were on their way, according to my walking companion, to a large gathering in front of the offices of the Diet members protesting the Big Lie that is the comfort women issue.
There have always been folks who have claimed that Japan's devotion to nuclear power development and the possession of all the elements of a fuel cycle represented an incipient nuclear capability, a backup for the day the U.S. suddenly withdraws its nuclear umbrella, leaving Japan naked and surrounded by nuclear armed states. What I did not know is that among the enemies to be crushed to protect this incipient deterrent was a bunch of old Korean women and their co-conspirators who pretend to be Japanese radicalized by the Fukushima disaster.
Amazing the things you can learn from just walking around.
Later - Someone better not tell this crowd that NHK's lineup for the annual New Year's Eve Kohaku Uta Gassen ("Red/White Song Battle" - always bet on White) includes not one, not two, but three K-Pop acts (KARA, Toho Shinki and Shojo Jidai - the last being a pop act based on the premise "the longer the bare leg, the better the song."). Because you know what all this means: we have to support Japan's nuclear power industry even more.
It's all connected, obviously.
Later still - Please click on comments to learn about the interesting characters I ran into, courtesy the Shingetsu News Agency.
Apparently, from the hyperpatriots shrieks and grunts of "Zainichi, zettai zainichi" ("Korean residents, definitely Korean residents") and all kinds of imprecations of leaving Japan open to attacks from the DPRK, they were convinced that the anti-nuclear movement was a Korean plot. "How is this country going to survive, you idiots!" yelled one of the hyperpatriots at the knot of anti-nuclear protestors.
Later, my walking companion and I were treated to a very fine explanation from a very nice old lady that Japan is full of DPRK spies, this as she and the multitude were on their way, according to my walking companion, to a large gathering in front of the offices of the Diet members protesting the Big Lie that is the comfort women issue.
There have always been folks who have claimed that Japan's devotion to nuclear power development and the possession of all the elements of a fuel cycle represented an incipient nuclear capability, a backup for the day the U.S. suddenly withdraws its nuclear umbrella, leaving Japan naked and surrounded by nuclear armed states. What I did not know is that among the enemies to be crushed to protect this incipient deterrent was a bunch of old Korean women and their co-conspirators who pretend to be Japanese radicalized by the Fukushima disaster.
Amazing the things you can learn from just walking around.
Later - Someone better not tell this crowd that NHK's lineup for the annual New Year's Eve Kohaku Uta Gassen ("Red/White Song Battle" - always bet on White) includes not one, not two, but three K-Pop acts (KARA, Toho Shinki and Shojo Jidai - the last being a pop act based on the premise "the longer the bare leg, the better the song."). Because you know what all this means: we have to support Japan's nuclear power industry even more.
It's all connected, obviously.
Later still - Please click on comments to learn about the interesting characters I ran into, courtesy the Shingetsu News Agency.
Wednesday, February 24, 2010
Tomahawk Down
It seems all but official. Newspapers are reporting that according to Japanese government sources, the United States government has come to decision to retire the nuclear-armed Tomahawk cruise missile (TLAM/N). The retirement of these cruise missiles essentially closes the door on the deployment of U.S. tactical nuclear weapons in the East Asia theater.
In December, Dr. Jeffrey Lewis at published a vital research note on a dangerous fundamental flaw in the TLAM\N that would seemingly make it unusable against its most likely targets in North Korea. Also in December, Foreign Minister Okada Katsuya sent letters to the U.S. secretaries of state and defense disavowing a Japanese government intent to offer advice to the U.S. government on the desirability of particular U.S. nuclear weapons systems.
Today's article on the purported decision in The Asahi Shimbun makes note of the fundamental logical inconsistency (also noted by The Japan Times) regarding Japan's advocating the redeployment of these short-range missiles on U.S. attack submarines. Where would these vessels stop and where would they sail if their presence in Japanese waters or arrival in a Japanese port violates the "no-introduction" pledge of the Three Non-Nuclear Principles? Would a submarine positioning itself to defend Japan with TLAM\Ns have to start its voyage in Guam, then enter the Sea of Japan on the South Korean side of the Tsushima Straits in order to avoid triggering a violation of the pledge? Furthermore, how could a government that made a campaign promise to expose the existence of heretofore denied secret agreements on the introduction of nuclear weapons into Japan during military contingencies then turn around and adopt a Don't Ask/Don't Tell policy for U.S. submarines possibly carrying TLAM/Ns?
Unanswered at the end of this drama is the question of who ordered Japan's diplomats to lobby the Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States (the Perry Commission) to suggest in its report that the U.S. retain the TLAM/N...and under what conception of Japan's stance on nuclear weapons was such lobbying justified. "Go and sin no more," seems to be Okada's view toward his bureaucrat subordinates...and his decision to not look into this matter further seems a wise choice.
In December, Dr. Jeffrey Lewis at published a vital research note on a dangerous fundamental flaw in the TLAM\N that would seemingly make it unusable against its most likely targets in North Korea. Also in December, Foreign Minister Okada Katsuya sent letters to the U.S. secretaries of state and defense disavowing a Japanese government intent to offer advice to the U.S. government on the desirability of particular U.S. nuclear weapons systems.
Today's article on the purported decision in The Asahi Shimbun makes note of the fundamental logical inconsistency (also noted by The Japan Times) regarding Japan's advocating the redeployment of these short-range missiles on U.S. attack submarines. Where would these vessels stop and where would they sail if their presence in Japanese waters or arrival in a Japanese port violates the "no-introduction" pledge of the Three Non-Nuclear Principles? Would a submarine positioning itself to defend Japan with TLAM\Ns have to start its voyage in Guam, then enter the Sea of Japan on the South Korean side of the Tsushima Straits in order to avoid triggering a violation of the pledge? Furthermore, how could a government that made a campaign promise to expose the existence of heretofore denied secret agreements on the introduction of nuclear weapons into Japan during military contingencies then turn around and adopt a Don't Ask/Don't Tell policy for U.S. submarines possibly carrying TLAM/Ns?
Unanswered at the end of this drama is the question of who ordered Japan's diplomats to lobby the Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States (the Perry Commission) to suggest in its report that the U.S. retain the TLAM/N...and under what conception of Japan's stance on nuclear weapons was such lobbying justified. "Go and sin no more," seems to be Okada's view toward his bureaucrat subordinates...and his decision to not look into this matter further seems a wise choice.
Wednesday, January 27, 2010
Tentative Notes Upon the Hatoyama Government's Statement on Non-Interference in U.S. Strategic Planning
Dr. Jeffrey Lewis of Arms Control Wonk passes on some good news: the Government of Japan is not in favor of the U.S. military’s retention of the TLAM-N nuclear-armed cruise missile and the development of the RNEP earth penetrator. At the Ministry of Foreign Affairs press conference of January 22 of this year, it was revealed that Foreign Minister Okada Katsuya sent letters to both U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates on December 24 of last year. In the letters FM Okada declares that the Government of Japan has no opinion as to the retention or abolition of these two systems, or any other systems for that matter. The letter to Secretaries ask only that the U.S. consult with Japan regarding the cancellation or development of systems, explaining how U.S. actions will affect deterrence.
In his post on the Okada Statement, Dr. Lewis shows confusion over Foreign Minister Okada’s dismissal of an inconvenient truth: Japanese diplomats did actually lobby the Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States for the retention of these weapons systems.
Dr. Lewis sees a “non-denial denial” going on:
First, in the translated version, "the Japanese Government" is the subject of the subordinate clause in the first sentence. In the Japanese original, the subordinate clause has no subject due to the use of "the government of our country as itself" (Wagakuni seifu to shite) as a subordinate clause topic identifier and the sly replacement of the normal robust construction nobeta koto ga nai with the more diffuse nobeta koto wa nai. Under normal circumstance switching “wa” for “ga” would be a style matter, an affectation. Here, however, the writer seems to be intentionally choosing the smudgy nobeta koto wa nai construction. He/She is very careful to switch back to the robust "ga" form in the next sentence (“nobeta koto ga atta") when talking about the reality that Japanese diplomats did indeed make such requests.
Second, the words moshi and kari ni are translated “if, hypothetically…” I am not sure to what extent the most popular online dictionary’s translation of the phrase “moshi kari ni” as “hypothetically” has affected the word choice here. As there is a comma in between moshi and kari ni these are separate clauses, the moshi indicating the introducation of a hypothetical and kari ni indicating the idea of “temporarily” or “tentatively” -- this rather than a repetition of the hypothetical established by moshi.
Introducing these ideas, the sentences read something more like:
I of course invite readers to show me I am talking out of my hat.
Later - The FAS Strategic Security blog has more on the Okada letters.
Later still - Fixed the broken link to the original MOFA document.
In his post on the Okada Statement, Dr. Lewis shows confusion over Foreign Minister Okada’s dismissal of an inconvenient truth: Japanese diplomats did actually lobby the Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States for the retention of these weapons systems.
Dr. Lewis sees a “non-denial denial” going on:
Looking at the original Japanese letter to Secretary Clinton, it seems that the source of the confusion is an imprecise translation. On the whole, the translation provided by the Citizens’ Nuclear Information Center is fluid and correct. However, the translation of the face-saving pair of sentences beginning "Hence, although the discussions...” and ending ”...which are in favor of nuclear disarmament" contain what seem to be two significant errors in translation."It was reported in some sections of the Japanese media that, during the production of the report of the “Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States” released in May this year, Japanese officials of the responsible diplomatic section lobbied your government not to reduce the number of its nuclear weapons, or, more specifically, opposed the retirement of the United States’ Tomahawk Land Attack Missile – Nuclear (TLAM/N) and requested that the United States maintain a Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrator (RNEP).“Some sections of the Japanese media” almost certainly refers to Masa Ota’s excellent story, Japan lobbied for robust nuclear umbrella before power shift, in Kyodo News(November 24, 2009). Ota reported that senior Japanese diplomats told the Commission that the United States should retain the TLAM-N and develop low-yield nuclear options.
However, the Japanese Government is not in a position to judge whether it is necessary or desirable for your government to possess particular [weapons] systems. Hence, although the discussions were held under the previous Cabinet, it is my understanding that, in the course of exchanges between our countries, including the deliberations of the above mentioned Commission, the Japanese Government has expressed no view concerning whether or not your government should possess particular [weapons] systems such as TLAM/N and RNEP. If, hypothetically, such a view was expressed, it would clearly be at variance with my views, which are in favor of nuclear disarmament.
Nevertheless, if TLAM/N is retired, we hope to receive ongoing explanations of your government’s extended deterrence policy, including any impact this might have on extended deterrence for Japan and how this could be supplemented."
Although Okada seems to deny that Japan lobbied the Commission, it looks to be the classic non-denial denial. (It would be helpful to parse the original Japanese, but Okada admits to the exchanges, which in any event are listed at the back of the Posture Commission Report, denying only the expression of a “view concerning whether or not [the US] should possess particular [weapons] systems.”)
In any event, everyone in Washington knows that Mr. Akiba and Mr. Kanai expressed precisely such a view, even if it would be inconvenient, not to mention career-ending, for them to admit it now...
First, in the translated version, "the Japanese Government" is the subject of the subordinate clause in the first sentence. In the Japanese original, the subordinate clause has no subject due to the use of "the government of our country as itself" (Wagakuni seifu to shite) as a subordinate clause topic identifier and the sly replacement of the normal robust construction nobeta koto ga nai with the more diffuse nobeta koto wa nai. Under normal circumstance switching “wa” for “ga” would be a style matter, an affectation. Here, however, the writer seems to be intentionally choosing the smudgy nobeta koto wa nai construction. He/She is very careful to switch back to the robust "ga" form in the next sentence (“nobeta koto ga atta") when talking about the reality that Japanese diplomats did indeed make such requests.
Second, the words moshi and kari ni are translated “if, hypothetically…” I am not sure to what extent the most popular online dictionary’s translation of the phrase “moshi kari ni” as “hypothetically” has affected the word choice here. As there is a comma in between moshi and kari ni these are separate clauses, the moshi indicating the introducation of a hypothetical and kari ni indicating the idea of “temporarily” or “tentatively” -- this rather than a repetition of the hypothetical established by moshi.
Introducing these ideas, the sentences read something more like:
"Hence, although the discussions were held under the previous Cabinet, it is my understanding that, in the course of exchanges between our countries, including the deliberations of the above mentioned Commission, it was never the case that views were expressed as being those of our government concerning whether or not your government should possess particular [weapons] systems such as TLAM/N and RNEP. If, in some tentative way such a view was expressed, it would clearly be at variance with my views, which are in favor of nuclear disarmament."I think that this clears up the problem of attribution Dr. Lewis identifies.
I of course invite readers to show me I am talking out of my hat.
Later - The FAS Strategic Security blog has more on the Okada letters.
Later still - Fixed the broken link to the original MOFA document.
Wednesday, July 16, 2008
Send in the Clown
"Isn't it rich?" asks the song.
The former head of the Asia Division of the CIA's Clandestine Service--the black arm of the world's most sprawling and powerful intelligence service -- cries now to the unblinking heavens that the Administration's removing North Korea from the list of state sponsors of terror hangs the Japanese government out to dry.
One would have thought that shutting down A. Q. Khan's clandestine sales network of uranium enrichment technology, part of which purportedly sent a series of care packages to the DPRK, before February 2004 would have been a fantastic thing to do.
Either of those two actions (oh, action...why are you so hard to do?) would have significantly contributed to an increase in Japan's current security.
But I suppose that Mr. Brown had other priorities.
"Resolving this abductee issue goes to the fundamental integrity of the Japanese government."
Give me a break, please.
Resolving the abductee issue goes to the fundamental legitimacy of a certain subdivision within the Japanese political elite, one which is strangely and quite transparently attracted to the purchase and deployment of weapons systems as a means ofbringing order and security to East Asia solving Japan's security dilemmas.
Excuse me, Mr. Brown...but what were U.S. taxpayers paying you to do during the 25 years you spent inside the CIA? Oh, I am sure Mr. Brown did his duty.
But since he was one of the principals in the development and implementation of a totally failed set of policies, why can he not maintain a decent silence as his successors try to salvage something from the havoc wreaked?
------------------------------------
Hattip to NP for pointing out this New York Times op-ed to me.
The former head of the Asia Division of the CIA's Clandestine Service--the black arm of the world's most sprawling and powerful intelligence service -- cries now to the unblinking heavens that the Administration's removing North Korea from the list of state sponsors of terror hangs the Japanese government out to dry.
Not only will our taking North Korea off the state-sponsored terrorist list strengthen the regime and reward those minimal responses, it is a direct blow to our strongest ally in the region, Japan, which believes it had at least 13 (and possibly dozens more) citizens kidnapped by North Korea in the 1970s and '80s.One would have thought that telling the Bush Administration in no uncertain terms that wrapping up North Korea inside a package called the Axis of Evil, then having the U.S. military overthrow the government of one member of the Axis, would make it impossible to stop North Korea (and Iran too) from embarking on accelerated nuclear weapons development path.
Resolving this abductee issue goes to the fundamental integrity of the Japanese government. If the situation were reversed, and Americans were grabbed off a dark Florida beach by a Cuban patrol boat, we would go to war to bring them home.
But America has pledged to protect Japan in return for the Japanese forgoing offensive arms. Taking the Japanese abductees off the negotiating table while leaving North Korea with its existing weapons may cause Tokyo to question the utility of that pledge. North Korea’s missiles can’t hit us, but Japan is well within the kill zone.
No one should imply that North Korea is an easy nut to crack. Smart folks on both sides of the domestic political aisle have struggled with this challenge. North Korea has shown no intention of giving up its nuclear weapons, and we are unfortunately not in a position to either force or entice it to do so. Despite all the spin out of the talks among the six concerned parties — China, Japan, North Korea, Russia, South Korea and the United States — there is no reason to honestly assume North Korea will ever give up its nuclear capability.
But things are not made any better by pretending that we are making progress, as Washington seems to have decided to do, or by ignoring the real concerns of our allies. Our approach to North Korea calls for a lot more honesty and, in the eyes of those with more at risk, a greater dose of sincerity. There is more at stake here than just North Korean bombs.
One would have thought that shutting down A. Q. Khan's clandestine sales network of uranium enrichment technology, part of which purportedly sent a series of care packages to the DPRK, before February 2004 would have been a fantastic thing to do.
Either of those two actions (oh, action...why are you so hard to do?) would have significantly contributed to an increase in Japan's current security.
But I suppose that Mr. Brown had other priorities.
"Resolving this abductee issue goes to the fundamental integrity of the Japanese government."
Give me a break, please.
Resolving the abductee issue goes to the fundamental legitimacy of a certain subdivision within the Japanese political elite, one which is strangely and quite transparently attracted to the purchase and deployment of weapons systems as a means of
But since he was one of the principals in the development and implementation of a totally failed set of policies, why can he not maintain a decent silence as his successors try to salvage something from the havoc wreaked?
------------------------------------
Hattip to NP for pointing out this New York Times op-ed to me.
Monday, March 24, 2008
Our Nuclear Nightmares Now
The Japan Times has published Brad Glosserman's very competent review of Japan's need for a discussion on nuclear weapons, "Japan Peers into the Abyss", on the opinion page of this morning's print edition.
Unfortunately, The Japan Times has the storage capacity of a thimble, so the above link may soon go dark. The essay will probably be available on a more permanent basis on the Pacific Forum CSIS website later this month.
One of the fun parlor games that Glosserman avoids indulging in is the always amusing, "How long would it take for Japan to become a nuclear power?" Up until a few months ago I had always thought that it would take a number of months or even years for Japan to arm itself with nuclear weapons, based upon the amount of time it would take to perfect an implosion device for a plutonium weapon.
In a humbling exchange on Dr. Jeffrey Lewis' Arms Control Wonk blog, I learned something important that I really should have known: that Japan has 2 tons of highly enriched uranium (HEU) on its soil, much of it at the Fast Critical Assembly (FCA) reactor in Tokai Mura.
....which is really important to know...because according to slide #12 of this helpful presentation, (thanks Japan Atomic Energy Commission!) 60 kgs of HEU would be sufficient for a simple gun-type fission weapon.
So if the Japanese government, or even a cabal within the Japanese government, felt pressed to respond to the threat posed by the many nuclear weapons states in the area--then with the H2A rockets all ready tested and ready to go, the amount of time required to "go nuclear" would likely be brief.
Insanely brief.
Unfortunately, The Japan Times has the storage capacity of a thimble, so the above link may soon go dark. The essay will probably be available on a more permanent basis on the Pacific Forum CSIS website later this month.
One of the fun parlor games that Glosserman avoids indulging in is the always amusing, "How long would it take for Japan to become a nuclear power?" Up until a few months ago I had always thought that it would take a number of months or even years for Japan to arm itself with nuclear weapons, based upon the amount of time it would take to perfect an implosion device for a plutonium weapon.
In a humbling exchange on Dr. Jeffrey Lewis' Arms Control Wonk blog, I learned something important that I really should have known: that Japan has 2 tons of highly enriched uranium (HEU) on its soil, much of it at the Fast Critical Assembly (FCA) reactor in Tokai Mura.
....which is really important to know...because according to slide #12 of this helpful presentation, (thanks Japan Atomic Energy Commission!) 60 kgs of HEU would be sufficient for a simple gun-type fission weapon.
So if the Japanese government, or even a cabal within the Japanese government, felt pressed to respond to the threat posed by the many nuclear weapons states in the area--then with the H2A rockets all ready tested and ready to go, the amount of time required to "go nuclear" would likely be brief.
Insanely brief.
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