Very Kind Of Him #53 - The 70th Anniversaries

In a video talk from two weeks ago, Timothy Langley and I visit the various low points for the human species in this year's commemorative calendar, at least until September rolls around:

Link: Tokyo on Fire!: Episode 6 - Pacific War Anniversary

For the record the Abe Cabinet on Friday declared in a Cabinet Decision (kakugi kettei) responding to a question from Party of Future Generations member Wada Masamune that the words "invasion" (shinryaku) and "colonial domination" (shokuminchi shihai) found in the Murayama Statement are "difficult" to define -- and that the Cabinet will not try to do so. (Link - J)

Yes, a Cabinet Decision of "Sorry, we can't help you. Yes, it is a government statement. No, we do not know what it means."

To put a positive gloss on this Cabinet Decision, should Abe break down, listen to advisors like Kitaoka Shin'ichi (Link) and put those words in the 70th anniversary Abe Statement (Abe danwa) he will not have to defend a particular meaning for them. So the contested terms can be there -- pleasing the governments of China, South Korea and the U.S. -- without Abe having to explain them to anyone -- mollifying his movement's core supporters.

Of course, the lack of a willingness to explain the Murayama Statement -- which the Abe government has been saying it classes it alongside other apologetic postwar statements, accepting them all "as a body" (zentai to shite) -- can only be defended as pure opportunism. In terms of condemnation, the avenues of attack (ex: simple logic - how can can a government accept concepts it cannot define?) seem endless.

Myths About Myths: Wakefield and Martin vs. Green and Hornung

In a short essay published by Japan Focus this week, Bryce Wakefield and Craig Martin try to set the record straight on the significance of the July 1 Cabinet Decision removing the block on Japan's exercise of the right of collective self-defense (Link). The essay is a response to a longer work, "Ten Myths About Japan's Collective Self Defense Change," by Michael Green and Jeffrey Hornung, published by The Diplomat. (Link)

I am forced to say "try to set the record straight" rather than "set the record straight" because the Wakefield/Martin essay fails to thump the Green/Hornung opinion article hard enough. Wakefield and Martin do dissect the misleading assertions in the Green/Hornung piece and do offer some suggestions as to the sources of the misunderstandings, if not outright misrepresentations, therein.

Wakefield and Martin's argumentation, however, is not crisp. The essay compares unfavorably with "Abe's Law: Domestic Dimension of Japan's Self-Defense Debate," the magisterial paper Wakefield produced earlier this year for the Wilson Center's Japan's Vision of East Asia conference review (Link). That paper describes with great clarity the constitutional red lines the Abe administration was proposing to and eventually did cross in crafting the July 1 Cabinet Decision.

A lack of crispness in the more recent work should not be ascribed to anything Wakefield and Martin may have done or left undone. One has to indeed applaud them for the time and intellectual capital they expended in the effort of nailing down Green and Hornung.

The problem with confronting the assertions of the Green/Hornung article and knocking them down is that the whole process is rather like punching a bale of kapok. Try as one might, one cannot inflict much damage on what is, no matter its size or sense of self-importance, a bag of fluff.

In their article Green and Hornung set out to debunk ten "myths" about the collective self defense debate. However, there is no sourcing for these "myths" -- indeed, there is, in the whole length of the article, not a single person quoted as an author or transmitter of any of the ten propositions being debunked. Since what is presented is not the assertions of identifiable, real persons, Green and Hornung are jousting with the made up quotes of imaginary persons -- or, looking at the problem from a slightly different angle, since they and no others are the authors of the text, they are debunking themselves.

Hence the difficulty of the task Wakefield and Martin have taken on. If Green and Hornung had attacked the assertions of real persons, Wakefield and Martin could go back ro the original assertion, look at the context in which that assertion was uttered or even email the author to ascertain whether or not Green's and Hornung's characterizations of the so-called myth make any sense. Since the assertions are figments of Green's and Hornung's imaginations, however, Wakefield and Martin must first demonstrate the relevance of the "myth" to the actual intellectual and political debate going on in Japan. It is not surprising that Wakefield and Martin should get bogged down, as more often than not the "myth" only vaguely resembles actual assertions by actual actors in the drama.

It would be unfair to condemn Green and Hornung too much for having handed over to their opponents the responsibility of proving the salience of their essay. Though Green and Hornung both teaching academics, they have spent much of their careers in the trenches of America's think tanks, where wargaming against imaginary opponents has become confused with -- or has completely replaced -- argument. Many major think tanks only rarely take the time to paint pictures of reality. Such pictures are messy and require a certain level of knowledge to understand. More useful to the consumers of think tank-style writing is a set of smart-sounding answers to potential talking points of foes: i.e., "If Ms. X says A, you can respond by saying B."

In the combat of ideas, wargaming is probably indispensable as a preparatory measure. The problem is when, as in the piece by Green and Hornung, wargaming purports to be an explanation, rather than what it is, a set of responses to conjectures.

The real portrait of collective self defense debate has yet to be produced. Wakefield in his March paper presented a stunning sketch of the debate prior its July 1 denouement. Perhaps Wakefield and Martin, or even Green and Hornung, if the fancy so strikes them, will tackle the task of revisiting the struggle as it has been fought these last few month using the actual words of the combatants -- with a preview of the potential future fights tacked on. If none of the four gentleman is willing to take up the task, I know of at least one major scholar laboring away at what will most likely be the definitive presentation and analysis of the collective self defense debate.

That paper I will definitely blog and tweet about, if I am still blogging and tweeting when it comes out.

Abe Shinzo's Virtual Referendum

Today is supposed to be crunch day: the day when the New Komeito decides whether to accept or reject the Liberal Democratic Party's sudden cram down of an expansion of Japan's definition of constitutional self-defense to include collective self-defense.

The choice is not a happy or an easy one.

The New Komeito's mothership, the Soka Gakkai lay religious (I know that that is an oxymoron. So does the SG. Hence its paranoia) organization has already expressed its opposition to the LDP's plan to reverse through a simple Cabinet Decision (kakugi kettei) the Japanese government's heretofore decades-old official position that the exercise of the right of collective self defense is unconstitutional. For the SG, the only proper path for such a reversal of a previous unconstitutional ruling is a revision or amendment of the Constitution (Link - J).

For the New Komeito, surrendering to LDP pressure on a Cabinet Decision would set the party formally at odds with the SG leadership. This would, of course, do wonders for the party's longtime claims to be independent of the SG. At the same time it would be extremely confusing for the SG flock -- who vote en masse for the New Komeito because is it the political face of the SG.

Why would the LDP be putting its ruling coalition partner through this ordeal? I have speculated that the Abe administration's appreciation of its inability to halt hemorrhaging of public support not only for "constitutional revision via Cabinet Decision" but collective self-defense itself has triggered a panic response. (Link)

What is making the rounds of Nagata-cho now (and for this insight I am indebted to Michael Penn of Shingetsu News) is the idea of a snap dissolution of the House of Representatives after the end of the current Diet ordinary session.

On the face of it, a House of Representatives election now poses unnecessary risks for the LDP and Abe Shinzo. The party already has huge majority in the House of Representatives reflecting the frustration and disgust the voters felt for the political process in December 2012. There is no guarantee that the voters, when given a chance at passing judgment on the Abe Administration, will not opt for independents in the district seat elections and opposition parties in the proportional seat elections. Yes, the polls numbers for the LDP and for the Abe Cabinet are fantastic and the opposition parties abysmal -- but as the House of Councillors election in 2007 showed, the public has the power to clip Abe Shinzo's pretensions of political mastery.

A snap election for the House of Representatives does, of course, nothing to change the seating arrangements in the House of Councillors. The break ups of the Your Party, the disgrace of Watanabe Yoshimi and the division of the Japan Restoration Party into two have only complicated, not eliminated, the possibility of a crafting of a Hawk-Hawk-Hawk (add as many Hawks here as you like) coalition in the House to replace the existing Hawk-Dove LDP-New Komeito coalition.

The argument for the prime minister dissolving the House of Representatives is compelling. Given the thuggishness of reversing a government constitutionality ruling by fiat, the Abe Cabinet will be searching for a means of justifying its actions. A snap election, with the certainty of a strong, possibly entirely extirpating, victory of the LDP over its scattered, fissioning and puny opponents, would demonstrate, according to Abe, the LDP and the Yomiuri media empire, that the public strongly supports the Abe Cabinet's behavior.

Of course, an LDP victory would not be a virtual referendum on the party's policies. It would be a reflection of the current pitiful state of the opposition parties. In a true referendum, such as the one that a revision of the Constitution would require, the voters would get the chance to choose between "Yes" and "No." In the whispered-about snap dissolution and general election, the choice would be between "Yes" and "Nothing."

The further arguments for a snap election are an increase in the LDP's freedom of action and a coverup of the Abe Cabinet's continued fecklessness as regards structural reform.

The LDP's rank-and-file, the young and militant mass of Abe Shinzo acolytes that Machimura Nobutaka finds distressing (Link) are not wrong in wondering why, in the face of polls showing support for the LDP in the 40% range, the LDP has not ditched its coalition with the cautious New Komeito. The relationship does seem an artifact of another time -- when the long term trend in voter behavior was away from the LDP, despite all the financial rewards being dangled, toward alternatives (the 1993 opposition coalition, the New Frontier Party, the Democratic Party of Japan, the Nippon Isshin no Kai, et cetera). for the wild things in the party the obvious choise is to force the New Komeito to chose one way or the other on a Cabinet Decision -- and if they balk, dump the coalition and go to the public for its response.

After the victory, the party could roll up its sleeves and set to work on really remaking Japan, free of the New Komeito's annoying obstructionism.

As for structural reform, on Monday the 16th the government is supposed to release a "third time's the charm" rerevised Third Arrow of Abenomics. All signs are that the government will, despite being given two chances to rethink and revamp its presentation, fail to include the details and synergies global investors and the world media crave. (Link)

What better time then, to turn around to the rest of the world with a defiant, "What? You don't like it? Well, we asked the Japanese voters and they love it!"

So what is the likelihood on this Friday morning of Abe and Friends going through with a virtual referendum after the end of the regular Diet session? Incredibly, I am thinking they are 50-50.


Later - Jiji is reporting that the New Komeito is looking for a duplicitous out smudging the line in between individual and collective self-defense (Link). Wish them luck -- given the time frame on coming to a decision on specific scenarios, New Komeito negotiators will have no opportutinity to coordinate their positions with the Soka Gakkai directorate.

What Gives Abe Shinzo The Right To Re-Interpret The Constitution?

Prime Minister Abe Shinzo anxwering questions in Diet Budget Committee session on 20 Febraury 2014. Original image courtesy The Prime Minister's Residence website.

During the foreign policy and security interpellations in the House Budget Committee session last week Liberal Democratic Party member Iwaya Takeshi asked, amid his questions to the Prime Minister, the Minister of Defense and other government officials, for the Cabinet Legislation Bureau's opinion on who has the right to interpret the Constitution.

Since Richard Samuels has written What Everybody Needs To know About The Cabinet Legislation Bureau (not the actual title) I will eschew further explanation of the significance of Iwaya asking for the CLB's view.

Deputy CLB Director Yokobatake Yusuke, who was filling in for CLB Director General Komatsu Ichiro during Komatsu's hospitalization, responded that three articles of the Constitution are paramount in determing who can interpret the Constitution.

First, according to Yokobatake, is Article Eighty-One (just why I am writing the number this way becomes clearer later). This article shows the American origins of the revised Japanese Constitution, inserting into the body of the Japanese Constitution what was was missing from the U.S. Constitution and which was only later established in case law by Marbury vs. Madison (1804):

The Supreme Court is the court of last resort with power to determine the constitutionality of any law, order, regulation or official act.

The second article regulating interpretation, according to the CLB, is Article Ninety-Nine. This is a rather surprising choice, as Article Ninety-Nine seems like a bulwark against reinterpretation, not the foundation underneath it:

"The Emperor or the Regent as well as Ministers of State, members of the Diet, judges, and all other public officials have the obligation to respect and uphold this Constitution."

Reinterpretation might be a way of showing respect for the Constitution, maybe.

Finally, Yokobatake concluded, there is Article Argle-Bargle, which establishes that the prime minister, via the Cabinet, has ultimate responsibility.

Now one needs to know that I have tinnitus. My life is a constant series of cuppings of my hand to my ear and saying, "Eh?"

In this case, my saying "Eh?" to the live video broadcast from the Budget Committee chamber did not provoke Yokobatake to return to the microphone and repeat himself.

When I cannot importune the speaker to repeat himself or herself, I have to guess what it was that he or she must have said.

Being less than an expert in the Japanese Constitution but generally knowing my way around, I had to reason out which article would be granting the PM power to interpret the Constitution. Because that which sounds like "Article Argle-Bargle" and the articles in that neighborhood have nothing to do with that right.

I figured Yokobatake must have said, "Article Forty-One" as that article is the traditional cited source of confusion as to who, if anyone, has the ultimate right to interpret the Constitution:

"The Diet shall be the highest organ of state power, and shall be the sole law-making organ of the State."

I plunked out a series of messages saying that the CLB had spoken and by its ordering, had put the Supreme Court on the front lines of constitutional interpretation, with the Diet, the Cabinet and the PM coming after.

It was not until the next day that I could review the archived video on the House of Representatives TV website. To my surprise and not inconsiderable delight I found out that my ears had not failed me. Deputy CLB Director Yokobatake had indeed said, "Article Argle-Bargle." More precisely he said that the Cabinet's and the Prime Minister's power to interpret the Constitution came from "Article Ninety-Five" (Kyuju go jo).

There is a problem with that assertion:

Article 95: A special law, applicable only to one local public entity, cannot be enacted by the Diet without the consent of the majority of the voters of the local public entity concerned, obtained in accordance with law.

Reading the above, one can understand my original reaction of thinking that I had not heard Yokobatake correctly.

It took only a second or two for me to grasp how the Todai Law-trained Yokobatake could be saying that an obscure part of the Constitution on holding referendums on local administrative issues gives the PM the power to interpret the Constitution:

He was reading the article number upside down.

Or at least part of it.

If one flips the first digit of the Arabic numeral notation for Ninety-Five -- 95 -- one gets 65 (rokuju go jo).

Citing Article 65 makes a heck of a lot more sense:

Article 65 - Executive power shall be vested in the Cabinet.

Now one can pat oneself on the back and say, "Isn't that grand. The highest ranking active official in the bureau of the government known as 'The Guardian of The Constitution' (Kenpo no bannin) cites a completely irrelevant article of the Constitution in Budget Committee session before full house of national specialists in the law including the prime minister, Representatives, high ranking bureaucrats and legal experts, and no one flinches or even gets a confused look on his or her face."

Great, fine, but that is not the interesting part of Yokobatake's error.

Yokobatake did not, as I assumed he must, cite Article 41 (I will use the usual format from now on). When one compares the two articles, 41 and 65, "the highest organ of state power" and "sole law-making organ of the state" sure sound more like ultimate authority than simple "executive power."

Reviewing what Abe Shinzo has said regarding his plans to reinterpret the Constitution (which has been the subject of intense and bombastic debate in the newspapers, on blogs and on Twitter), he never says that he has the authority to do so. He declares instead that he has the ultimate responsibility for the Constitution -- which seems to be a different issue.

In terms of the nitty-gritty, when in the process of reinterpreting the Constitution does Abe has to let the Diet ("the highest organ of state power") debate the proposed reinterpretations? Can the Cabinet can issue a Cabinet Decision (kakugi kettei) approving the interpretatiion allowing for collective security before the passage of the new laws enabling the new interpretations? By citing Article 65 and not citing Article 41, the CLB seems to be taking the rather provocative position that the Cabinet can by itself declare the new interpretations government policy, with the Diet brought in ex post facto.

If the Abe Cabinet tries this approach with collective security legistlation, the resulting firestorm could make last autumn's fight over the Special Designated Secrets Act seem like a match flame in comparison.

Which begs the question: did Yokobatake, the constitutional expert, cite an irrelevant but visually related part of the Constitution on purpose?

Honours Deserved And Given

On Tuesday, just before lunch time, Murata Natsue, a 40 year old employee of her father's real estate company, was sitting in the front seat of a van at a railway crossing. Her father was at the wheel of the van. Directly in front of them, a 74 yeard old man collapsed onto the railway tracks. Against her father's wishes, Natsue leapt out of the van, scrambled under the crossing bar and spun the old man around 90 degrees, so that he was lying in the railbed where the train could not hit him. At that moment the train arrived, striking and killing her. (Link)

Murata Natsue's sacrifice, made in saving the life of an elderly stranger, has stunned the nation.

This morning the Cabinet, in its first meeting since the accident, produced a Cabinet Decision (kakugi kettei) posthumously awarding Murata the Medal of Honour with Red Ribbon (pictured above) -- the nation's highest award for lifesaving, given to those who saved others at no thought for themselves.　(Link - J)

Whatever one might want to say about this Abe Cabinet, one cannot say it is insensitive and slow to respond to the sacrifices made by ordinary citizens. The family of a most unlikely heroine did not have to wait for the nation's highest authorities to recognize and pay homage to her courage and selflessness. Many a Cabinet of the past, when faced with such an extraordinary occurence, would likely have shuffled papers, deciding only to "assiduously study" (shikkari to kento suru) the appropriateness of national honours.


Later - The Yomiuri Shimbun's online English-language service files its report. (Link)

Later still (Monday) - Chief Cabinet Secretary Suga Yoshihide visited with the Murata family at the funeral home prior to the start of last night's wake. He brought with him a special proclamation from Prime Minister Abe Shinzo, who is in Indonesia for the APEC summit. Kanagawa Prefecture Governor Kuroiwa Yuji and Yokohama City mayor Hayashi Fumiko showed up in person to pay their respects. (Link - J)

Is Today The Day For The DPRK?

Yesterday Abe Shinzo envoy and symbol manipulator extraordinaire Iijima Isao (the bald gentleman above) met with President of the Presidium of the Supreme People's Assembly Kim Yong-nam (the other...errr...gentleman above).

Now it is true that the government of North Korea could just be trotting out its #2 leader for a meeting that goes nowhere, releasing footage of Iijima and Kim in The Big Chairs in front of The Big Painting only to metaphorically pull the chair out from under Iijima-san's massive posterior, humiliating both him and his prime minister.

However, does one need the #2 in the leadership to take time out of his busy schedule of evildoing in order to humiliate Iijima, whose formal title is the decidedly modest one of Special Advisor to the Cabinet (naikaku kambo sanyo)? Would not ordering a driver to take Iijima all around greater Pyongyang, permitting him meet no one of consequence, have done the trick? Yes, some commentators have suggested that the meetings Iijima has had with top government officials are designed to make South Korean and U.S. officials worried that Japan is about to cut a deal undermining ongoing denuclearization and military pull back efforts. (Link)

But a breakthrough, even a lousy one, should be welcomed, right?

As I noted earlier, the complete lack of coordination between the Government of Japan and the governments of the United States, South Korea and seemingly China...and the only-Abe-could-get-away-with-this keeping in the dark of the families of the abducted are indicators that Abe has something in the works similar to, if not commensurate with, the Nixon Shock (Nikuson shokku).

If Iijima has secured a deal in Pyongyang regarding a resolution of the abductees issue then that deal could be put to the Cabinet for Cabinet Decision (kakugi kettei) during the its regularly scheduled meeting today (Friday). Prime Minister Abe could then call a special press conference starting at, if experience is any guide, 18:00 local time.

We shall see.

Image courtesy: Sankei News

She's Not There - Futenma-to-Henoko Edition

Well no one told me about her.
What could I do?
Well no one told me about her
Though they all knew.

But it's too late to say you're sorry.
How would I know, why should I care?
Please don't bother trying to find her,
She's not there.

The Zombies, "She's Not There" (1964)

All photographs are manipulations, saying as much (or more) about the attitudes of the photographer and the editor as what really occurred.

The above image of Consumer Affairs Minister Fukushima Mizuho and Prime Minister Hatoyama Yukio in the Diet yesterday graces the front page of my newspaper this morning. It is assumed to speak volumes, silently, in shared visual language all understand.

Image courtesy: The Mainichi Shimbun

Will Fukushima Mizuho Force Prime Minister Hatoyama's Hand?

Article 68

1) The Prime Minister shall appoint the Ministers of State. However, a majority of their number must be chosen from among the members of the Diet.

2) The Prime Minister may remove the Ministers of State as he chooses.

- The Constitution of Japan (1946)

As a preface to this post, please read Ethan Chua's argument that the biggest loser from the Futenma climbdown is the Social Democratic Party.

I take exception with Mr. Chua's conclusion. The biggest losers from the Futenma climbdown are still likely to be the Prime Minister and Chief Cabinet Secretary Hirano Hirofumi, both of whom have watched their reputations evanesce away into air. No amount of apologizing, prevaricating or pandering can give them the least bit of political substance.

Minister of Consumer Affairs Fukushima Mizuho and the SDP, however, seem to be preparing to walk away from the smoldering wreckage of the Hatoyama fallback with their reputations for principled intransigence intact. In appearance after appearance in Okinawa today, Fukushima made clear that she will not vote in favor of the government plan outlined this weekend to move the personnel and materiel of MCAS Futenma to a new offshore base to be built outside Camp Schwab in Henoko -- basically the plan outlined in the 2006 roadmap.

If Fukushima votes no at the plan's presentation to the Cabinet on Friday, she will provoke a stunning political showdown. Without the unanimous consent of the Cabinet, the plan cannot be considered a Cabinet Decision (kakugi kettei). It can only be a Prime Minister's Statement (shusho hatsugen) -- and according to press reports, Fukushima is ready to oppose the bill's even receiving this lower level of official status.

Furthermore --and someone should correct me if I am wrong here -- but if the plan does not receive the imprematur of a kakugi kettei, it cannot be presented in the Diet as a government bill (naikaku teishutsu hoan or seifuan). Hirano has argued that a Prime Minister's Statement, if it receives the understanding (ryokai) of the Cabinet is just as good as a Cabinet Decision -- but since Fukushima says she will oppose a Prime Minister's Statement, this attempt to find a work-around seems moot. Instead the bill would have to be presented as a Diet member's bill (giin teishutsu hoan), forcing the Prime Minister to either submit the bill in his own name with the signatures of 20 members of the House of Representatives or 10 members of the House of Councillors in support of it, or find a close ally to submit it instead.

Prime Minister Hatoyama can round up the signatures of 20 House of Representatives members in a second, of course. However, the humiliation of failing to win the unquestioned support of the Cabinet he himself picked makes this route the last one he would want to take.

The alternative is for Prime Minister Hatoyama somehow prevent Fukushima from voting no at Friday's regular Cabinet meeting. He and other Cabinet ministers, while indicting their rage at Fukushima's visit and statements, have tried to open a little political wiggle room for Fukushima to back out of her threat, saying that she traveled to Okinawa and made her statements not as a minister of the Japanese government, but as the head of her party.

Such casuistry will probably not lure Fukushima into backing down. Her party is facing the potential loss of all its seats up for election this year, including, it should be noted, hers. Having lost the support of, over the last 15 years, those hating the Liberal Democratic Party, the pacifists, the labor unions and true believers in socialism, the SDP has no natural constituency to keep it alive.

However, if the party can sell itself as the member of the revolutionary coalition that did not sell out the Okinawans, that held firm to its beliefs, it might win support amongst Japan's currently demoralized hardcore pacifists and the smoldering anti-American left.

If Fukushima does not back down before Thursday, when the DSP will hold a meeting that is sure to request that she vote against the Prime Minister's new plan, then Hatoyama may have no choice but to fire her. Under Article 68 of the constitution the prime minister has the right to arbitrarily (nin'i) remove any state minister from office.

The results of firing Fukushima could be even worse than letting her vote against the government's plans, however. While her party is numerically irrelevant in terms of the passage of bills through the Diet, its expulsion from the coalition will draw an immediate, negative response from the People's New Party, which is currently unenthusiastic albeit not opposed to the government's Futenma-to-Henoko proposal.

PNP president Kamei Shizuka, after talking to Fukushima on the telephone about the impending collision yesterday, has indeed suggested that Hatoyama needs to take two steps back, not even calling the plan a Prime Minister's Statement. Instead, he has suggested that Hatoyama refer to his plan simply as "a plan that is currently being undertaken" (tsukochu no an). As for Fukushima's seemingly suicidal devotion to principle, he is quoted as telling her, "Look, that government plan has no chance of being realized. To leave the coalition and go to an honorable death over a plan that cannot be realized is idiotic."

So for those who think that Hatoyama has, at great political cost, successfully sold out the Okinawans and the Socialists, staving off a crisis with the United States with a plan that essentially replicates the major elements of the plan LDP agreed to in 2006, hang on to your hats.

This is going to be a fun next three days.

I Am the Voice of the Zaikai...Pay Heed To Me

"I find you unworthy."

I had though that yesterday morning's rushed Cabinet Decision (kakugi kettei) endorsing the Prime Minister's plan to have the proceeds from gasoline taxes shifted from road construction to the general fund in 2009 would supply sufficient political cover for the ruling coalition as it used its two-thirds majority in the House of Representatives to override the House of Councillors's rejection of the 10 year, 59 trillion yen road construction bill.

Evidently the editors of the Nihon Keizai Shimbun, the readers and leaders of conservative corporate opinion (and no friends of the Democratic Party of Japan, believe you me) were nevertheless unimpressed by the Cabinet's tail-covering exercise:

A spineless conversion to the general fund is impermissible
May 14, 2008

The Road Financing Special Measures bill, which retains for 10 years the special tax revenues for road construction, has been passed by the House of Representatives through use of the two-thirds majority. It has now become law. The law clearly contradicts the stated policy of Prime Minister Fukuda Yasuo who promises to switch the full amount to general fund in fiscal year 2009. Having forcibly passed a bill as is without correcting it is deplorable...

The Prime Minister and the Cabinet were all smiles after the override vote...but with every victory, this impatient and innumerate ruling coalition loses more and more support.

What drives them to win the battles but lose the war?