Koshi'ishi Stays

Contrary to my assertions of Friday, Prime Minister Noda Yoshihiko has asked Democratic Party of Japan Secretary-General Koshi'ishi Azuma to remain at his post.

The press has asserted that despite Koshi'ishi's failure to keep some 70 members of the DPJ's Diet delegation from departing during his tenure, his presence is still needed to reassure the remaining disaffected elements in the party that their voices will be heard.

Noda may have indeed been planning to replace Koshi'ishi, only to reverse himself, due to a realization of how close the ruling coalition is to losing its once massive majority in the House of Representatives. More likely, however, the multiple meetings with Azuma over the weekend, ending in a plea for Azuma to stay on, was a careful concocted bit of theater, intent on convincing the losers in Friday's leadership contest that the central core of 220 Noda loyalists will pay attention to the party's fringe elements.

Koshi'ishi's retention as the party's main elections organizer sends a strong signal that elections are not imminent. Koshi'ishi is not credible and may lack the stamina to be the point man of an election pitting the DPJ not only against a default-vote LDP but an untried and as yet unassessable Japan Restoration Party.

Furthermore, the process of rendering the electoral district map constitutional will be a process of several months, not just a pair of votes in the House of Representatives and the House of Councillors.

First, the August reform bill is dead. Diet rules declare null and void bills passed by one House but not accepted in committee in the other House by the end of a Diet session. This is what happened to the bond issuance and electoral reform bills passed by the House of Representatives in an August 28 pre-emptive strike against the August 29 censure vote against the prime minister.

That the same electoral reform bill of August, a combination of the Liberal Democratic Party's so-call +0/-5 solution to the disparity in voting strengths in between the nation's largest and smallest electoral districts, a reduction of the number of proportional seat members in the House of Representatives and a mixed voting system for the remaining proportional seats, will not reappear is a virtual given. The August bill had been designed to fail, combining LDP and New Komeito ideas into a horrible chimera about which the opposition parties could never come to decision whether to accept or reject.

When the new, revised bill comes out of the DPJ's policy research council and receives Cabinet approval, however long that process will take, the draft will likely be so different from the August bill and so favorable to presumed DPJ strongholds that the LDP will gag. The resulting standoff between the two parties will extend for several more weeks, until a final reform bill can win passage from both Houses.

Only then will begin the process of resetting the boundaries of electoral districts, which have, since the last electoral reform, become scrambled by local municipality mergers and population shifts. This process, according a Tokyo Shimbun analysis, will take another two to three months (J).

So even if the ruling and major opposition parties come to a consensus on a basic electoral reform bill in the first weeks of October, an event which is extremely unlikely, the final electoral districts bill will probably not win passage before the end of the fall extraordinary session. This will leave the opposition gnashing its teeth until the 2013 regular Diet session, which means sometime in January.

The strugge over electoral districts would, of course, only become more tortured if a majority of the House of Representatives vote in favor of a motion of no confidence against the Cabinet. Noda wants to both keep his present job and chaos to a minimum. The LDP, which has demonstrated a disturbing nihilism, cannot be trusted to go along with Noda to prevent this catastrophe.

Hence the importance of retaining Koshi'ishi to keep the less-than-reliable DPJ troops in line when the crunch time comes during the extraordinary session.

Tanigaki's Reelection: Deader Than Elvis

Elvis Presley, of course.

Liberal Democratic Party president Tanigaki Sadakazu drifted further down in his Kurztian course yesterday.

In what should have been a mere formality, he called upon Koga Makoto, leader of the Kochikai (Koga Faction). A formality because Tanigaki is himself a member of the Kochikai, having merged his own faction, also called the Kochikai, with Koga's in May of 2008, first in order to order to reunite the sundered original Kochikai, which split into two competing groups in 2001 and second and more importantly, to gain leverage through numbers in intra-LDP fights for position and spoils.

Now as the champion of the rebuilt Koseikai, albeit arising out of the far smaller of the two shards of the original faction, Tanigaki should, out of the bonds of loyalty that bind LDP members to one another even when their bonding makes zero sense in terms of ideology or general election strategy, have received Koga's support.

Tanigaki did not get it. (E)

Koga has been a known opponent of the Tanigaki doctrine of taking a confrontational stance toward the Democratic Party of Japan's every proposal in a bid to force a House of Representatives election. He encouraged cooperation, being a major back room facilitator of the DPJ-LDP-New Komeito agreement to pass the bills reforming the social welfare and pension systems, including the raising of the consumption tax.

The LDP's voting on August 29 in support of the seven party censure motion, which condemned the three party agreement, infuriated Koga. He could not, would not support Tanigaki's continued reign as party president. (J)

Without the support of his faction behind him in the party election, Tanigaki has essentially zero chance of rounding up the even the 20 signatures necessary for applying to be a candidate. No one wants to be associated with a politician who has been cast off by his faction leader.

Unwilling as ever to comprehend that some things are just impossible, Tanigaki has yet to call it a day.

By the way, unlike Tanigaki's reelection chances, the other Elvis is quite alive...and laughing at himself.

Tanigaki Sadakazu In The Heart Of His Darkness

Willard: They told me that you had gone totally insane, and that your methods were unsound.

Kurtz: Are my methods unsound?

Willard: I don't see any method at all, sir.

- Apocalypse Now (1979)

There are number of ways one can betray oneself. One can violate one's stated principles. One can behave in a manner that defies simple logic. One can act in a way that leads one's friends to abandon you.

In general, it is best to avoid all of the above.

However, there are times that we flawed creatures really, really, really want something so badly we are willing to betray ourselves. In these cases is still best to limit oneself to one of the above forms of self-injury on any given day.

Yesterday, the Liberal Democratic Party and their leader Tanigaki Sadakazu threw that concept into the fire.

Immediately after the Democratic Party of Japan's ramming of the bond issuance bill and the electoral reform bill through a just short of half-empty House of Representatives, the LDP and the New Komeito submitted to the House of Councillors a childish and nearly parodic motion of censure to that House's president.

The two parties wanted to have a vote on their motion the next day.

Unfortunately for the two parties, they had not conferred with the other opposition parties in the House of Councillors, whose votes they needed for the LDP-New Komeito motion to pass. When negotiators from the two parties went to meet their peers in the other opposition parties, they were aghast to find out that the other parties wanted the LDP and the New Komeito to vote for their censure motion, which had been sitting on ice in the House of Councillors since August 7.

Since the August 7 bill of censure contained a condemnation of the DPJ-LDP-New Komeito Three Party Agreement on the passage of the social welfare and pension bills -- and singled out for condemnation the consumption tax bill, which the LDP and New Komeito had both voted for, the tax rise indeed being a campaign promise of the LDP -- voting for such a censure motion would seem out of the question.

However, to everyone's surprise but those who know how deep the rot inside the LDP extends, the LDP leadership said:

"OK, if you are adamant about this, we are cool with voting for your motion."

Which immediately led to the New Komeito asking for time for "an adjustment" (chosei) of the atttack on the prime minister.

I would have loved to have been at that strategy meeting...

New Komeito Member (slowly, as if in distress): "OK, let me see if I have this straight.

You want us to vote in favor of a censure motion condemning the Three Party Agreement, an agreement to which we were two of the three Parties...and which also condemns the legislation agreed upon in that agreement, that we, together with a wounded DPJ, dutifully voted in favor of in the House of Councillors...legislation which, may I remind you, was not in the DPJ's manifesto, but in the LDP's manifesto.

Please tell me that this is not the plan."

LDP Member (grinning): "That's the plan!"

At which point the New Komeito delegation probaly told -- or should have told -- their peers in their longtime alliance partner:

"We twisted the arms of our local party organizations to forge this alliance. We took a huge blow to our reputation as the party of peace by voting with you on the dispatch of Maritime Self Defense Forces ships to the Indian Ocean. We hung with you when you tried to turn back the clock to the pre-war era under Abe Shinzo. We got wiped out in the 2009 House of Representatives election because of our association with you. Our district vote switching in that election saved your party from utter annihilation.

We have been through hell and high water with you.

But this, this insane.

Sorry, but you're on your own now."

I have said it before -- when the religious party in a secular-religious party coalition is the voice of logic, moderation, patience and the dirtying ones' hands in the service of a greater good -- then you are suffering from a serious breakdown in the natural order.

Undeterred by their friends having abandoned them, the LDP yesterday linked arms with the remaining opposition parties in the House of Councillors, including the People's First Party headed by the LDP's arch-foe and designated punching bag Ozawa Ichiro, to pass the August 7 motion of censure, the New Komeito's members walking out of the chamber before the vote.

The motion passed, 129 votes to 91.

Ostensibly, the passage of the motion of censure means the current Diet session is over. The House of Representatives can continue to carry out its business. The House of Councillors, according to tradition if not law or rule, goes on immediate hiatus. The tradition of ceasing all business after a motion of censure is a reason why under normal conditions, the House of Councillors has indulged in this non-binding nonsense on what had been previously determined to be the last day of the Diet session.

We live, however, in abnormal times. The inability of one man, Tanigaki Sadakazu, to accept that he has never had what it takes to be LDP president, much less Prime Minister of Japan -- and the inability of the LDP presidential hopefuls in the top leadership, with their vested interest in maintaining the status of the office of the president even as it was being dragged down by an incompetent -- have left the LDP sans sense, sans morality, sans anything.

OK, Morons. Now What?

Yamaguchi Kunio Natsuo (L) and Tanigaki Sadakazu (R) are Leader and President of the New Komeito and the LDP, respectively.

As can be expected in these lamest of times, the Liberal Democratic Party and the New Komeito, having failed to halt the passage of the bond isuance and electoral reform bills in the House of Representatives, submitted at a velocity somewhat faster than the speed of thought a censure motion to the President of the House of Councillors.

So what happens now?

All business in the House of Councillors comes to a halt, the motion taking precedence. The membership gathers in the plenary chamber. The parties submitting the motion explain their reasons for submitting the motion. The chamber votes.

Should the measure pass, nothing of consequence happens, as a censure motion has no legal effect. The prime minister, however, will be persona non grata in the House, stripped of the dignity of his office.

The presumed result is that the House of Councillors will cease to conduct any of its business, despite the Diet's still being in session -- the continued acceptance of high salaries for no work being extremely popular with the taxpayers. (J)

I am looking forward to the LDP's and the New Komeito's speeches. New levels of casuistry will be necessary to prevent folks from laughing.

The prime minister's faults:

- "He convinced us to vote for a rise in the consumption tax, which was our own policy."

- "He has increased Japan's international prestige by keeping his cool at a time when Japan is beset with challenges to its territories and territorial claims."

- "He disposed of non-Japanese activists landing on the Senkakus in exactly the same way Koizumi Jun'ichiro did."

- "He has led his party into passing a bill that provides the legal basis for the government to pay its bills."

- "He has led his party into passing an electoral reform bill that a) resolves the issue of the unconstitutionality of the districts due to over- and under-representation, b) cuts the cost of government by eliminating 40 seats of the House of Representatives and 3) increases the chances of the smaller parties to win seats."

A damning list, to be sure.

The live broadcast from the House of Councillors chamber is scheduled to begin at 10:00 a.m., accessible at http://www.webtv.sangiin.go.jp/webtv/index.php.

Photo image credit: Kyodo News

The Ignobility Of Failure

Soon oh soon the light
Pass within and soothe this endless night
And wait here for you
Our reason to be here...

Yes, "The Gates of Delirium" (1974)

Soon.

Soon (chikai uchi ni).

The Diet will be dissolved...soon.

That is the promise Liberal Democratic Party president Tanigaki Sadakazu was able to wring out of Prime Minister Noda Yoshihiko last night, after threatening to submit a no confidence motion in the House of Representatives and a censure motion in the House of Councillors if the PM did not commit to a dissolution before September 9.

After the leadership of the LDP spent the afternoon mocking the prime minister's offer of a dissolution "in the near future" (chikai shorai ni), asking what the heck it meant and demanding a precise date. "'In the near future?' It is ridiculous to think we would ever agree to that," declared LDP Diet Affairs Committee Chairman Kishida Fumio. (J)

For all the energy expended and all the threats, what the LDP has won is the status quo ante. Actually, it came out with less than when it embarked on this campaign of confrontation: its members cannot vote for the no confidence motion six mini- and micro-parties submitted to the House of Representatives and the censure motion seven caucuses submitted to the House of Councillors. (J)

Noda did not cover himself with glory either, at least not on the surface. He agreed to wield the "treasured sword passed down through the generations" (denka no hoto) -- the fancy-pants term for a dissolution of the Diet -- at the request of the LDP.

However, Noda stayed true to the promise he made to his fellow party members yesterday afternoon: that he would not give the LDP a precise date for a dissolution of the Diet. (J)

Furthermore Noda knows -- and one hopes by now the rest of the DPJ knows -- that the meaning of "soon" depends upon how deeply the LDP is willing to injure itself. A House of Representatives election cannot be held until the matter of the unconstitutionality of the districts is settled. If the LDP wants an election "soon" it will have to acquiesce to a DPJ redistricting bill, the details of which are going to make the LDP gag.

As for Tanigaki, this is his Waterloo. He needed to break the Noda government in order to have a chance at reelection in September.

As at Waterloo, the outcome was "a damn nice thing." Noda's fate was not fully secure until the sudden and timely intercession of the six-party and seven-caucus coalitions. Their submissions of motions of no confidence and censure on the 7th scrambled Tanigaki's and the LDP's schedule of attack.

Ever wonder if Ozawa Ichiro's breakaway from the DPJ was an act of political theater meant to confuse the LDP? Sometimes I do.

As for the LDP as a whole, it is in grave peril. Party discipline, which has always been a thing of wonder, will be tested on the no confidence and censure votes. There will be a whirl of activity today, as the leadership tries to keep members of the party from voting for the motions.


Later - Veteran newsman Tahara So'ichiro, writing for Nikkei BP Net, offers a theory: that LDP faction heads, together with Oshima Tadamori, the Talleyrand of LDP politics, cooked up a Tanigaki attempt to renegotiate done deal as a means of guaranteeing Tanigaki's not being reelected party leader in September. (J)

The Mini- And Micro-Parties Wing the DPJ And Clobber the LDP

There were a lot of long, exhausted faces at Liberal Democratic Party headquarters yesterday. A basic fact of life had sunk in: nobody loves the LDP.

Check out this [TBS video report - link already dead] NHK video report of the leaders minus Tanigaki filing into headquarters yesterday (WARNING – link will likely fail within 24 hours). Even someone knowing not a jot of Japanese can tell from LDP Secretary-General Ishihara Nobuteru’s blank stare and flat diction that his real message is: "Disregard what my lips and tongue are saying. I do not want to be here. If you do not believe what I am saying, don't worry: I don't either."

The LDP and its coalition partner the New Komeito had been hoping to have their cake and eat it too: first vote with the government on a set of reform bills including a rise in the consumption tax, then turn around and submit a motion of no confidence against the Cabinet in the House of Representatives and a motion of censure against Prime Minister Noda Yoshihiko in the House of Councillors.

Coalitions of the mini- and micro-parties of the Diet blew that plan to splinters yesterday. A six-party coalition submitted their own no confidence motion to the Speaker of the House of Representatives. A seven-caucus coalition submitted a motion of censure to the president of the House of Councillors. (E)

Under the rules of order of both Houses, these submissions put all other Diet business on hold, pending the outcomes of the votes on these two bills. This includes the House of Councillors vote on the reform bills, which the LDP had seemingly forced the DPJ to move forward to today (August 8).

The only way the LDP can delay a vote on these no confidence and censure bills is to submit its own two bills, which the party has threatened to do if Prime Minister Noda does not promise today to dissolve the Diet within the next 40 days.

The LDP’s original deadline for action by the prime minister was yesterday. However, yesterday passed by without prime ministerial action. One can pretty much expect the same lack of action today.

If the LDP follows through with its threats to submit its own versions of the bills, the attempted flanking action runs up against a wall of procedure. Which versions of the no-confidence and censure motions make it to the floor is a matter of trans-party negotiations. Since the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the president of the House of Councillors are both members of the DPJ, though on hiatus from membership during their tenures in their offices, the likelihood that the LDP versions of the two bills will win out is nil.

In theory, the LDP could treat the six-party and seven-caucus submissions with contempt, absenting themselves from the votes saying:

"We are the main party of opposition. Nothing happens without us. You did this without consulting with us. We do not care what is on offer: we do not vote on motions where we have been passed over and our views not considered."

Such a strategy has an Achilles heel, however. There is a rule – but an unwritten one (kanrei) – that a House cannot consider the same bill twice in a single Diet session. The LDP’s voting down or abstaining from the vote on the six-party coalition motion or the seven-caucus motion would, under the accepted patterns parliamentary behavior, shut the door on revisiting the substance of those motions until the fall extraordinary session of the Diet.

Of course, the LDP could try to argue that the rule is an unwritten one, and submit a no-confidence motion or a motion of censure after the vote on the consumption tax bill. The news media and public's reaction to the LDP's opposing a piece of legislation only to resubmit it later would be ferocious.

Furthermore, a major party has a strong incentive to uphold the informal rules of order of the Diet, lest under its rule, the opposition, in a tit-for-tat response, flouts the rules to the point that the Diet becomes unmanageable.

A contrarian option remains open, whereby the LDP abstains or votes down the six-party coalition’s no-confidence motion and the censure motion now, freeing up the House of Councillors to vote on the reform package. The LDP then submits a motion for a vote of confidence in the Cabinet in the House of Representatives, which it then votes against.

This option is freakish (submitting a bill in order to vote against it?) and has not, to my knowledge, been discussed by major commentators. However, it does not violate the "one vote on a single bill per session" (ichiji fusaigi) principle.

As for the six-party and seven-caucus coalitions, all of their members deserve a bouquet from the DPJ. This includes, perversely, the People's Life First and Kizuna parties, which are composed of DPJ defectors. While submitting a no-confidence motion in the House of Representatives and a censure motion in the House of Councillors seems a strange way of making oneself beloved of the DPJ and the prime minister, the timing of submission has both tied the LDP up in knots and damaged the LDP's relations with its partner the New Komeito.

The mini- and micro-parties have their issues with the Democratic Party of Japan. There are many things that the mini- and micro-parties want that they are not getting. However, the leaders of the mini- and micro-parties are not nearly so stupid as to believe that they will receive the benefits they seek following a return to power by the LDP.

A pair of motions that appear to attack the DPJ but in fact box in the LDP, driving its leaders to commit absurd acts, are very much to the mini- and micro-parties’ liking. That the motions can be submitted out of what seems to be principle, opposing a raising of the consumption tax because an increased tax rate will have a depressive effect on the national economy, is icing on the cake.

Rushing Forward With No Confidence

On Sunday, I put forth the proposition that Koizumi Shinjiro's visit to Liberal Democratic Party headquarters accelerated LDP moves toward submitting either a no-confidence motion against the Cabinet or a censure motion against prime minister Noda Yoshihiko. Koizumi, walking very much in his father's footsteps and also reflecting his long stint in Washington, has become the face of the free market/low tax wing of the LDP, especially since The Big Man, Nakagawa Hidenao, has been put on ice.

In pushing a plant to threaten the PM with a no-confidence motion or censure, Koizumi was also the representative of the members of the LDP who had resigned themselves to the June 15 three-way LDP, the New Komeito and Democratic Party of Japan agreement to vote for consumption tax bill in both Houses of the Diet. Not a few in the LDP were sure the consumption tax issue would lead to the breakup of the DPJ.

The controversy over the raising of the consumption tax did indeed lead to a breakup, with Ozawa Ichiro leading his followers out of the DPJ. However, to the disappointment of those who thought the breakup would result in the DPJ-led coalition losing its majority in the House of Representatives, Ozawa led out of the DPJ only about half of the legislators purportedly under his influence -- well short of the number of rebels needed to transform the DPJ-led coalition into a minority government.

When Koizumi and his six youthful fellow LDP members bullrushed the office of the LDP party president, however, they were pushing on an open door. LDP president Tanigaki Sadakazu has known that in order for him to win reelection in the party presidential election in September, he had to have something to show for his first term.

He had to foment a crisis, and in this month.

The dispute over the date of the House of Councillors vote on the consumption tax was too small potatoes for this purpose, at first glance. The LDP proposed to have the vote on the 10th; the DPJ and Prime Minister, wanting delay action in the Diet so that they might cut deals on legislation with Tanigaki's successor, proposed a vote on the 20th.

The DPJ offer was only an initial bargaining position, though. The party's negotiators, in talks with LDP and New Komeito representatives, indicated the August 10th date was acceptable. (J)

Taken aback, the LDP violated all normal negotiating procedures and proposed a vote on the 8th -- a counter proposal to which the DPJ, while indulging in the requisite amount of whining at the LDP's duplicity, agreed to yesterday. (J)

Of course, in the meantime, in the face of the DPJ's violent accommodation to every one of the LDP's wishes, the LDP presented a further demand -- that Prime Minister Noda make a public commitment (kakuyaku) to dissolve the Diet after the House of Councillors vote on the consumption tax legislation. Otherwise the LDP would submit either a no-confidence motion or a censure motion or both.

The Prime Minister, who if anything is calm and controlled in his responses, told the LDP yesterday that the dissolution of the Diet was his problem, the timing of which was up to him and nobody else (J). A seemingly now hysterical LDP leadership responded by vowing to go through with its threatened submission of a no-confidence motion or a censure motion today, and to renege on the June 15 agreement. (J)

It is a rare thing when the representatives of a small religious party have to pay a visit to the headquarters of a large secular party in order to tell the secular party "Calm down or else." Nevertheless, that is what leaders of the LDP's longtime ally the New Komeito, their faces grim, had to do last night (J). Presumably they explained to their LDP counterparts that if an election were held, the LDP-New Komeito alliance would lack a majority in either House of the Diet -- and that no third party would cut any deals on passage of legislation with an LDP that has a history of backing out of major, signed agreements.

So all by indications, Tanigaki has triggered the political crisis he needed. Unfortunately, it seems to be leading to his own private Waterloo, rather than the overthrow of the Noda government he has desired.


Later - This post has been edited for clarity.

This Is So Not The News

"Mr. Prime Minister, if I could have a moment. The members of the House of Councillors of the Liberal Democratic Party, in protest of your decision to not fire the two ministers the House censured, are not attending committee sessions examining major pending bills."

"That's right, they're not."

"So even though this is boycott is preventing the discussion of major parts of your policy program, you are not planning to fire the two ministers."

"The two ministers are reflecting deeply on their actions. So as to the following up on the demands to fire the pair, I'm not going to do it."

"Despite the deadlock in the Diet and the demands from the opposition for elections, or whispered plans of a quid pro quo where you dissolve the House of Representatives and call for elections in return for opposition votes on the bills establishing the legal basis for a rise in the consumption tax, and of course your inability to establish any kind of internal consensus within the Democratic Party of Japan on these bills, you are not planning to call elections, correct?

"I wish to strengthen the unity of the government and the opposition in grappling with these issues, so no, I am not planning to hold elections at this time*."

"Well, there you have it folks. From Dulles Airport, Commonwealth of Virginia, all the news that is not going to happen."

That is the gist of this article posted by the Yomiuri Shimbun.

For no apparent reason.

----------------------
* NHK announcer Okoshi Kensuke, in a special live interview on the 9 o'clock news, managed to squeeze out of Prime Minister Noda Yoshihiko the admission that the current electoral districts for the House of Representatives are unconstitutional. Okoshi could not, however, pressure the prime minister into admitting that it was impossible to call an election. (J). Instead the PM launched into the same rigmarole as in the main text, about the many important bills to be considered this session.

This is what is called "staying on message."

Given 'Em The Axe, The Axe, The Axe

"Give 'em the axe, where?
Right in the neck, the neck, the neck!"

- The Stanford University Axe chant

Aside from the Prime Minister and Chief Cabinet Minister Fujimura Osamu, Tanaka Naoki and Maeda Takeshi have been my favorite members of the current Cabinet. Given how much the latter two ministers have done to damage, sully or otherwise trash the reputation of the Noda Government and the Democratic Party of Japan, it is has only been natural to write about them (click on the labels below for earlier posts). I could have written so much more, too...

However, it seems these halcyon days are drawing to a close. Rather than play with Tanaka and Maeda as a cat would with mortally-injured-but-still-living mice, the opposition trio of the Liberal Democratic Party, the Your Party and the New Renaissance Party yesterday submitted motions of censure against both men to the president of the House of Councillors. The censure votes will come on Friday, with passage a seeming mathematical certainty. (E)

I heartily support the censure motions. If any pair of ministers has deserved the axe, this pair has.

I have two reservations tempering my glee, however.

First, Noda Yoshihiko should have fired both of these morons himself the moment each first cast doubts upon the ethical or intellectual standards of the Cabinet, rather than giving them time to add to their pewter reputations and besmirch his and the DPJ's rule.

Second, the LDP has debased the censure motion. It will be hard for the public and possibly historians to see a difference between the censures Tanaka and Maeda and those of Ichikawa Tatsuo and Yamaoka Kenji. These latter motions were passed on the last day of the last year's extraordinary session of the Diet in what looked like a fit of pique. Ichikawa started out as a defense idiot but grew into his job over the course of the Diet session. Yamaoka was censured not anything he had done as minister but for not renouncing his support from direct-marketers. Censuring Ichikawa and Yamaoka was done not for actions by the ministers but with the goal of sowing confusion within the DPJ, as both Ichikawa and Yamaoka were Ozawa Ichiro supporters, through and through.

Defenders of the LDP will point out that the DPJ, in its time in opposition, filed a blizzard of censure motions. While true, the claim elides over the crucial point that prior to the takeover of the government by the DPJ, only one cabinet minister had ever been forced to resign after being censured: Nukaga Fukushiro in 1998. Since the LDP-led opposition seized control of the House of Councillors in July 2010, however, it has used the censure motion to force the resignation of four cabinet ministers and is set to hack down two more.

Use of the censure motion when the opposition has the power to halt the progress of non-budget legislation carries with it the danger of censure becoming nothing more that a blunt instrument of political mischief-making, rather than a weapon of righteous anger or for shaking when political circumstances render the opposition impotent.


Later - The morning's NHK plain white rice news show Ohayo Nippon had person-on-the-street interviews regarding yesterday's submissions. Voters -- men and women, young and old -- all thought the opposition was abusing the power to censure.

Later still - The Asahi Shimbun offers its two yen's worth, not significantly different from my own. (E)

It Was A Drag When You Left; It Was A Drag When You Were Here

With the flameouts and censures last fall of Defense Minister Ishikawa Tatsuo and Consumer Affairs Minister Yamaoka Kenji, the two close confidants of Ozawa Ichiro in the Cabinet, the cabinet of Prime Minister Noda Yoshihiko became essentially Ozawa-influence free. In order to fill the holes in the cabinet ranks he appointed Tanaka Naoki, a weak Ozawa ally (and a defense ignoramus) as his new minister of defense and the incompetent Hirano Hirofumi, former Prime Minister Hatoyama Yukio's right hand man, as his minister of education, culture, sports, science and technology -- the latter choice seemingly an attempt to drive a wedge between the underrepresented Ozawa and his ally/puppet Hatoyama.

However, as a part of his promise to be a "no sides" leader of the ruling party – i.e., willing to appoint members of all the Democratic Party of Japan's various sub-groups to positions in the government and the party, the sub-cabinet level senior vice-ministerial and parliamentary vice-ministerial posts were filled chock-a-block with Ozawa loyalists.

So it was not terribly surprising that in what may have been meant as a symbolic action on Friday night, four Ozawa loyalists offered their letters of resignation from their government posts, this after the Cabinet approved the bill raising the consumption tax to 10%. Nor was it terribly surprising that 29 Ozawa loyalists offered their letters of resignation from their party posts over the weekend.

Today, Prime Minister Noda, after indicating he would ask the four sub-cabinet officials to withdraw their resignations, brought the resignation letters to the Cabinet, which promptly accepted them. (J)

One reason given for this change of heart is the demand, made by the Liberal Democratic Party yesterday (before, during or after the storm?) that the party status of Financial Services Minister Jimi Shozaburo and the four Ozawa loyalists be clarified before the LDP would acknowledge the government’s representatives sent to Diet committee meetings. (J)

While the complaints of the main opposition party might play a part in the Prime Minister Noda's calculations, his following through on the acceptance of the resignation of the four is only a means to pretend to follow the LDP's lead when he is indeed acting out of his own self-interest. One cannot avoid the impression that LDP leaders have transformed themselves into the Sideshow Bobs of this process, barking complete nonsense from the sidelines. As for Noda, he asked his least credible interlocutor, Chief Cabinet Secretary Fujimura Osamu, to make the calls asking for the four Friday night walkouts to come back.

Accepting the resignation of the four sub-cabinet officials sends two messages. One is to the 29 DPJ MPs who have tendered their resignations from their party posts. The message reads, "Don't believe what the papers say. You're next."

The other message is to Ozawa Ichiro himself. It most likely reads something like, "If you, of your own volition, want to rid the DPJ of your influence by having your people resign from their government and party positions, be my guest. Oh, and by the way, if you have been reading the papers, you may have noticed that the LDP and the New Komeito have targeted your friend Tanaka for a censure motion (E). Considering how much he has done for me and my reputation, please do not expect me to fight too hard on his behalf."

The JNN Poll of February 4-5 - A Quick Review

This is a "catch it while you can" post.


TBS has put up the results of its telephone public opinion poll taken February 4-5 (J).

The key takeaways from the post are:

Support for the cabinet has declined to 32.2%, while the percentage of those not supporting the Cabinet has risen to 66.6%. The decline in the Noda Cabinet's support numbers have been uninterrupted since the cabinet's inauguration, with no bounce at all from the cabinet reshuffle of January 13.

This news would be terrible news for Noda if it were not for the conveniently provided numbers for the Kan Cabinet, which stood at 28.3% at the time of the opening of last year's regular session of the Diet. Of course at the time the Kan Cabinet was reeling from the horrible mishandling of the Chinese fishing boat collision and subsequent leak of the video of that collision (a pair of extraordinary blunders that Sengoku Yoshito walked away from with a censure from the House of Councillors. That Sengoku is now in charge of drafting the DPJ's new electoral manifesto shows that some folks and organizations never learn).　Kan received a bump due to his efforts post-3/11 but never regained the popularity Noda enjoys now.

As for the reasons why voters do not support the Noda Cabinet, the tired old "Because we have no hopes for his policies" occupies the top spot with 42% of all those not supporting the Cabinet. The reason why this is tired and old is that "no hopes for his policies" is always in the top spot, that or "no hopes for improving the economy" -- something a prime minister nowadays has almost no control over. As for not implementing policies, in a previous post I have indicated that there is, quite on the contrary, a great deal of movement toward the implementation of policies, if not quite the policies of the DPJ per se.

- As for the fraught legislation raising the consumption tax from 5% to 10% by fiscal year 2015, a majority of those polled, 56% are in favor, with 46% opposed. This is good news for the Noda government, for which the passage of the consumption tax legislation is the highest hurdle in its agenda for the current Diet session.

- Demonstrating that "by the year 2075" has not yet stuck in the voters heads as the height of absurdity, the further 7.1% rise in the consumption tax projected to be need by that date in order to pay for the 2009 manifesto promise of a floor of 70,000 yen per month in national pension payments is unpopular with 72% of the voters. These voters want the DPJ to reconsider its 2009 pledge -- no matter that only a small fraction of those offering this opinion will still be alive in 2075.

- Demonstrating that the sudden burst of activity in regionalist politics is having an effect on voters, 75% of those polled believe it desirable that regional parties participate in national politics. Unsurprisingly, the top vote getter among politicians that the voters find themselves drawn to is Osaka City mayor Hashimoto Toru, the poster child of the regionalist movement. Number two on the voters' mind is Tokyo Metropolitan District Governor Ishihara Shintaro, who has allied himself in name with Hashimoto's proposed administrative reforms in Osaka Prefecture. Coming in in third place is current Prime Minister Noda Yoshihiko.

Though it does not appear in the above linked report, the JNN poll found the support numbers for the main national parties still on a downward slide, with the popularity of both the DPJ and the Liberal Democratic Party below 20% and falling from last month's reading. The continuing decline in DPJ and LDP numbers is good for the country as it reduces to nil the enthusiasm of either party to face the voters in a snap election. These figures and the sudden irruption of interest in the regional parties going national are strong incentives for the two main national parties, along with the LDP's alliance partner the New Komeito, to produce a solid record of achievement in the current Diet session.

Whether the DPJ and the LDP follow these incentives, or find themselves getting sidetracked yet again by new developments in the ever-shifting saga of Ozawa Ichiro and his convicted lieutenants (one of whom, Ishikawa Tomohiro just got married to a former television presenter -- demonstrating that even future jailbirds still got wings to fly), remains the big question.

Image courtesy: TBS

Later - Here it is the next day and the link to the TBS report has already been removed from the Web.

As I said, catch as catch can.

Tanaka Naoki And Censure

Yesterday was an another bad day in the House of Representatives Budget Committee for beleaguered Minister of Defense Tanaka Naoki. Opposition questioners summoned him to the microphone an astonishing 50 times over the course of 3 hours. The minister with the next highest number of questions put to him was Minister of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology Hirano Hirofumi. He answered only 5 questions. (J)

As his stunning lack of knowledge of even the most basic issues of Japanese security and defense has demonstrated, Tanaka Naoki has no business being Minister of Defense. As he has zero credibility in the Diet and in the public eye, he cannot serve as the chief administrator of his ministry. He also cannot serve as a credible representative of Japan in meetings with his international peers.

However, getting rid of Tanaka is rather difficult. A Democratic Party of Japan-dominated House of Representatives will not pass a no-confidence measure against him. Prime Minister Noda Yoshihiko cannot ask Tanaka for his resignation, as it was only three weeks ago that Noda picked Tanaka for his present post. Tanaka could, on his own, resign -- but that is likely to happen only if Tanaka's wife, the formidable Makiko tells him, "That's it honey. You're done."

The other possibility is that Tanaka would resign or be forced to resign after the passage of a motion of censure against him in the House of Councillors. However, the submission of such a motion is unlikely to happen any time soon. While it is true that Tanaka's predecessor, the equally uninformed Ichikawa Yasuo was censured by the House of Councillors and dropped from the cabinet by Prime Minister Noda, the opposition delayed the passage of the motion of censure to the very last day of the extraordinary Diet session. It was simply too delicious to have the unqualified Ichikawa around, waiting for his next blunder. That Ichikawa learned to keep his head down, not extemporize but instead just read his briefing notes and largely stay out of trouble for much of tenure did not spare him from the censure axe.

What was true for Ichikawa is even more true for Tanaka. Like cats keeping alive the mice they have captured in order to play with them before killing them, the opposition loves having Tanaka around, despite the damage his continued presence will have on morale inside the Ministry of Defense and on the international standing of Japan in defense matters.

While on the subject of censure motions, I would like correct a possibly incorrect impression created by this blog post by Sheila Smith of the Council on Foreign Relations. Historically, successful censure motions are exceedingly rare. As the chart on the Wikipedia page for monseki ketsugi shows, a blizzard of censure motions were submitted to the House of Councillors during the DPJ's time in opposition. However, the House of Councillors has passed a motion of censure only seven times since 1956. Of these, the DPJ is responsible for only three of the successful motions, the first against Minister of Defense Nukaga Fukushiro in 1998 (Nukaga resigned), the second against Prime Minister Fukuda Yasuo in 2008 (Fukuda stayed in office) and the third against Prime Minister Aso Taro in 2009 (Aso stayed in office).

Three instances in 11 years, with only one minister resigning as a consequence.

By contrast, the LDP-New Komeito alliance has been responsible for the passage of four motions of censure against cabinet ministers in the 17 months since it seized of control of the House of Councillors. In all four cases, the ministers in question did not survive the subsequent reshuffling of the cabinet.

Tanaka, if he does not resign of his own accord, would clearly be the fifth in the line, except, of course, that the opposition has an incentive to censure Prime Minister Noda first for having appointed the flailing Tanaka to his ministerial post.

And by Next Week, Prime Minister Kan?

Heaven has no rage like love to hatred turned, Nor hell a fury like a woman scorned.

- William Congreve

Memo to me: avoid making definitive pronouncements.

I said yesterday that not enough time remained before the end of the current Diet session and the probable date of the House of Councillors election for the DPJ to replace deeply unpopular Prime Minister Hatoyama Yukio.

My having made this statement seems to not be impeding in any way political maneuvering that very well might lead to such an outcome.

The avalanche began in a question to Democratic Socialist Party leader Fukushima Mizuho, who until last Friday was State Minister for Consumer Affairs and Declining Birthrate. When asked whether or not members of her party, who voted to leave the ruling coalition on Sunday, would join members of the opposition in a vote of a no-confidence against Prime Minister Hatoyama, Fukushima said it would be "rather difficult" (nakanaka muzukashii) for her party to not support the resolution.

That "rather difficult" set everyone's pulses to racing. Not about a no-confidence resolution in the House of Representatives, which would compel the Prime Minister to resign or call a general election. In that chamber the prime minister's Democratic Party of Japan holds a ponderous majority of 308 seats out of 480.

No, the exciting possibility is a censure measure in the House of Councillors, where ruling coalition's majority is wafer-thin. While the passage of a censure measure would not force the prime minister from office, it would be a stinging official rebuke to the PM, one he can ill afford given that his fumbling has cost his party dearly in terms of public support on the eve of a crucial election. Should the House of Councillors vote to censure the PM, the humiliation could be enough to force him to resign of his own volition.

The numbers on the vote work out like this. Following the withdrawal of the SDP from the ruling coalition, the DPJ-Shinryokufukai/People's New Party/Japan New Party caucus controls 122 seats, one seat above 50% line in the 242 seat House of Councillors. In fact, as Adamu has recently pointed out, the caucus enjoys a two-vote cushion, thank to Wakabayashi Masatoshi's having had to resign from the chamber in shame following an extraordinary case of wandering fingers. So if all the member of the caucus show up, their numbers can easily defeat any censure motion.

That caveat however -- if the members of the caucus show up -- turns out to be significant. Of late, it has been the non-ruling coalition members of the House of Councillors who have been absenting themselves from plenary sessions. They feel that since their votes cannot stop the majority from prevailing in the House, their time would be better spent out campaigning for the upcoming election. If the opposition offers a censure motion, however, one can be fairly sure that the party whips will get on the phone (or send an email) to their wandering charges to get back to the chamber for the vote.

If all the members of the opposition are in the House, the focus then shifts to the ruling coalition's membership. If even only a handful of them fail to show up for the vote -- or even, in a fit of manic rage, a handful vote for the censure motion -- the motion will pass.

How likely is it that members of the ruling coalition will not show up to block a censure motion or show up to turn tables on the PM? That depends on how serious you believe the "Class of 2004 Problem" to be.

The DPJ has 35 district seat holders and 18 proportional seat holders facing reelection this year. These incumbent seat holders were elected in 2004, when Okada Katsuya was DPJ party president. Some of these seatholders have close ties to the current problematic party leadership duo of Prime Minister Hatoyama and Secretary-General Ozawa Ichiro. Most, however, do not. Indeed, the Class of 2004 in the House of Councillors are the DPJ members who owe the least allegiance to Hatoyama and Ozawa. That the fundraising scandals, fiscally irresponsible policies and infuriating leadership styles of both men have put these members of the House of Councillors in a precarious electoral position (not to mention Ozawa's cramming a second DPJ candidate into some multi-seat districts, meaning that the incumbent would be running not just against opponents from other parties but one from his/her own party) would seem to be reason enough for them to suddenly have an errand to run when the opposition brings its censure motion up for a vote.

A situation that seems indeed nakanaka muzukashii for the PM and his political fixit man Ozawa.

The figures don't lie...

....but they sure are not telling much.

NHK nightly news just broadcast the result of their new weekend survey. As I expected, appearing to pass legislation and engaging in the everyday activities of governing is pulling the Cabinet's support levels up off the floor. At least it gets some of the public's eye off the Cabinet's less attractive features. The Cabinet's support rating rose 5% from last month's 21% to 26%, while the disapproval rating sank 5% from 66% to 61%.

Even with the improvement, however, these are still incredibly bad numbers for the Prime Minister.

Asked how the Prime Minister should respond to the passage of a censure motion by the House of Councillors, 49% said that Prime Minister Fukuda should dissolve the Diet and have an election. Another 11% said he should simply resign. Only 30% said he should continue as he has been doing.

Asked what kind of government would be ideal after a general election, 23% answered "a grand coalition," but nearly identical percentages wished for an LDP-dominated (22%) or a DPJ-dominated (22%) coalition government.

In straight, one party-only government, a DPJ-only government had twice the support (11%) as an LDP-only (6%) government.

When asked when the PM should hold an election, given the need for one, the plurality (38%) said, "After the Toyako summit, in the fall." The second choice, though, that of 26% of those polled, was "in the fall of 2009, at the end of the House of Representatives term." Only a very few of those polled wanted an election ASAP.

Asked which party they support, 33% said the LDP (up 3%) and 26% said the DPJ (down 4%).

What? Maybe it is a margin-of-error thing.

As for the over-75 eldercare system, 52% of respondents said they supported it but thought it should be reformed. 35% thought it shoud be rescinded. Only 7% (?) thought it should be left as is.

But then the weirdness started.

When asked whether they appreciated strongly or to a certain extent the bill passed by the House of Councillors rescinding the new eldercare system in favor of a return to the old system, 59% said yes they do. But when asked whether they either appreciate strongly or to a certain extent the ruling coalition's efforts in the House of Representatives to modify the new eldercare system to make it less onerous
59% -- exactly the same number -- of those polled said yes.

As a political wedge issue, the eldercare insurance system seems to be a wash.

So the public as interviewed by NHK is pretty much evenly split on policy and political orientation. However, the voters like neither the PM nor the current Diet.

Later - Now that NHK has some of the numbers up, I have made some adjustments and additions.

Ozawa's Sour Send-Off

"In walking from one end of the country to the other, the voices cry out to me loudly, ‘Please do something about the eldercare insurance system!’ Can we just let the Diet session come to an end like this?"

Democratic Party leader Ozawa Ichirō, speaking to fellow members of the DPJ leadership council, as reported in the Yomiuri Shimbun of June 5, 2008, p. 4 .

Yes, Ozawa-san and his party could do "something" – they could cooperate with the ruling coalition to craft an emergency compromise bill ameliorating at least some of deficiencies, perceived or real, of the new eldercare insurance system.

However, fixing the existing system was not under discussion on Wednesday night. Instead, the leaders of the main opposition party were meeting to decide whether or not to deploy against the prime minister a constitutionally inert chastisement of the government: a House of Councillors censure motion.

The sudden revival of a plan to pass a censure motion against the PM in the waning days of the Diet Session is the clearest indication yet that Prime Minister Fukuda has reshuffled the political deck. By going behind the backs of the leadership councils of the ruling coalition parties to unilaterally declare a one year lifespan for the nominally 10 year long plan for road construction finance and by instructing his negotiators to accept Democratic Party-proposed changes to the law on managing the bureaucracy, Fukuda took away the Democratic Party’s biggest electoral cudgel: the claim that Fukuda is "just another Liberal Democratic Party tool of power brokers."

Confronted by a Prime Minister willing not only to brush off those in his party intent on reinstitutionalizing patronage politics but also willing to incorporate Democratic Party ideas into legislation (Sound like any other prime minister we know, a recent one, maybe?) the leaders of the Democratic Party have lost their political bearings.

The post August 2007 DPJ has relied upon a particular master narrative--that the Democratic Party is engaged in principled resistance against the policies of a ruling coalition beholden to narrow interests, be they foreign (the Bush Administration) or domestic (the road construction lobby, the Ministry of Finance). In the Democratic narrative the LDP-New Komeitō ruling coalition sacrifices the national interest in order to please the narrow interests—and is willing to go even so far as an Article 59 override of the expressed will of the House of Councillors in order to show its loyalty to these narrow interests. "Ergo," the narrative concludes, "we need a House of Representatives election to end the reign of the special interests and restore government for the benefit of the people."

Throughout the fall and winter, the ruling coalition has been the stubborn facilitator of the DPJ's political program—seemingly bowing to U.S. pressure to reinstate the mission in the Indian Ocean and clearly kowtowing to the road construction lobby in the gasoline levy and road construction plan bills.

Now, however, a new, pliant Fukuda Yasuo (with Cabinet support rates in the 20s, he could hardly be anything else but pliant) seems to have accepted the DPJ's main premise: that the ruling coalition has indeed been too solicitous of narrow interests and must work on behalf of the country—even if that means accommodating DPJ policies.

When your political enemy suddenly embraces you and tells you, "I'm sorry, you were right, I was wrong, let's do it your way!" -- you are non-plussed. When your political enemy does the above and you had, in order to build up your wall of political resistance, brought together a gang of fringe elements and kooks whose only commonality was their common enemy—you are in serious trouble.

This danger was hammered home last week when the People's New Party announced that it would not longer caucus with the DPJ, the Socialists and the Communists unless those parties united to oppose the nomination of Ikeo Kazuhito to the board of governors of the Bank of Japan. Ikeo had been a supporter of the privatization of the post office, making him utterly unacceptable to the PNP, the party of those expelled from the LDP for their opposition to postal privatization.

The loss of the support of the PNP shrinks by four votes the majority the opposition holds in the House of Councillors. It is not enough to throw control of the House of Councillors to the LDP-New Komeito coalition. Since the ruling coalition nominated Ikeo as well, the chance of the PNP will throw its lot in with the ruling coalition is zero.

So no big deal, right?

Wrong. The loss of four conservative votes tips the balance of power in the House of Councillors. First, it brings the opposition majority ever closer to the 51% line. This increases the leverage of the Socialists and the Communists vis-à-vis the Democrats, who need the Socialist and Communist votes in order to stop LDP initiatives. Second, the Democratic Party has lost a convenient excuse—"I am sorry, we cannot do ( X) because it is too leftist. It will cause the PNP to bolt from the unified front." – that could be deployed whenever the Socialists and/or the Communists started making demands too left wing for many in the DPJ.

Passing a motion of censure against the Prime Minister is the DPJ's way of reassuring the other members of the anti-LDP alliance that the DPJ is not considering accommodation with the LDP. That the DPJ's steadfast opposition to the LDP can be demonstrated without the act being very substantial (though the Communists, ever the legalists in the politics, are wary, wondering, "Doesn't passing a censure motion at the end of the regular Diet session mean that those voting for the motion are also committing themselves to not cooperating in any way with the prime minister in the extraordinary session in the fall?") is icing on the cake.

A censure motion also closes the regular session on a down note, reminding the voters (or so the opposition hopes) of how rancorous this session has been...though one would think that reminding the voters via an act of unforced aggression against the PM might prompt some voters to reconsider who exactly was at fault for the turmoil over the last few months.

But Ozawa's observation quoted at the beginning of this post points to a more fundamental problem facing the DPJ in the summer and early autumn—the clock is ticking on post-Koizumi LDP bungling. Prime Minister Fukuda has injected new life into his administration by borrowing the Koizumi trick of placing himself between diehard elements of the LDP on one side and the DPJ on the other—stealing the DPJ's thunder without surrending the microphone. Telegenic Koizumi kids, particularly the "Tokyo WOMEN" trio of Koike Yuriko, Inoguchi Kuniko and Sato Yukari—along with the more frail but still startlingly impressive Kawaguchi Yoriko--are shoehorning themselves back into political news stories again. Nakagawa Hidenao, Koizumi's eminence grise at the Policy Research Council, has a new book out on furthering political reform. On Tuesday, to the horror of both his nominal faction leader Machimura Nobutaka (formally on leave from the post because of his service as Chief Cabinet Secretary) and former faction leader Mori Yoshirō, Nakagawa established a new, 33 member pro-growth, anti-consumption tax rise study group, offering an alternative to the Machimura-Yosano Kaoru-Tanigaki Sadakazu mainline bent on wiping out budget deficits through a dramatic increase in the consumption tax.

[Opposition to hikes in the consumption tax has resulted in a strange political alliance between revenue-hungry bureaucrats, anti-smoking activists and Nakagawa--who both smokes like a chimney and has no compunctions against kicking bureaucratic butt—in support of a tripling of taxes on tobacco.]

If the Koizumi brain trust has regrouped for a comeback—and after having gone through the Revisionist Radicals, then Ye Olde Wise Men, the LDP only has the Carnival of Nobodies left before it has to go back to the Koizumi Korps—then Ozawa and the DPJ will see their chance at a seizure of power slipping from their grasp. The DPJ has benefited mightily from an arrogant, narcissistic and clueless LDP. Were a general election to be held today, the LDP-New Komeitō coalition would likely fall short of 50% majority in the House of Representatives, forcing the formation an LDP-DPJ grand coalition—if not an outright DPJ-led government.

If, however, the prime minister hosts a successful, substantial summit -- and with all the advance work on mega-problems in energy, the rise of the BRICs and global warming there is more than a decent chance the Toyako Summit will be a damned significant one – if the PM keeps relations with the Chinese and the South Koreans on an even keel throughout the testing time of the Olympic Games; and, to top it off, if the PM manages to rein in the worst elements of this own party (through intimidation and a threat of replacing all his current advisors with Koizumi loyalists) then the DPJ will lose its greatest asset: a tin-eared, brick-stupid LDP.

For Ozawa, whose knowledge of the score in the long run has always led to carelessness about losing points over inexplicable nonsense in the present, the possibility of the LDP slipping away from its doom once again is unbearable. Better go forth with the censure motion, even at the cost of appearing spiteful. Perhaps the censure motion will cause the PM to lose his cool out of exasperation and hurt (let us not forget the PM's "crying in frustration" episode in the Diet) leading him to govern badly again, precipitating a political crisis.

Adding up all the pluses and minuses, it must be worth a try.

In Rude Political Health

In what is a probably astute gesture of restraint, the leadership of the Democratic Party of Japan has reportedly backed away from the plan for a vote of censure in the House of Councillors.

A DPJ candidate's defeat of the Liberal Democratic Party candidate in the Yamaguchi #2 by-election and the prime minister's disastrous public polling numbers have robbed a bill of censure against the PM, a member of the other house of parliament, of much of its former luster. The DPJ has proven itself relevant: it does not need an act of political theater to convince the public of its sincerity and importance. On balance, a censure motion now poses more of a risk to the DPJ's standing than the DPJ can perhaps stomach. Proceeding to a vote on a legally dubious bill could boomerang, leading to the public to call into question the DPJ's credibility.

As if to balance its new restraint in regards the censure with excess elsewhere, the DPJ has announced a plan to proceed with a bill terminating the new over-75 elder care system.

The move is smart in seikyoku (political street fighting) terms. The elderly vote in far greater numbers, both in aggregate and proportionally, than the young. In terms of regional power, retirees are a larger fraction of the voting public in the low population rural prefectures, where the move of a few thousand votes from one column to the other could switch a district from LDP to DPJ control. Elderly-dominated districts are also over-represented in the Diet due to the incomplete equalization of the declining rural districts with stable or growing urban-suburban ones. Appealing to the old cannot only win you more votes within a district, it can win you more districts period, due the dominance of elderly voting a larger number of districts. Add to this structural justification for pandering to the retirees a tone-deaf ruling coalition incapable of even breathing without offending—and you have what must be a seductive opportunity to position the DPJ for a seizure of power.

Such positioning is Ozawaism at its worst. It is Tanakaism reversed: the irresponsible promising to undo all unpopular LDP policies—even the difficult and necessary ones—in order to win the next election. It is irresponsible and dishonest—justifiable only to revolutionaries to whom the end of winning political control justifies the means. That Kan Naoto—a former minister of health and welfare—should be the DPJ's spokesman for this facetious termination bill is disturbing. He of all the leaders of the DPJ should know that health insurance system is doomed to a financial unraveling unless fundamental reforms of elder care are undertaken.

In seisaku (political policies) terms, the recently instigated elder care system seems a fair solution to the looming elder care crisis. With the young a decreasing fraction of the total population, relying upon on the underconsumption of healthcare by the young as the subsidizer of the healthcare of the very old puts one on a collision course with reality—no matter what one may think of the social justice aspects of the intergenerational transfers...

(I am an apostate. I hold as self-evident that the young today have high paying jobs in an advanced industrial society thanks to the savings, self-sacrifice and hard work of preceding generations. Whining about being taxed to death in order to coddle rapacious old folks grants to the individual an unearned aura of autonomy across time.)

The decision to deduct (tenbiki) a regular extra insurance fee from the pensions of persons over 75 years of age in return for lowering the patient's visit costs to 10% of the total cost does penalize very healthy seniors. Then again, all insurance systems penalize the healthy.

Having a regular fee deducted from one's pension and a low per visit cost avoids a major problem with the elderly: self-rationing of healthcare. One wants the healthcare system to discourage frivolous visits to the doctor—one of the reasons (aside from the obvious fiscal ones) that the authorities over the last decade have increased the percentage an individual pays out of pocket from the original 10% to 20% and 30%. However, one would want the very old to seek treatment for minor ailments before they deteriorate into major and expensive-to-treat illnesses. One would want the system to stimulate the individual retiree into rationalizing a visit to the doctor as a way of recouping for himself or herself at least some fraction of the money the government has forcibly taken from his or her pension.

The regular pension deduction and lower per-visit cost also addresses one of the real problems of the cost curve of healthcare over time—that the last six months of a person's life are the most expensive. As organs and internal systems fail, doctors and hospitals deploy all kinds of life-prolonging medications and devices...

(One unfortunately misinterpreted gesture has been the government program encouraging physicians to give their patients questionnaires asking them to specify about what kind of life-prolonging treatments they would not want deployed in case of incapacitation. Some critics [Veracity Alert - The following is according to Shūkan Gendai - quote at your peril] of the system have depicted the gathering of this information as a preliminary step to charging higher monthly fees to those individuals expecting more aggressive and expensive life-prolonging strategies. They have pointed to the assigning of a point system to certain kinds of treatment as evidence--as if a person amassing a certain number of points after saying "yes" to a particular number of life-prolonging treatments would be then charged an "X" amount in fees. The actual goal of the point system is almost certainly to help hospitals decide on how much to spend on certain technologies and treatments, and avoid overinvestment into life-prolonging technologies the patients do not want employed.)

To expect an individual to have liquid savings able to cover 20% or 30% of the cost of these end-of-life treatments, especially as life-prolonging technologies advance in their ability to increase lifespan, is simply not reasonable. Better to have each person pre-paying over the course of her or his retirement into a general fund, creating a special drawing right for the individual for the time when her or his vital systems begin to shut down, leaving the individual at that time liable for only 10% of the cost out-of-pocket.

Now, if the above is indeed a proper description of the new elder care system, it would take a special kind of genius to be so unnerved as to never, ever attempt to explain it. Perhaps the LDP and the New Komeitō deserve to be sent to perdition for having both delayed the introduction of this system and left it to the bureaucracy to justify.

However, the cowardice of the ruling coalition is no excuse for the DPJ's turning its back on reform. The public is not stupid: it will ask what the DPJ's plan is for the long-term financially stability of the healthcare system. Being in an advantageous position on the electoral map is a fine and wonderful thing—and elections are about winning. However, as a party that will win at best a plurality of seats in the House of Representatives, requiring the cobbling together of a coalition in order to form government, the DPJ should be at least considering the possibility that a reputation for conscientiousness could make the signing up of allies a slightly easier task.

Kan Naoto speaking out in favor of reverting to the previous system puts pressure on the DPJ's House of Councillors membership to speed up the consideration of the termination bill. Submitted to the House of Councillors in February, the bill has yet to see the inside of a committee chamber. A suspicious mind could even posit that the DPJ councillors have been stalling on their allies—all of whom are enthusiastic supporters of a rescinding of the new system.

Perhaps being in charge of one of the houses of the Diet has made DPJ's House of Councillors members the party's "responsible wing" —which would be a neat reversal of the traditional image of the House of Councillors membership as the breakfast cereal (i.e., the flakes and nuts) of every political party.

Alls Hell That Starts In Disarray

Once again without a single non-Communist member of the opposition in the chamber, the LDP-New Komeitō ruling coalition has used its supermajority in the House of Representatives to vote for a revival of the temporary gasoline levy.

One cannot imagine that the scenes of gasoline distributorships shutting down mid-afternoon in response to the vote in the House of Representatives will play too well on the late night, non-NHK networks--nor that the new, higher prices tomorrow will be greeted with cheers from the public.

So where do we go from here?

Not to censure, at least not immediately.

Ozawa Ichirō has moved his marker regarding the possibility of the House of Councillors censuring the Prime Minister. Rather than censure the PM for using an Article 59 override to force a reapplication of the temporary gasoline levy, Ozawa will be "keeping an eye on the road construction bill" -- i.e., the 10 year, 59 trillion yen, truly grotesque testing of the public's patience that is the next bill up for the override treatment.

The PM has promised to put the revenues from the gasoline tax go into the general fund as of next year. Unfortunately, the PM's wish is not included in the current language of the road construction bill.

This would seem to create an interesting procedural mess.

Opening up the road construction bill and rewriting it in joint committee would be one solution. Unfortunately, convening an interparliamentary committee it is not possible without at least a sister bill having been passed by the House of Councillors.

That has not happened. It will not happen.

Alteration of the legislation already passed by the House of Representatives will be, in terms of the rules, the submission of a brand new bill.

However, unless the House of Representatives votes down its own 10 year, 59 trillion bill first, the House of Representatives will be on record--as far as I can tell--as having sent to the House of Councillors two mutually contradictory bills on a single subject.

Not exactly a place where anyone wants to be.

Submitting a bill reflecting the Prime Minister's plan to move revenues to the general fund--i.e., a brand new bill--will also start the 60 day override clock all over again.

Now a clock starting in the first week of May would set the Diet up for an override in early July...which is something the PM's people and the ruling coalition would probably want to avoid given that would put a loud battle about an incredibly important bill right smack dab in the middle of the Toyako Summit--the most historic, important and environmentally correct summit ever™!

As for what the DPJ's response to today's events will be, it looks like going forward with the threatened censure motion will be a tough call. It is not necessarily significant that the PM can ignore the censure motion--the point all the newspapers harp on. The core issue is that a censure motion could be perceived as a waste of time.

Not showing up for votes--boycotting the Diet--is perfectly acceptable political theater with a long and illustrious history. Not showing up challenges the ruling party to push forward legislation using the rules of the Diet and its majority.

A censure motion, however, will be under the operational control of the opposition. The Democratic Party House of Councillors Diet Measures Chairman will have to go to Speaker Eda Satsuki and the other opposition parties to instigate the assembling of a quorum of the House of Councillors for an act that has 1) no effect as law and 2) no basis in law.

The calendar of the House of Councillors is the DPJ's ball of string--to play with or not depending on the party's reading of the mood of a public pissed off at new taxes and automatic deductions.

The public may not be in the mood for meaningless gestures--expecially ones engaged in by those living off the public purse.

Tricky thing, the public mood, what?