Explaining The House Of Councillors Election - On The Lack Of A Viable Centrist Opposition

In the most recent set of public opinion polls, conducted over the weekend following the Ise-Shima G7 summit, the ruling Liberal Democratic Party and its leader Abe Shinzo had much to smile about. Most polls showed a leap in Cabinet approval ratings of about 5%, adding on to what are at historic levels of public acceptance of a Cabinet, at least for a prime minister in his fourth in office (not that there have been, historically, many of these creatures). The ruling party's dispiriting four-to-one advantage in support over its centrist rival, the Democratic Party remained unchanged or improved.

Certainly the atmospherics of President Barack Obama's visit to Hiroshima, which pleased an astonishing 98% of respondents in the Kyodo poll (the first time I have ever seen such a polling number anywhere outside the DPRK) have added to the luster of Prime Minister Abe and his government.

Nevertheless, the public's attitude toward the policies of the Abe administration and the LDP remains at best grudging and at worst hostile. A majority of the population does not believe the government's economic policies are a success or likely to succeed. A majority of the voters do not want the government to consider a revision of the Constitution. A majority indeed do even not want the ruling coalition to win the necessary number of seats giving it the potential to alter the Constitution.

So what is going on? Why has the opposition been unable to translate the public dissatisfaction with the current policy directions or potential policy directions of the LDP and the Cabinet into support?

A considerable amount of the blame for the Democratic Party's inability to capitalize on a favorable policy environment has to be laid at the door of party leader Okada Katsuya. He is a bland and earnest individual with poor charisma and paltry appreciation of the value of political symbols. With his wooden speeches and leaden demeanor he practically begs the news media to belittle him. That journalists are recording his words and his image not because he has anything to say but because he is the leader of the opposition bothers him not enough. If not for the sheen of the leadership post, the news media and the public would ignore him.

However, it is facile to attribute the major part of anti-LDP opposition's unpopularity to the current leader of DP. Replacing Okada with someone else (a prospect the DP faces following the drubbing they will receive in July) cannot fix the fundamental problems of the opposition, even if the opposition were to recruit a magnetar like Koizumi Shinjiro, the only current rival to Prime Minister Abe.

For a viable opposition to be both viable and an opposition it has to 1) oppose and 2) have a place upon which to make its stand.

In the current political environment, both internal and external, neither is possible.

In terms of policy stance, the LDP is incorrectly classified as a center-right party. It is in fact a center-left party or even leftist party, with a nationalist/patriotic veneer of ersatz, sheepish rightism. The LDP's current economic policies are the interventionist dreams of European and North American liberals, with not a shred left of the small-government and market-driven drives of the Hashimoto and Koizumi (pere) eras. As for security policy, Japan's politico-military establishment under Abe is as cautious and rule-bound as it has ever been, at least as compared with counterparts in other OECD countries. As for its promises of constant expansion of social spending, only the Japan Communist Party holds a candle to the LDP.

So where is Japan's so-called "liberal" opposition to stand? Yes, it can oppose last year's security legislation on procedural grounds. However, if one looks for concrete difference, one finds that when the DPJ, the precursor to today's DP, was in power, its security plans were identical to those of the current government. On the economy and social welfare, to the immediate left of the LDP is the JCP, with only a micrometer of space between them.

Rob the electorate of the illusion that a change in political parties will in and of itself better Japan, as the DPJ's turn in power did, and you have an impossibly narrow base on which to build a challenge to the current ruling coalition and its leader.


Later - For a review of the latest polling numbers, check out the most recent Sasakawa Foundation post by Tobias Harris (Link)

Some Nice Things About the Minshinto

This past weekend the Minshuto (Democratic Party of Japan) and the Ishin no To (Japan Innovation Party) merged, forming a new named party, the Minshinto (which in English could be "the Democratic Progressive Party”but in order to avoid confusion with the Taiwan ruling party of the same name is being called the "Democratic Party"). The so far mild public reaction to the event has prompted the small English language Japan commentariat to offer only a tiny burst of mostly negative reviews. Yuki Tatsumi at Stimson is the most scathing, dismissing the new party as merely the old party, with all the same negatives as before (Link1). Tobias Harris, writing for the Sasakawa Foundation, is a bit nicer but still dwells upon the lack so far of a positive public reaction to the new party’s formation. (Link2)

As hard as it may be to believe, there are some nice things one can say about the Minshinto.

1) DP leader Okada Katsuya headed off a potentially catastrophic split of his own party prior to a House of Councillors election. DP conservatives/Matsushita Seikei products (often both) like Maehara Seiji, Nagashima Akihisa and Hosono Goshi are unhappy at the Okada secretariat's steps toward electoral collaboration with the Japan Communist Party. They have been threatening to leave, joining members of the rump Ishin no To in a new conservative opposition party. With brought their JIP conservative buddies now in their party, the DP conservatives are less likely to depart. The price for this unity was accepting a stupid name change.

2) Japan's largest opposition party got larger, not smaller. That alone is something. DP has 96 seats in the House of Representatives; 60 seats in the House of Councillors. Not bad.

3) The party secretariat is the DPJ's secretariat with a few tweaks. Tatsumi sees reappointment of the DPJ leadership as a weakness, with too few new faces to generate excitement (the one new face in the bunch, attack dog Policy Research Chair YAMAO Shiori, has been slapped back with a financial scandal). One could also turn the analysis around and see a merger where one team's members kept all the important posts and the other team's members, including some with titanic egos (Eda Kenji) got essentially nothing as a pretty sweet deal for that first team.

Representative
OKADA Katsuya (DPJ)

Acting Representatives
EDA Kenji (JIP)
NAGATSUMA Akira (DPJ)
RENHO (DPJ)

Secretary-General
EDANA Yukio (DPJ)

Policy Research Chair
YAMAO Shiori (DPJ)

Elections Council Chair
GEMBA Koichiro (DPJ)

Diet Affairs Council Chair
AZUMI Jun (DPJ)

House of Councillors Chair
GUNJI Akira (DPJ)

4) With the Will They/Won't They/Why Don't They phase completed, the opposition can now turn to the important business of coordinating Diet and electoral actions against the still immensely powerful but increasingly less likable Liberal Democratic Party of Abe Shinzo.

Very Kind Of Him #48 - Podcast

Steve Miller of Asia News Weekly caught up with me the other day, allowing me to talk almost coherently about the Budget Speech, the supposed positive inflation/growth cycle and its discontents, constitutional reform and the 2016 House of Councillors election.

Here is the link:

Is China a bully, can Abe complete his reforms, will democracy return to Thailand and More

For the streaming audio click the orange arrow. One can also download the podcast MP3 via the provided link. Mine is the exasperated voice at the beginning of the podcast, with the main body of the conversation starting at the 4:30 mark.

Two Really Can Play At This Game

Seeking that majority in the House of Councillors...

In the background of the debate over the dissolution of the House of Representatives there has been the little matter of what happens to the Your Party. The basic operating assumption is that the Your Party, with its 0.0% support rate (according to the latest NHK public opinion poll) goes to annihilation in the snap election. Party leader Asao Ken'ichiro, even if he manages to retain his seat, is forced to resign as leader. Disgraced party founder Watanabe Yoshimi, who relinquished control of his pet project to Asao after being caught with his hand in the cookie jar to the tune of 800 million yen in loans from just one political benefactor, retakes control of the party and its precious 13 House of Councillors seats. Watanabe then goes to his very good friend Abe Shinzo and offers either to have Your Party join the ruling coalition or allow itself to join the LDP as the Watanabe Faction. Abe Shinzo graciously accepts whichever because the new political arrangement gives the LDP a majority in both Houses of the Diet -- WITHOUT THE KOMEITO.

Oooooohhh...

Of course, all this skulduggery would come to naught if Asao could find a way to keep the Your Party from being captured by Watanabe and offered up as booty to Abe... like say, arranging for the Your Party to allow itself to be absorbed into the opposition Democratic Party of Japan prior to the House of Representative snap election. (Link - J video)

Oooooohhh...

What fun...two really can play at this absorption game.

In A Blue Metal Can With Yellow Lettering

Wow.

Member of the House of Councillors for Tottori Prefecture, Ph.D (George Washington University, wrote his dissertation on the conversion of the Soviet military-industrial complex to civilian production), member of the New Renaissance Party and Group of Independents Caucus (current membership = 3), former staffer for both the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) and the Congressional Research Service (CRS) Hamada Kazuyuki (Link) seems to be his own brand of nuts.

I mean nuts.

I mean deluxe with that certain special je-ne-sais-quoi nuts:

..in some quarters, Mr. Obama is derided as "the worst president of the postwar era."

Of the many, the biggest reason for the collapse of [Barack Obama's] reputation is his bad relationship with his wife.

It is an open secret that the pair are already in negotiations for a divorce and that "they are waiting for his term in office to end, at which point they will separate."

If you ask the President, he will tell you, "I cannot show my face to the voters after her spendthrift ways."

[snip]

On the other hand, if you get Mrs. [Obama] to speak, she will tell you, "The President is a pathological philanderer. He uses the Secret Service in this regard and has them cover up the evidence."

Hamada-sensei, dude, are you sure you should be publishing this stuff as a post on your official blog? (Link - J)

My assumption: Hamada Kazuyuki is not on the list of invitees to the State Dinner tomorrow night.

If he is, he shouldn't be.

Another assumption: Hamada is not sought out by his former Washington colleagues as a valued source of insight into the politics in this blessed land.

And to think I thought Fujita Yukihisa's 9/11 conspiracy theories painful to read...which they were, as Fujita was one of the few members of the Diet willing to criticize Japan's pre-1945 record of imperial expansion and human trafficking.

Many thanks to Kyodo's Ben Dooley for highlighting this astonishing glimpse into a truly...original thinker. (Link)

If You Do Not Think Like Me Then You Are Crazy

Prime Minister Abe Shinzo said something peculiar in the Diet yesterday.

He was responding in House of Representatives Budget Committee to a question regarding the Liberal Democratic Party's plans to amend Article 96 of the Constitution. Article 96 mandates that any alteration of the Constitution be ratified by 2/3rds of all sitting members of both Houses, followed by a national referendum. Prime Minister Abe and his party want to lower the threshold in the Diet votes to 3/5ths or even lower.

When asked about the reason to amend Article 96 and lower the threshold, the Prime Minister replied, "It is just common sense for a person to think it strange that if just slightly over 1/3rd of Diet members are opposed to something then we cannot amend the Constitution."
(Link – J)

When the Prime Minister says "strange" (okashii) what does he mean? Strange as in wrong or unfair? Strange as in unbalanced and threatening? In everyday usage okashii is dismissive and has a strong association with sickness or a wrong having been done.

And what are we to make of the laying of the mantle of "common sense" (joshiki) upon what is no more than the Prime Minister's personal opinion?

One can understand the statement "Requiring a 2/3rds majority in both Houses is stupid." Saying that it is inefficient is also comprehensible.

However, a dismissive dumping of the nation's basic law as odd and contrary to regular thinking? Based upon what standard? What is the "normal" against which one should measure the offending article?

The PM would probably want to short-circuit a discussion of why requiring a 2/3rds majority in both Houses is such a bad thing. For regular Diet business having a 2/3rds or even a 60% majority requirement would indeed be nuts. For amending the Constitution, however, it seems a reasonable hurdle.

Of course, the PM does not like the Constitution, most deeply because it was drafted by Occupation staffers, demoting the Emperor and enshrining a defense-only military posture -- but also because it stands in the way of his running the country as he sees fit.

That Abe Shinzo the man and even Abe Shinzo the Diet member should not like the Constitution is acceptable, if a bit lacking in reflection in the latter case ("I hate this Constitution that gives me my job!").

However, the standards of behavior for a leader of a democratic country are a bit higher than for the simple member of the legislature. Mr. Abe seems somewhat confused about the responsibilities inherent in the position he is occupying -- and on the importance of a nation's leader having an open mind.

More Negative Assessments Of Abenomics And A Look At The House Of Councillors Election

The Guardian blog, which is interestingly copyrighted with Project Syndicate, has published a devastating review of both the fiscal and monetary sides of Abenomics (Link). Over at the Foreign Policy website, Clyde Prestowitz continues his rock-slinging. (Link)

What needs to be said in these non-Japanese language reviews is what a goodly portion of the Japanese electorate already recognizes: that Abenomics is an attempt to buy victory in the House of Councillors election. Dump cash or promises of cash all over the country, talk the yen down so that exporters can book huge profits by the March 31 end of the fiscal year, push up share prices in the short term by creating expectations of monetary easing to the point of setting off asset inflation -- then hold an election.

Win, win, win! The bill comes due after the polls close.

Sadly, Abe Shinzo and his Liberal Democratic have to do nothing, zero, zip, rien, nicht, nanimo nai, nada to come out winners in July. The opposition Democratic Party of Japan is defending 30 district seats and 15 party proportional seats -- a hopeless task for the party, given its nearly comatose state and the emergence of rival opposition forces.

Were the Abe Cabinet and the Liberal Democratic Party-New Komeito ruling alliance to just sit tight and do nothing but govern for the next six months, the LDP would seize half of the seats the DPJ and its splinters the Livelihood Party (Seikatsu no To) and Green Breeze (Midori no kaze) will be defending.

So why destabilize the economy, if one has no good political reason to do so?

1) Abe Shinzo still lives in torment over the results of the 2007 House of Councillors election

If Abe has learned anything from 2007, and from his Cabinet and top Prime Minister's Residence appointments is seems he has learned little, it is get the sequencing right: win the House of Councillors election first, then embark on your reactionary revolution. Abe's term and the dreams of his camp followers became undone after 2007 loss of seats and control of the House to the DPJ. While nothing substantial had changed -- the LDP and the New Komeito alliance still possessed a 2/3rds supermajority in the House of Representatives -- Abe's legitimacy as president of the LDP had been compromised, allowing Aso Taro (What is in Amaterasu's name he doing in the present Cabinet?) and Yosano Kaoru to move in and take over de facto control of the government.

Abe's goal this year is to win in the House of Councillors election -- whatever the costs to the nation -- in his view wiping out the memory of his 2007 failure.

2) Constitutional reform

The magic number for the reactionaries is 160, which is 2/3rds of the seats in the House of Councillors. If the LDP and its allies, whoever they may be, can cobble together 160 seats, they are within shouting distance of amending the Constitution. At present the LDP and the New Komeito hold 92 seats. The Your Party and the Japan Restoration Party, parties sympathetic to the LDP's goal of amending the constitution, hold 11 and 3 seats respectively, bringing the total to 106.

The math is daunting. The DPJ has 35 seats up for election, the Livelihood Party 6, Green Breeze 5. If the levels of losses of the December 16 election are replicated -- a not unreasonable outcome -- the LDP and its collaborators will scoop up around 75% of these seats -- i.e., 34 seats (Running total=140). Six are currently vacant -- five on-cycle and one off-cycle. Pick these up and the total is 146. Five independent seats are up for election. Take these or co-opt the seat owner to the constitutional amendment cause, and the total is 151. Snap up the one proportional seat from the doomed People's New Party and the total is 152.

At this point, the forces of constitutional amendment hit a wall. They have to

- convince a number of the DPJ seat holders up for reelection in 2016 to either jump ship or pledge to vote for constitutional amendment

- crowd out the Socialists and the Communists in the proportional vote, picking up one or two of the five seats those parties have up for election

- beat the DPJ and its splinter parties even worse than predicted

The only way to achieve any of these latter goals is for the LDP and its allies to be insanely popular going into the election and insanely popular coming out.

With no reasonable path to 160, all that is left is the unreasonable.

How Much Longer Can Noda Hang On Or The LDP Keep Still?

The Yomiuri Shimbun, Kyodo and the TBS network released the results of new public opinion polls this morning. The results are, as can be expected, miserable news for Noda Yoshihiko and his government.

Cabinet support (previous poll in [ ])

Kyodo - Nov. 3-4 [Oct. 1-2]
Support 18% [29%]

Yomiuri - Nov. 3-4 [Oct. 1-2]
Support 19% [34%]

TBS - Nov. 3-4 [Oct. 1-2]
Support 25% [30%]

For those wanting the rose-colored glasses view, after the ridiculous drama of the way-too-familiar-with-the-yakuza-and-other-scandals-tainted Tanaka Keishu having to be pushed out of the office of Minister of Law (Link), one could hardly expect the Cabinet's support numbers to stay stable. Who indeed could not lose confidence in the prime minister's judgment after his appointing of a man with flashing red light over his head (DANGER – LOST HIS DIET SEAT IN RECRUIT SCANDAL) to be the head of the nation's legal system?

However, for those wishing to look upon the numbers with a critical eye, a fall in Cabinet support below 20% level has historically triggered a deathwatch. No matter how tough Noda is -- and he is tough, perhaps the most iron-bottomed of the prime ministers since Sato Eisaku – he will bombarded with calls for his resignation. The Liberal Democratic Party and New Komeito will call for a resignation and a dissolution of the Diet, the unconstitutionality of a House of Representatives election be damned.

More dangerous for Noda than the screams of the opposition parties and the pompous thundering of the editorialists and pundits is the possibility of coup within his own party. However, there are good reasons to believe that despite the fall in Cabinet support, the Democratic Party of Japan will stand beside their prime minister.

First, the DPJ just had a leadership election five weeks ago, which re-elected Noda head of the party by a wide margin. Declaring their choice stupid so soon after having made it would be fatal for the electoral chances of the DPJ’s Diet members and for the party as whole.

Second, while the numbers for the Cabinet crashed, the numbers for the DPJ, both the support numbers and the far more important "Which party will you vote for in the proportional seat ballot?" numbers, stayed stable. Meanwhile, the numbers for the LDP declined.

Which party do you support?

Kyodo - Nov. 3-4 [Oct. 1-2]
DPJ 12% [12%]
LDP 26% [30%]

TBS - Nov. 3-4 [Oct. 1-2]
DPJ 12% [12%]
LDP 22% [26%]

Which party will you cast your proportional ballot for?

Kyodo - Nov. 3-4 [Oct. 1-2]
DPJ 12% [12%]
LDP 28% [31%]

TBS - Nov. 3-4 [Oct. 1-2]
DPJ 12% [12%]
LDP 29% [35%]

The LDP decline can be attributed to a wavering of support in the face of Ishihara Shintaro's return to national politics. Ishihara's successful courtship of the Sunrise party has injected life into what was a dead party – and I mean dead in a real sense. Support for the Sunrise Party rose from 0% to 2% in the Kyodo poll and from 0% to 1% in the TBS poll. The rest of the LDP's losses seem to have bled into Hashimoto Toru's Japan Restoration Party, with which Ishihara wants to ally, or into the No Party column.

The LDP also received some bad news in the "Who should be prime minister?" imaginary vote (imaginary because the people do not pick the prime minister) as Abe Shinzo's numbers fell along with those of Prime Minister Noda.

Who should be prime minister, Noda Yoshihiko or Abe Shinzo?

Kyodo - Nov. 3-4 [Oct. 1-2]
Noda 29% [N/A]
Abe 40% [N/A]

Yomiuri - Nov. 3-4 [Oct. 1-2]
Noda 25% [34%]
Abe 39% [44%]

TBS - Nov. 3-4 [Oct. 1-2]
Noda 24% [29%]
Abe 40% [45%]

Confusion still reigns regarding what the unconstitutionality of a House of Representatives election means. That a plurality of voters can be found who want an election before the year is out further demonstrates that the news media's intentional failure to explain the mechanics of redrawing district boundaries has succeeded in its intended effect: keeping relevant the nattering nonsense of an election's being just around the corner.

Do you think an election can be held despite the Supreme Court's having ruled the district boundaries unconstitutional, or should the boundaries be reformed first, before the holding of an election?

Kyodo
Can be held 35%
Must be reformed 53%

TBS
Can be held 35%
Must be reformed 49%

When should an election be held?

Kyodo
During this Diet session 34%
Early on in the Regular Diet Session 34%

Yomiuri
Before the year is out 47%
Early on in the Regular Diet Session 14%

TBS
Before the year is out 42%
By March of next year 33%

One must note in passing the odd phrasing of he constitutionality question and the consequent odd responses. To ask voters whether they think it is all right or not to have an election, as opposed to whether it would be legal or not, injects the individual voter's personal likes or dislikes into a place they have no business being.

If Prime Minister Noda needs talking points, there were questions where the public supported him.

Was the majority of the members of the House of Councillors' refusal to allow the Prime Minister to deliver his policy address to them (Link) appropriate or not? (TBS)

Appropriate 30%
Inappropriate 58%

The LDP and the New Komeito are holding up action on the bond issuance bill until they receive from Prime Minister Noda a public promise on a date certain for an election. What do feel about this? (Kyodo)

The Diet should pass the bond issuance bill, regardless of the Prime Minister making a public promise on the election or not 53%
The Diet should pass the bond issuance bill if and only if the Prime Minister has made a public promise on the election 28%

Noda is clearly in more trouble now than he was on Friday. While the DPJ is unlikely to replace him any time soon, the danger of more DPJ members jumping ship has increased -- though the stability of the party support numbers are an argument against such an exodus.

Nevertheless, a number of DPJ members are certainly wondering whether or not they would be better off as independents or as supplicants at Hashimoto Toru's door. Hashimoto has given notice that he has a limit of 15 sitting Diet members in the Japan Restoration Party, which means enough room remains in the JRP for the number of DPJ defectors needed to drop the DPJ-People's New Party ruling coalition below the 50% level in the House of Representatives.

DPJ defectors could also seek refuge in parties other than the JRP. However, given the incredible multiplication of micro-parties and the resumed viability of the LDP, trying one's luck in one of the micro-parties is likely to end very badly.

As for the LDP, it should take the drop in the Noda Cabinet's support numbers and the drops in its popularity numbers and in Abe Shinzo's "Who should be prime minister?" numbers in stride. The question is if an enervated LDP can or not. It takes very little to trigger the panic response in the LDP under normal circumstances. In an Abe Shinzo-led LDP, the barrier between reaction and overreaction is tissue thin.

Shutting The Door In Noda's Face

On October 29, the much-delayed fall Extraordinatry Session of the Diet will open. In the House of Representatives, the first order of business will be the Prime Minister's delivery of his Policy Address, outlining what he and his Cabinet intend to accomplish in the session.

Under normal circumstances, the Prime Minister would then move to the House of Councillors chamber, to deliver the same Policy Address.

However, Prime Minister Noda Yoshihiko will not be delivering his address to the House of Councillors. In an agreement worked out between the heads of all the opposition parties, who together control the majority of seats in the House of Councillors, the doors of the chamber will be shut to him, and the day will pass without his addressing the Senators. (Link - J)

Now this is a decidedly peculiar beginning to a session of the Diet. However, Noda has infuriated the opposition parties, particularly the Liberal Democratic Party, by his refusal to dissolve the Diet and hold elections before the year is out. Indeed, after privately promising the former LDP president Tanigaki Sadakazu that he would call elections "soon" (chikai uchi ni), Noda has refused to name a date for the Diet's dissolution. The delay of the opening of the Extraordinary Session until the final days of October indeed guarantees that there will be no election this year, there being not enough time for the drawing of an unimpeachable, constitutional revision of the House of Representatives electoral map and for a legal declaration of candidates for office. (Link)

More pointedly and pettily, the current House of Councillors censured the Prime Minister at the tail end of the Regular Session. Though s censure motion has no legal force behind it and ceased to be meaningful following the closure of the Regular Session on September 8, the PM is still in essence and perhaps in perpetuity persona non grata in the House of Councillors, even before yesterday's formal agreement among the opposition parties to bar the doors to his entry.

If the Prime Minister and the Democratic Party of Japan wanted to, and the President of the House of Councillors agreed to it, the DPJ members of the House of Councillors, who by themselves represent a quorum, could presumably open up the doors of the House of Councillors, invite the PM in and and sit and listen to him deliver his Policy Address.

Even if the PM and the DPJ could pull off this trick and get out of the Diet building before the opposition arrived -- which is unlikely as the Diet members' offices are across the street from the Diet Building -- there would be no point in such a gesture, aside from striking back at the opposition's insulting refusal to listen to a presentation by the head of the government. The opposition would simply censure the prime minister again, bringing the Extraordinary Session to a halt before it had even begun.

So Prime Minister Noda will suffer a stunning slight on October 29, the first time a prime minister has been denied the opportunity to deliver a policy address since the present constitution was adopted. He is probably overjoyed at the prospect, as not having to address the House of Councillors will free up a couple of otherwise wasted hours in the middle of a busy workday.

In an interesting twist, the LDP caucus in the House of Councillors is picking a fight with the LDP caucus in the House of Representatives over the use of pressure tactics. The LDP caucus in the House of Councillors is raring to insult the prime minister as regards the policy address. However, it is agnostic as regards withholding approval on the bond issuance bill until the Noda government has coughed up electoral district reform legislation that both pleases the LDP-New Komeito opposition alliance and hastens the government's demise -- a request that the Noda government has been reticent to honor. Mizote Kensei, the LDP's House of Councillors Secretary-General, has stated that Diet dissolutions are a House of Representatives affair, House of Councillors members being elected for fixed terms. If a bond issuance bill emerges from the House of Representatives, which it can thanks to the ruling DPJ-People's New Party coalition's still holding a thin numerical majority in that House, then, according to Mizote, "The bill will pass in my House." (Link - J)

If Mizote is not just blowing smoke, and Prime Minister Noda can count on the House of Councillors passing the bond issuance bill for the price of insulting him like no prime minister ever has been insulted before, he will take that deal.

Abe Shinzo: The Remembering

Some subjects are just not funny. This post will be about one of them. If you are visiting for the usual irreverent take on the Japanese political scene, you should probably stop reading now.

In honor of the zeitgeist, I will address the subject directly, though he is not really here.

Abe-san,

Forgive me for addressing you as an equal. I know you are not used to it.

Abe-san, you frighten me. On Wednesday the 29th, you went to the offices of Machimura Nobutaka, your faction leader, to tell him you are running for the position of president of the Liberal Democratic Party. (E)

I knew relations between you and Machimura were bad. I knew this on April 23, when the Machimura faction held its annual fundraising party. I was there; you were not.

Incidentally, the take at the party you did not attend? 600 million yen. Not bad for a guy whose leadership you fail to respect.

I hope, I pray that you told Machimura of your intention to run only to dissuade Machimura himself from running, as he has indicated he might. I hope, I pray that your formation of a study group, the usual first step toward a run for the presidency, is just a feint. I hope, I pray that the sixty-one lawmakers signed up for your study group are just a show of force by what used to be called the "non-mainstream" segment of the LDP, not the nucleus of an actual support group.

I hope, I pray that on September 14, your name will not be among the roster of candidates.

As a defender of the Democratic Party of Japan, which has never had a serious chance at undoing 54 years of LDP malfeasance, I should be dancing a jig on the tatami. There is no potential leader of the LDP that the DPJ would rather run against. You have foreign policy prescriptions that would have would have the entire region in flames (You have limited your study group's focus to the revitalization of Japan's economy so maybe even you have some awareness of just how inflammatory your security views are). Your silver-spoon-in-mouth upbringing just irks, in comparison to DPJ leader Noda Yoshihiko's relatively modest beginnings and Hashimoto Toru's emergence from the muck. Your history of political thuggery, of simply ignoring the opposition (Remember June 30, 2007, the last day any business got done in the House of Councillors prior to the election? The vote after vote in the morning, every one with the same result: 123 to 96, 123 to 96, again and again? Remember how the opposition just gave up over the lunch break and did not return?) will be disinterred. Your groveling lust for power, refusing to follow the LDP's tradition of the party president resigning after the party suffers a humiliating electoral loss, will be revisited. The chaos that your refusal caused, making unclear exactly who was running the country in August 2007, will be page 4 analysis again.

And of course, your suddenly quitting as prime minister, after saying you would not. For medical reasons, even though you never mentioned them in your resignation speech.

Yes that.

Abe-san, you may not remember that last stunning week, almost exactly five years ago.

Let me help you.

You came back on Sunday night, from the APEC meeting in Sydney, burnt out. August had been a terrible month for you, with many of your party members screaming at you to resign, with Aso Taro conspiring with Yosano Kaoru to replace your "friends of Shinzo" cabinet with one to their and the faction leaders' liking. Your trip to India, Malaysia and Indonesia had been a complete bust politically and left you physically debilitated from the food and the travel. The Cabinet was reshuffled and blew up almost immediately, with Minister Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries Endo Takehiko forced to resign after a week in office -- not at your request, but at the request of Aso and Kaoru, who had arranged to have themselves appointed LDP Secretary-General and Chief Cabinet Secretary, respectively.


Then came summit in Sydney. You promised Prime Minister John Howard and President George Bush that Japan would be their stalwart ally on the global stage, when you knew full well that upon returning to Tokyo Ozawa Ichiro's majority in the House of Councillors was going yo kill Japan's participation in Operation Enduring Freedom.

It was the last straw.

Upon your arrival back in Tokyo, you told Aso, who was waiting for you, "I cannot go on."

Unfortunately for you, you chose as your confidant a man with zero sensitivity as to human frailty, a man who when he became prime minister a year later appointed an alcoholic as his minister of finance, in the midst of the worst financial crisis the world had known in eighty years*.

He told you to gambaru, the most heartless and vapid of wishes.

The next day, Monday, you delivered a policy address opening the extraordinary session of the Diet that was so pugnacious and ambitious, it sounded delusional.

You somehow made it through Tuesday.

On Wednesday morning, however, either you or someone near you decided you were finished, done, finito, deep-fat fried. You resigned in the afternoon, claiming you were not capable of saving the Indian Ocean dispatch legislation.

Then on Thursday morning, you left the office of prime minister prematurely, never to return.

Abe-san, do you remember how you left?

Not in the back of ambulance, like most persons suffering from acute, chronic gastroenteritis would. Not with your loving wife beside you. Not with a doctor monitoring you. Not having arranged a formal transfer of your prime ministerial powers to another member of the Cabinet.

No, in the back car of a two-car motorcade packed with panicked SPs (Japan Secret Service) with you in the back seat of the second vehicle, barreling through traffic to the Keio University Hospital.

Remember?

I will be honest: your breaking down was the first hint I ever caught of your being human. Your previous behavior, until the voters of Japan liberated us of you, left me speechless with horror.

Which is why I am terribly afraid at the news you want to be LDP president again.

The LDP, the country, does not need a leader as brittle and fragile as a glass vase, especially as the next LDP leader will be facing a political situation many times more complex, more poisonous and more energy-sapping that the one that felled you in 2007. The LDP, the country does not a new improved bullet proof Abe Shinzo either. You are the archetype of the fantabulist conservative, a man who disdains his country and its people, wanting through revisions of the education system and the Constitution to create a new citizenry, replacing the one you cannot stomach.

Whichever Abe Shinzo you are, after your five years of rest, you should not be running for the presidency of the LDP.

Sincerely,

MTC

---------------------------------------
* A belated word of praise for the bizarrely departed Nakagawa Shoichi. To his eternal credit, until that fateful plane flight to Italy, he had remained, probably for the longest period of his adult life, clean and sober. He was an addict, in the grips of a terrible addiction, yet for the good of the country and world he toughed it out.

OK, Morons. Now What?

Yamaguchi Kunio Natsuo (L) and Tanigaki Sadakazu (R) are Leader and President of the New Komeito and the LDP, respectively.

As can be expected in these lamest of times, the Liberal Democratic Party and the New Komeito, having failed to halt the passage of the bond isuance and electoral reform bills in the House of Representatives, submitted at a velocity somewhat faster than the speed of thought a censure motion to the President of the House of Councillors.

So what happens now?

All business in the House of Councillors comes to a halt, the motion taking precedence. The membership gathers in the plenary chamber. The parties submitting the motion explain their reasons for submitting the motion. The chamber votes.

Should the measure pass, nothing of consequence happens, as a censure motion has no legal effect. The prime minister, however, will be persona non grata in the House, stripped of the dignity of his office.

The presumed result is that the House of Councillors will cease to conduct any of its business, despite the Diet's still being in session -- the continued acceptance of high salaries for no work being extremely popular with the taxpayers. (J)

I am looking forward to the LDP's and the New Komeito's speeches. New levels of casuistry will be necessary to prevent folks from laughing.

The prime minister's faults:

- "He convinced us to vote for a rise in the consumption tax, which was our own policy."

- "He has increased Japan's international prestige by keeping his cool at a time when Japan is beset with challenges to its territories and territorial claims."

- "He disposed of non-Japanese activists landing on the Senkakus in exactly the same way Koizumi Jun'ichiro did."

- "He has led his party into passing a bill that provides the legal basis for the government to pay its bills."

- "He has led his party into passing an electoral reform bill that a) resolves the issue of the unconstitutionality of the districts due to over- and under-representation, b) cuts the cost of government by eliminating 40 seats of the House of Representatives and 3) increases the chances of the smaller parties to win seats."

A damning list, to be sure.

The live broadcast from the House of Councillors chamber is scheduled to begin at 10:00 a.m., accessible at http://www.webtv.sangiin.go.jp/webtv/index.php.

Photo image credit: Kyodo News

This Time, Definitely

A friend of mine tells a hoary joke about standing one's ground:

"Look, I've got my principles.  And if you don't like like 'em...well...then I got other principles!"

That is what I have rattling around inside my head when I read the news that Hashimoto Toru's Osaka Ishin no kai will revise its "Eight Policies of the Revival" (ishin hassaku) by or around the 20th of this month. (J)

The last two days have seen a heating up of efforts by opposition parties to topple the Noda government (J). This has understandably lit a fire under the Osaka Ishin no kai to revise its six-months old list of basic goals (J), especially since the original "Eight Policies" were simply nuts. That the Osaka Ishin no kai wants to become a real party and not just a political organization, may also have triggered a sudden "you know, maybe in February we got a little carried away" realization.

It will be hard, for example, for the new Ishin no kai political party to run candidates for office in the July 2013 House of Councillors elections, as the "Eight Policies" Version 1.0 called for the abolition of said House. That an amendment to the Constitution to eliminate the House of Councillors would have to be approved by the House of Councillors (with a two-thirds majority!) seems to have never crossed the Osaka Ishin no kai's directorate's mind.

Ooops.

I look forward to reading the revision.

We Can Have Elections!

Well of one kind. And only with regrets. And they are not the elections everyone is talking about.

Quietly, and without very much fuss, it seems that Ishikawa Yasuo, the disgraced former minister of defense (Mister "I am an amateur in defense issues and that is the epitome of civilian control" to you and me), now secretary-general of the Democratic Party of Japan's House of Councillors delegation, has crafted a simple plan to rectify the disparities in that House that the courts have ruled unconstitutional. The plan has the agreement of the Liberal Democratic Party and the New Komeito and the disappointed acquiescence of the rest of the opposition parties. In contrast with the reform of the House of Representatives districts, which has the various parties talking past one another, the Ishikawa Plan has an excellent chance of being converted into law by the end of this extended regular session of the Diet.

The plan is a minimal, hair-splitting solution to the Supreme Court-mandated reform of the disparities in the House of Councillors. Kanagawa Prefecture, which currently suffers from the fewest Senators per capita, will be bounced from six senators to eight. Osaka Prefecture, which is the next in line in terms of underrepresentation, will be similarly bounced from six to eight.

To supply these four new Senate seats, someone will have to give up seats. Those someones will be Fukushima Prefecture (great timing!) and Gifu Prefecture, both of which will drop from four senators to just two.

This is a quick and dirty solution. The highest level of disparity in the country, currently 5.11 to 1 in between the voters in Kanagawa Prefecture and those in Tottori Prefecture, will drop to 4.75 to 1 in between those in Hyogo Prefecture and those in Tottori. This slips below the court-mandated maximum of 4.99 to 1, allowing for a legal election to take place on schedule in July next year. (J)

While the Ishikawa Plan seems unremarkable for what it contains, what it does not contain makes it interesting. Gone, for example, is any hint of the DPJ's manifesto promise to cut 40 seats from the House of Councillors. This is a huge concession on the part of Ishikawa, a reputed Ozawa Ichiro toady. Also absent from the plan is any hint of an attempt to accommodate the New Komeito Party's and the Democratic Socialist Party's desires to replace the d'Hondt proportional seat distribution system with the Additional Member System. The minor parties have been asked to wait to have their desires answered prior to the 2016 electoral cycle, ostensibly in order give everyone time to think about the proposal.

In the absence honoring the promises of massive seat cuts made in the DPJ's 2009 manifesto, reform of the House of Councillors was always relatively simple. This is due in part to the greater level of disparity allowed -- 4.99 to 1 as opposed to 1.99 to 1, the standard set by the Supreme Court for the House of Representatives districts.

Another contributing factor is, perversely, the knowledge that the House of Councillors had all the constitutional sense wrung out of it decades ago. Designed to be friendly to independents, and thus a brake on party mob rule, it became partisan battleground through the 1982 introduction of the awarding of proportional seats from party lists. The takeover of the House by parties failed to upend the relationship between the two Houses thanks to the persistence of the 1955 System, whereby the LDP retained dominance in the House of Representatives and the country and the Socialist Party played the part of an opposition while being the dominant party's tacit accommodators. However, in the 1990s the concorde collapsed, half after the breakup of the LDP in 1993 and half in the Socialists' committing ideological suicide from 1994 onward.

The person who really cracked the nut, however, was, unsurprisingly, Ozawa Ichiro. First through the New Frontier Party and then later through the DPJ, Ozawa capitalized on the perversion of the the House of Councillors' original purpose and status to make it, and not the House of Representatives, the fulcrum point in politics.

That the minority parliament in the Diet can now, through control of the House of Councillors, hold the rest of the apparatus of government hostage, was never the intent of the writers of the Constitution. The Ishikawa Plan's meagre reforms will make no dent in this anomalous situation.

The resolution of the unconstitutionality of the districts in the House of Councillors sets up a huge battle over the reform of the districts of the House of Representatives. It will not be resolved, as the LDP desires, with a simple abolition of the five smallest electoral districts. The DPJ rank-and-file will demand an Armageddon over House of Representatives redistricting.

Expect them to get one.

Essential Reading on Hashimoto Toru

This has been a fertile weekend for postings on the rolling snowball that is Hashimoto Toru.

First we have the essay from Spike Japan on the personal history, amazing sayings and local achievements of Osaka's more-than-just-a-mayor. (Link 1)

I, for one, do not really care if Hashimoto and his family came from the wrong side of the tracks. The Liberal Democratic Party's Nonaka Hiromu came from the wrong side of the tracks and he managed through grit, patience and knowing-where-you-had-dinner-last-night-and-with-whom to push past many a princeling and former elite bureaucrat to become a force within the party, eventually becoming secretary-general. Nonaka, however, never forgot about where he came from, and he would lacerate bureaucrats for their institutionalized prejudice against persons with suspicious ancestral addresses. Nonaka also retained a sympathy for Japan's North Korean population -- the country's least beloved and most misunderstood minority.

What worries me about Hashimoto is he has seems to have the airs of a self-made man. Few things are worse than self-made men, as they believe their success is due to their own special form of greatness, rather than because in their case talent transected with chance and opportunity.

Then we have the always comprehensive Corey Wallace on the confusion Hashimoto has whipped up in the political world, particularly the cosy little corner of the world inhabited by the Liberal Democratic Party. (Link 2)

The part of Hashimoto's Ishin no kai's declaration that has me shaking in my boots (and I am wearing boots) is the proposal for direct elections of prime ministers. (J) Such a proposal faces the same soaring constitutional hurdles as the other major radical reform: the abolition of the House of Councillors. Unlike the abolition, which has no chance of passing as the House of Councillors would have to vote itself out of existence -- a decidedly unlikely event -- a move toward a direct election of prime ministers could gather up enough support to pass through both Houses of the Diet and then received the people's imprimatur in a national referendum.

Nothing would guarantee gridlock in the Diet or, paradoxically, tyranny than to have a popularly elected prime minister. Floating Japanese voters do not vote for something, they vote against the status quo, often in the absence of logical examination of the content of a person's political program (Japanese undecided voters are, of course, far from unique in possessing this trait). Japan lacks the formal institutional brakes or political and social structures necessary to channel the energies of a leader voted into office for negative reasons into positive, rather than merely populist, directions.

And Then There Was One

As noted in comments to a previous post, nine members of the Democratic Party of Japan's House of Representatives delegation have submitted their resignations from the party (E) in protest against a number of policies the government has recently rammed down the party's throat.

In a "let's all take a deep breath and wait before predicting the deluge" post at Global Talk 21, Okumura Jun noted that no House of Councillors members had headed for the exits (E).

Well, guess what? A few hours ago House of Councillors member Yokomine Yoshiro offered up his resignation from the DPJ (J).

Now Yokomine, the father of the golfer Yokomine Sakura, has been a huge pain for the party, being involved in a series of mishaps and ethical lapses since he was picked as a proportional seat candidate by party leader Ozawa Ichiro. His resignation from the party for what his political secretary called "personal reasons" may have nothing to do with the current party distress over the proposed rise in the consumption tax, the Yamba Dam restart declaration and the prime minister's hair-splitting and ultimately undone solution to winning party support for Japan's entering into discussions on joining the Trans-Pacific Partnership.

But the timing of Yokomine's resignation is, if not suspicious, then still bad for the image of the prime minister.

I am not going to say that I warned that that fission could happen...but I warned that fission could happen.

What I got wrong was the timing: I did not think the breakup would begin before the New Year.

Later - Over at σ1, Corey Wallace goes into some particulars as to why it is appropriate to think that "this time, it's different" (Link).

Winning Leaves the LDP in a Quandary

One of the great prizes lost, possibly the greatest prize, in the Democratic Party of Japan's House of Councillors election defeat on July 11 was the ability of the ruling coalition make appointments to governmental and quasi-governmental entities without consulting the opposition. Unlike budget legislation which becomes law 30 days after the House of Representatives passes it, or regular legislation, which can be passed by a two-thirds majority override in House of Representatives should the House of Councillors either vote down or not act on a bill for 60 days -- bills of appointment become null and void without the approval of the House of Councillors. The DPJ's losing so many seats on July 11 means that Japan has reentered an era where the parties out of formal power become the gate keepers for non-bureaucratic government appointments.

Nullifying appointments is the one real power the House of Councillors. The DPJ, in the "Twisted Diet" (nejire kokkai) period of July 2007 to August 2009, used this power 28 times to stymie the appointments plans of the then ruling Liberal Democratic Party. The most famous appointment's struggle occurred in 2008 over Fukui's Toshihiko's replacement as Governor of the Bank of Japan. The DPJ-led House of Councillors first rejected one, then a second nominee for the post, claiming that the LDP's nominees' connections to Ministry of Finance made them incapable defending the Bank of Japan's independence. The LDP, unable to push forward one of its favorites, relented and approved a third, non-BOJ tied nominee, the then Deputy Governor, BOJ lifer Shirakawa Masaaki.

This fight over the appointment of the governor of the BOJ, which left the country without BOJ governor during a three week span of the global financial crisis, has become engraved in LDP lore as the proof of just how grubby the DPJ is at its core -- that the DPJ is so low it would be willing to put the country's and the world's financial stability at risk. LDP president Tanigaki Sadakazu has promised that no matter what powers the LDP may now have in the House of Councillors, never again will Japan will be without a Governor of the Bank of Japan.

What of other posts though? What is the point of having a power if one is not willing to use it? The desire to do unto the Democrats as the Democrats did unto the LDP must be overwhelming, particularly among the younger LDP members of the House of Councillors.

There are currently 13 vacant posts requiring Diet approval before they can be filled, including the heads of the Deposit Insurance Corporation of Japan and the Securities Exchange and Surveillance Commission. Another 30 posts are to become vacant by the end of this year. Where if anywhere will the LDP choose to make its stand, or make its point, and reject a DPJ-supported appointee? Of course it can reject the occasional one, but how many is too many? At what point will the media turn against the LDP, denouncing it for torturing the DPJ using the same tactics the DPJ used to torture the LDP?

Of course, the problems of what strategy to pursue in the House of Councillors regarding appointments is a part of the larger problem for the LDP of how it should behave in opposition in general. Confrontation on every level, such as the DPJ used against the LDP in the 2007 to 2009 period, is enticing. However, despite its recent electoral victory in the House of Councillors, the LDP is still a secondary level force as compared to the DPJ nationally. The LDP's support numbers are only two-thirds those of the DPJ, and they have been falling, both over the long and the short term. When the Yomiuri Shimbun asked whether the LDP should return to power as soon as possible, only 16% of respondents thought this desirable. Organizationally, the party is in no way ready for a general election, with sources inside the party saying that one third of the House of Representatives districts lack even an LDP election office head.

With the LDP unprepared for a sudden House of Representatives dissolution, the outlook would for cooperation rather than confrontation in the resolution of upcoming appointments -- and perhaps other Diet business as well. This is almost the exact opposite of the situation of the DPJ in the 2007-2009, when the DPJ was in the position to demand, on a daily basis, the dissolution of the Diet and a general election

It seems that almost exactly one year after the LDP's fall from power, after significant failures and disappointing behavior on the DPJ side, and the sudden acquisition of an ability to halt virtually all Diet business thanks to the results of the July elections, the LDP still has not acquired significant leverage in the Diet nor developed a clear strategic path to use the powers it has in opposition.

_______________________

Sources:

http://sankei.jp.msn.com/politics/policy/100728/plc1007282151022-n1.htm
http://www.nhk.or.jp/news/html/20100811/t10013287461000.html
http://mainichi.jp/select/seiji/news/20100813ddm002010074000c.html
http://www.tokyo-np.co.jp/article/politics/news/CK2010081302000035.html
http://www.yomiuri.co.jp/politics/news/20100809-OYT1T00727.htm

Table: Projected House of Councillor July 11 Results, Party Proportional Votes

Party	Jun 7-8 Kyodo poll	projected seats
DPJ	48.3%	(23~24)
LDP	14.5%	(9~10)
New Komeito	3.1%	(6~7)
Your Party	8.1%	(6)
JCP	2.3%	(2)
SDP	1.9%	(1~2)
PNP	1.9%	(0~1)
Sunrise	1.3%	(0~1)
New Renaissance	0.6%	(0)
The Spirit of Japan	0.1%	(0)
New Party Nippon	0.1%	(0)
Undecided	15.2%	(0)

-------------------------------------

Total seats

48

Now as to my predictions on who will win the 73 district seats up for grabs on July 11, see my next few posts.

They're Off!

The 2010 regular session of the Diet closed down for good yesterday, on schedule but with a record amount of its business unfinished. Lawmakers of both Houses immediately scrambled for their prefectures to begin campaigning in earnest, if in advance of the official starting date for the elections period, which will begin on June 24.

The press and commentariat have been critical of the immense number of government bills left lying either out on the table in the House of Representatives or to die in the House of Councillor's docket. Delayed until further notice are the bills on establishing a bureau for national policy strategy and the rules governing the use of dispatched contract labor. Evaporated into nothingness are the bills on revisions to the postal reform law, the climate change bill and the bill revising the way bureaucratic appointments are made. In total, the Hatoyama and Kan administrations managed to push only 56% of the governmment-submitted bills through the Diet in the regular session -- a postwar record low.

Then again, with so many of these bills having being either blatant attempts to buy off consituencies in advance of the House of Councillors elections or simply ill-considered gestures at quickly fulfilling campaign promises made by members of the ruling coalition in 2009, that they are now either delayed or deceased should prompt hurrahs, not sniping and harrumphing.

House of Councillors Election - The Proportional Vote*

[* A formatting problem marred the original posting of this material. The original text is here reproduced sans the problem. - MTC]

So how will the various parties do in the proportional vote in July? Let's take a gander at the historical results for insights.

Year: 2004

Total votes: 55,431,789

Share of the vote:

DPJ: 37.7%
LDP: 30.3%
New Komeito: 15.4%
JCP: 7.7%
SDP: 5.3%
Women's: 1.7%
Green: 1.7%

Final number of seats, proportional vote in 2004

DPJ: 19
LDP: 15
New Komeito: 8
JCP: 4
SDP: 2
Women's: 0
Green: 0

------------------------------------------------------------

Year: 2007

Total votes: 58,913,679

Share of the vote:

DPJ: 39.5%
LDP: 28.1%
New Komeito: 13.2%
JCP: 7.6%
SDP: 4.5%
JNP: 3.0%
PNP: 2.2%
Women's: 1.1%

Final number of seats, proportional vote in 2007

DPJ: 20
LDP: 14
New Komeito: 7
JCP: 3
SDP: 1
JNP : 1
PNP: 1
Women's: 0

------------------------------------------------------------

How does the outlook for the July 2010 election look?

This week's Kyodo Tsushin poll of June 8-9, where the new Kan Cabinet received a hearty 61% approval rating, the DPJ's projected share of the proportional vote was astonishingly high.

When asked which party they intended to cast their vote for in the proportional vote, the respondents said:

DPJ: 48.3%
LDP: 21.6%
Your Party: 8.1%
New Komeito: 3.1%
JCP: 2.3%
SDP: 1.9%
PNP: 1.9%
Sunrise: 1.3%
New Renaissance 0.6%
The Spirit of Japan 0.1%
New Party Nippon 0.1%


Don't know 15.2%

Now if these numbers hold up until date of the July 11 elections, with the DPJ in the end receiving more than 40% or more of the popular vote, then the great dream of the DPJ's winning enough seats to have control of the House of Councillors seems assured (Alison, it seems you were right - MTC).

Much of the boost in the numbers for the DPJ (just four days earlier, the percentage of voters ready to cast their votes for the DPJ was only 34%) can be ascribed to exultation at the departures of Hatoyama Yukio, Shizuka Kamei and Ozawa Ichiro. However, 40% of the party line vote should be considered a floor for the DPJ in this coming election. In the decidedly heady August 2009 House of Representatives election, the DPJ's percentage of the proportional bloc vote ranged from a high of 46% in Hokkaido and Tokai to a low of 38% in the LDP bastion of Kyushu, with the median of all the blocks hovering around 42%. Since those August 2009 elections, the DPJ's main rival the LDP has been shedding many of its most attractive members; has watched professional group after professional group shedding its affiliation with the LDP; and has failed to come up with a convincing reason for the voters to cast their proportional ballots for the former party of government.

So what do the above Kyodo polling numbers foretell in the way of results in the proportional vote on July 11? Going out on a limb I would guess:

DPJ: 24 seats
LDP: 9
Your Party: 6
New Komeito: 6
JCP: 1
SDP: 1
PNP: 0
Sunrise: 1
New Renaissance 0
The Spirit of Japan 0
New Party Nippon 0

That my friends is a prognostication of the elements of a wipeout for the DPJ's rivals.

Tell Me I Am Dreaming

Here is the main schedule for the time remaining before the House of Councillors elections, according to the Yomiuri Shimbun:

June 4

- Joint meeting of the Democratic Party of Japan members of the House of Representatives and the House of Councillors to elect a new party leader

- Special plenary sessions of the House of Representatives and the House of Councillors to elect a new prime minister (in case of different persons winning in each House, the decision of the House of Representatives takes precedence)

- New prime minister unveils his/her Cabinet

[Yes, you read it right. All three in one day.]

June 7

Prime Minister's Policy Address to the Diet

June 12

Prime Minister pays official visit to the Shanghai World's Fair (tentative)

June 16

End of Regular Diet Session

June 24

Opening of the official campaign period for the House of Councillors elections (projected)

June 25-27

Prime visits Canada and attends the G8 Summit

July 11

House of Councillors Elections

I have to admit: if one set out with the intention to draw all attention away from the campaign efforts of opposition parties, one could hardly devise a more tightly packed and distracting schedule.

I also see do not see how either the revisions to postal reform bill or the revisions of the laws governing the dispatch of contract labor will make it out of the House of Councillors by the currently projected June 16 deadline.