Does anyone know House of Councillors member Katayama Satsuki? Because someone needs to explain to me the fantasy photo thing to me.
When it happens once the breakdown can be attributed to a staffer's lack of judgment.
But when it happens again...it looks like more than just carelessness, to borrow a term from Oscar Wilde.
Yes, one does want to put one's best face on Facebook, though with a record of being the Finance Ministry's most stinging lash and one of Koizumi Jun'ichiro's most trusted assassins, one would hardly have to care.
As far as image goes, the official party page picture is great.
I am of the old school, I guess, believing that completing more than a few orbits under the sun and looking like the trip has not hurt too much ain't half bad, really.
For the prurient or merely curious, the next image from same Facebook set is here.
Showing posts with label MOF. Show all posts
Showing posts with label MOF. Show all posts
Thursday, July 18, 2013
Friday, January 25, 2013
Many Thanks
Many thanks this morning to commenter "Troy." He has increased the value of my hastily-set down, half-formed opinions with links, supportive statements and counterarguments.
Though I value all of his comments--and hope my readers do likewise--I would like to highlight two of his most recent contributions.
The first is the link to the Ministry of Finance's English-language brief Japan's Fiscal Condition. While an update is due, the paper nevertheless provides an invaluable review, in just a few pages of graphs, of the background to the decisions being made regarding the country's finances. If you ever want, as I do, to rid yourself of the "It is my understanding that..." disease, going over this paper is a great first step.
The second contribution is a graph of the size of Japan's 25-45 years-of-age cohort (Link). While I for selfish reasons despair at the narrowness of the window described, Troy's graph does show the fundamental macroeconomic problem: the swiftly falling numbers of persons in the top consumption years. Reductions in Japan's productive capacity can be made up with increased participation of women in the workforce, delayed retirement and increased productivity. However, the loss of domestic consumption is an issue the government and business either fail to grasp or want to face.
One big victim of the shrinkage in the domestic market will have to be keiretsu tribalism. That Japan's markets are not free -- that purchases by either corporate consumers or individuals are guided as much by keiretsu loyalties as price or quality -- can be accepted and acceptable as long as the domestic market is growing or stable. The reality of a shrinking market -- that in order to keep sales on the same level, one must make inroads into a competitor's customer base -- is not something Japan's established businesses want to think about.
However, do not make any investments based upon the above. No matter how inevitable the collapse of a large institutional structure, it will survive longer than reason dictates or suggests.
Though I value all of his comments--and hope my readers do likewise--I would like to highlight two of his most recent contributions.
The first is the link to the Ministry of Finance's English-language brief Japan's Fiscal Condition. While an update is due, the paper nevertheless provides an invaluable review, in just a few pages of graphs, of the background to the decisions being made regarding the country's finances. If you ever want, as I do, to rid yourself of the "It is my understanding that..." disease, going over this paper is a great first step.
The second contribution is a graph of the size of Japan's 25-45 years-of-age cohort (Link). While I for selfish reasons despair at the narrowness of the window described, Troy's graph does show the fundamental macroeconomic problem: the swiftly falling numbers of persons in the top consumption years. Reductions in Japan's productive capacity can be made up with increased participation of women in the workforce, delayed retirement and increased productivity. However, the loss of domestic consumption is an issue the government and business either fail to grasp or want to face.
One big victim of the shrinkage in the domestic market will have to be keiretsu tribalism. That Japan's markets are not free -- that purchases by either corporate consumers or individuals are guided as much by keiretsu loyalties as price or quality -- can be accepted and acceptable as long as the domestic market is growing or stable. The reality of a shrinking market -- that in order to keep sales on the same level, one must make inroads into a competitor's customer base -- is not something Japan's established businesses want to think about.
However, do not make any investments based upon the above. No matter how inevitable the collapse of a large institutional structure, it will survive longer than reason dictates or suggests.
Thursday, January 17, 2013
From All Sides Now
The negative reviews of Abenomics keep pouring in. So numerous are the voices raised in protest that the objections come now in all kinds of flavors:
- Clyde Prestowitz's MOSS ("More Of the Same Stuff" - Link) highlights one of the most infuriating aspects of Abe Shinzo's economic program. Abe & Co. have a supermajority in the House of Representatives, a four year mandate, a despised and divided opposition...and all they can come up with as plans for pulling Japan out of chronic deflation and low growth are a public works spending-heavy fiscal package and stripping the Bank of Japan of its independence. ARE YOU KIDDING ME?
(How egregious is the assault on the Bank of Japan? No one has raised a peep about Abe smothering the Financial Services Agency by handing the Agency portfolio to Finance Minister Aso Taro. Perhaps new Abe advisor Takenaka Heizo can suggest that a de facto reversal of the bust up of the old Finance Ministry* is a Really Bad Idea.)
- Following up on the suggestion that Dr. Noah Smith made almost three weeks ago -- that Abe Shinzo's real goal in roughing up the BOJ is to drive down the value of the yen (Link) -- Bank Rossii First Deputy Chairman Alexei Ulyukayev has declared the world on the brink of a "currency war." (Link)
It seems than goosing the profits of exporters through currency manipulation, indirect as that manipulation may be, prior to the March 31 end of the fiscal year, upsets folks in other countries.
Consequences...consequences...
- From domestic economists working for the research arms of financial giants, an assessment that the Abe fiscal stimulus package will create far fewer jobs than promised (Link). I am trying to figure out why these staff economists would have a vested interest in denigrating the stimulus. At present I cannot see an ulterior motive.
----------------
* In the kind of precious slip of the tongue that only an old-fashioned pol in full smirk can deliver, Aso Taro, in his first NHK interview after being named Finance Minister, called the Finance Ministry the Okurasho ("Ministry of the Great Storehouse") -- the pompous archaism the MOF abandoned as its official name twelve years ago.
- Clyde Prestowitz's MOSS ("More Of the Same Stuff" - Link) highlights one of the most infuriating aspects of Abe Shinzo's economic program. Abe & Co. have a supermajority in the House of Representatives, a four year mandate, a despised and divided opposition...and all they can come up with as plans for pulling Japan out of chronic deflation and low growth are a public works spending-heavy fiscal package and stripping the Bank of Japan of its independence. ARE YOU KIDDING ME?
(How egregious is the assault on the Bank of Japan? No one has raised a peep about Abe smothering the Financial Services Agency by handing the Agency portfolio to Finance Minister Aso Taro. Perhaps new Abe advisor Takenaka Heizo can suggest that a de facto reversal of the bust up of the old Finance Ministry* is a Really Bad Idea.)
- Following up on the suggestion that Dr. Noah Smith made almost three weeks ago -- that Abe Shinzo's real goal in roughing up the BOJ is to drive down the value of the yen (Link) -- Bank Rossii First Deputy Chairman Alexei Ulyukayev has declared the world on the brink of a "currency war." (Link)
It seems than goosing the profits of exporters through currency manipulation, indirect as that manipulation may be, prior to the March 31 end of the fiscal year, upsets folks in other countries.
Consequences...consequences...
- From domestic economists working for the research arms of financial giants, an assessment that the Abe fiscal stimulus package will create far fewer jobs than promised (Link). I am trying to figure out why these staff economists would have a vested interest in denigrating the stimulus. At present I cannot see an ulterior motive.
----------------
* In the kind of precious slip of the tongue that only an old-fashioned pol in full smirk can deliver, Aso Taro, in his first NHK interview after being named Finance Minister, called the Finance Ministry the Okurasho ("Ministry of the Great Storehouse") -- the pompous archaism the MOF abandoned as its official name twelve years ago.
Labels:
Abe Shinzo,
Aso Taro,
economic malaise,
financial services,
MOF,
popular reforms
Thursday, June 14, 2012
The BOJ's Holding The Line And Why Diet Members Do Not Like It
Someone has finally printed an article in English which defends the Bank of Japan's independence and policies. Predictably, the responsible publication is the Financial Times (E) which as recently as yesterday I was chiding for its tendency to plunge its Japanese interview subjects into hot water.
Amidst all the noise "that the bank should be doing more" it is refreshing to read an article observing that the BOJ is doing all that can be done and still maintain the appellation of "bank." The BOJ is not a berserk ATM responsible for counteracting the incredibly bad fiscal policies of countries around the globe. Since the BOJ cannot succeed in this endeavor it is pointless for the bank to attempt it.
And a cleverly run bank the BOJ is, having posted in fiscal 2011 an unexpected and tidy profit in its bond dealings. (E)
As for reports that Diet members are preparing legislation to rein in the BOJ's independence, regranting the Finance Ministry the powers the MOF lost over the BOJ's policies -- or merely to terrify the BOJ into pre-emptively ceding part of its independence from government interference so as to preserve the larger portion of its independence -- the drafting of legislation is what lawmakers do, whether or not such legislation will have significant effects on the economy's performance or not. (E)
Frankly, noting that legislators are preparing bills with the intention of curbing the BOJ's independence is a little like noting that bonobos have sex. (E)
That legislators would want to be seen as doing something, anything, to arrest deflation is understandable. Deflation, as analyst extraordinaire Naomi Fink recently pointed out, diminishes the willingness of companies to borrow (increasing, as it does, the real interest rate borrowers pay) and hammers the stock markets (by inducing companies to raise funds through the issuance of new equity, diluting the value of the holdings of existing shareholders).
That deflation simultaneously delivers real, nontaxable returns on savings is something legislators possibly do not know, have forgotten or ignore as it has no impact on their being able to hit up corporations into paying for fundraising party tickets or for candidates to win the votes of those who live on the margin and are thus unable to save.
So rather than being about doing something, BOJ bashing seems to be about appearing to be doing something.
Amidst all the noise "that the bank should be doing more" it is refreshing to read an article observing that the BOJ is doing all that can be done and still maintain the appellation of "bank." The BOJ is not a berserk ATM responsible for counteracting the incredibly bad fiscal policies of countries around the globe. Since the BOJ cannot succeed in this endeavor it is pointless for the bank to attempt it.
And a cleverly run bank the BOJ is, having posted in fiscal 2011 an unexpected and tidy profit in its bond dealings. (E)
As for reports that Diet members are preparing legislation to rein in the BOJ's independence, regranting the Finance Ministry the powers the MOF lost over the BOJ's policies -- or merely to terrify the BOJ into pre-emptively ceding part of its independence from government interference so as to preserve the larger portion of its independence -- the drafting of legislation is what lawmakers do, whether or not such legislation will have significant effects on the economy's performance or not. (E)
Frankly, noting that legislators are preparing bills with the intention of curbing the BOJ's independence is a little like noting that bonobos have sex. (E)
That legislators would want to be seen as doing something, anything, to arrest deflation is understandable. Deflation, as analyst extraordinaire Naomi Fink recently pointed out, diminishes the willingness of companies to borrow (increasing, as it does, the real interest rate borrowers pay) and hammers the stock markets (by inducing companies to raise funds through the issuance of new equity, diluting the value of the holdings of existing shareholders).
That deflation simultaneously delivers real, nontaxable returns on savings is something legislators possibly do not know, have forgotten or ignore as it has no impact on their being able to hit up corporations into paying for fundraising party tickets or for candidates to win the votes of those who live on the margin and are thus unable to save.
So rather than being about doing something, BOJ bashing seems to be about appearing to be doing something.
Labels:
BOJ,
economic malaise,
images of politicians,
Japan deflation,
MOF,
press behavior
Thursday, May 24, 2012
Mr. Noda's Ambivalent Attitude Toward The National Bureaucracy
The conventional wisdom state that Prime Minister Noda Yoshihiko is a tool/enabler of a resurrected national bureaucracy.
Signs of the return of bureaucratic power include:
- the reinstitution of the right of bureaucrats, particularly the head of the Cabinet Legislative Office, to testify in the Diet
- the full acceptance of a plan to raise the consumption tax to 10% -- a longtime dream of the Ministry of Finance (actually their dream is to send the consumption tax rate even higher).
This a corollary of Noda's having moved directly from the position of Finance Minister to the premiership. Former prime minister Kan Naoto made the same move in June of 2010, and seemingly the first words out of his mouth upon taking over as the country's leader were that taxes will need to be raised. This statement sent Kan's and the Democratic Party of Japan's popularity ratings southward and is credited as having been a significant factor in the the DPJ's losses in the July 2010 House of Councillors election -- losses that handed control of the House to the opposition, derailing the DPJ's ambitious plans to change the way the country is run.
In the popular view, any politician who serves as the minister of finance succumbs to that bureaucracy's mantras, becoming a glassy-eyed novitiate in the cult of raising the consumption tax ("Must-raise-the-tax. Must-save-Japan")
- the deceleration in the campaign to cut the funding of projects of questionable merit made by the ministries and the quasi-government entities that provide retiring bureaucrat with cushy sinecures
- the acceptance without question or amendment of the budget compiled by the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism, including spending for a restart of the Yamba Dam project -- the cancellation of which was the signal in 2009 that the new DPJ-led government was willing to go to the wall to effect change in the country
- the selection of the F-35 as Japan's next generation fighter, which seems to have no justifications other than simultaneously pleasing the United States government and satisfying the Ministry of Defense's lust for stealth -- even if Japan's beleaguered defense contractors get nothing out of the deal and the stealth technology remains entirely in the hands of the United States
[Please add to the list, if you can, in comments]
It is tempting to believe that the PM is allowing national bureaucrats (kokka komuin) to run amok because he needs them as allies or at least neutral parties. He cannot be fighting simultaneously on two fronts against both the bureaucrats and the political opposition, as the first DPJ prime ministers Hatoyama Yukio and Naoto Kan tried to do, with catastrophic results.
Evidence exists, however, that the above is only half of a double-sided game the PM is having with the national bureaucrats, the left hand taking while the right hand gives. Noda did nothing to stop his party from swallowing whole a New Komeito bill cutting bureaucratic salaries by an average of 7.8% for the next two years, with a retroactive cut of 0.23% for this year and no collective bargaining rights, the last item being a promise the DPJ made to the Japanese Trade Union Confederation (Rengo), a crucial vote machine for the party. He has a government-appointed panel recommending a four million yen cut in the lump sum bonus bureaucrats receive upon retirement, as well as an accelerated program of early retirement buyouts. ( J)
Prime Minister Noda has said and done nothing about Deputy Prime Minister Okada Katsuya's staggering cuts in the intake of new recruits into career track positions, this taking place on top of previous cuts in the number of national bureaucrats:
Number of career-track hirees
by the office, commission, ministry and agency
April 2012 --> April 2013
Cabinet Secretariat 10 --> 4
Cabinet Legislative Office 2 --> 1
Cabinet Office 35 --> 20
Imperial Household Agency 32 --> 16
Japan Fair Trade Commission 37 --> 22
National Police Agency 164 --> 100
Financial Services Agency 42 --> 22
Consumer Affairs Agency 2 --> 1
Ministry of Internal Affairs
and Communications 120 --> 73
Ministry of Justice 1,475 --> 942
Ministry of Foreign Affairs 141 --> 80
Ministry of Finance 1,482 --> 929
Ministry of Education,Culture,
Sports, Science & Technology 66 -> 36
Ministry of Health, Labour
and Welfare 625 --> 298
Ministry of Agriculture,
Forestry and Fisheries 235 --> 120
Ministry of Economy
Trade and Industry 181 -- 107
Ministry of Land, Infrastructure
Transport and Tourism 1078 --> 682
Ministry of the Environment 34 --> 27
Ministry of Defense 575 --> 300
Source:
Ministry of General Affairs and Telecommunications
With these assaults on the income and the number of national bureaucrats (who will have to do the same amount of work as their predecessors, despite their reduced numbers) is it any wonder that the number of those taking the entrance examinations to become national bureaucrats dropped 13% in between 2011 and 2012? (J)
So is Prime Minister Noda just so much putty in the hands of the bureaucracy? The numbers do not seem to support that view.
Signs of the return of bureaucratic power include:
- the reinstitution of the right of bureaucrats, particularly the head of the Cabinet Legislative Office, to testify in the Diet
- the full acceptance of a plan to raise the consumption tax to 10% -- a longtime dream of the Ministry of Finance (actually their dream is to send the consumption tax rate even higher).
This a corollary of Noda's having moved directly from the position of Finance Minister to the premiership. Former prime minister Kan Naoto made the same move in June of 2010, and seemingly the first words out of his mouth upon taking over as the country's leader were that taxes will need to be raised. This statement sent Kan's and the Democratic Party of Japan's popularity ratings southward and is credited as having been a significant factor in the the DPJ's losses in the July 2010 House of Councillors election -- losses that handed control of the House to the opposition, derailing the DPJ's ambitious plans to change the way the country is run.
In the popular view, any politician who serves as the minister of finance succumbs to that bureaucracy's mantras, becoming a glassy-eyed novitiate in the cult of raising the consumption tax ("Must-raise-the-tax. Must-save-Japan")
- the deceleration in the campaign to cut the funding of projects of questionable merit made by the ministries and the quasi-government entities that provide retiring bureaucrat with cushy sinecures
- the acceptance without question or amendment of the budget compiled by the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism, including spending for a restart of the Yamba Dam project -- the cancellation of which was the signal in 2009 that the new DPJ-led government was willing to go to the wall to effect change in the country
- the selection of the F-35 as Japan's next generation fighter, which seems to have no justifications other than simultaneously pleasing the United States government and satisfying the Ministry of Defense's lust for stealth -- even if Japan's beleaguered defense contractors get nothing out of the deal and the stealth technology remains entirely in the hands of the United States
[Please add to the list, if you can, in comments]
It is tempting to believe that the PM is allowing national bureaucrats (kokka komuin) to run amok because he needs them as allies or at least neutral parties. He cannot be fighting simultaneously on two fronts against both the bureaucrats and the political opposition, as the first DPJ prime ministers Hatoyama Yukio and Naoto Kan tried to do, with catastrophic results.
Evidence exists, however, that the above is only half of a double-sided game the PM is having with the national bureaucrats, the left hand taking while the right hand gives. Noda did nothing to stop his party from swallowing whole a New Komeito bill cutting bureaucratic salaries by an average of 7.8% for the next two years, with a retroactive cut of 0.23% for this year and no collective bargaining rights, the last item being a promise the DPJ made to the Japanese Trade Union Confederation (Rengo), a crucial vote machine for the party. He has a government-appointed panel recommending a four million yen cut in the lump sum bonus bureaucrats receive upon retirement, as well as an accelerated program of early retirement buyouts. ( J)
Prime Minister Noda has said and done nothing about Deputy Prime Minister Okada Katsuya's staggering cuts in the intake of new recruits into career track positions, this taking place on top of previous cuts in the number of national bureaucrats:
Number of career-track hirees
by the office, commission, ministry and agency
April 2012 --> April 2013
Cabinet Secretariat 10 --> 4
Cabinet Legislative Office 2 --> 1
Cabinet Office 35 --> 20
Imperial Household Agency 32 --> 16
Japan Fair Trade Commission 37 --> 22
National Police Agency 164 --> 100
Financial Services Agency 42 --> 22
Consumer Affairs Agency 2 --> 1
Ministry of Internal Affairs
and Communications 120 --> 73
Ministry of Justice 1,475 --> 942
Ministry of Foreign Affairs 141 --> 80
Ministry of Finance 1,482 --> 929
Ministry of Education,Culture,
Sports, Science & Technology 66 -> 36
Ministry of Health, Labour
and Welfare 625 --> 298
Ministry of Agriculture,
Forestry and Fisheries 235 --> 120
Ministry of Economy
Trade and Industry 181 -- 107
Ministry of Land, Infrastructure
Transport and Tourism 1078 --> 682
Ministry of the Environment 34 --> 27
Ministry of Defense 575 --> 300
Source:
Ministry of General Affairs and Telecommunications
With these assaults on the income and the number of national bureaucrats (who will have to do the same amount of work as their predecessors, despite their reduced numbers) is it any wonder that the number of those taking the entrance examinations to become national bureaucrats dropped 13% in between 2011 and 2012? (J)
So is Prime Minister Noda just so much putty in the hands of the bureaucracy? The numbers do not seem to support that view.
Subscribe to:
Posts (Atom)
