Some items of interest:
- According to the Nikkei Shimbun, BOJ expansion of its balance sheet have made the market for national debt so barren the Ministry of Finance has offered its first short-term debt with a negative interest rate (Link - J). The appropriate comment at this point is, "Yikes!"
- Tobias Harris does a turn on television offering a sober view of the current turmoil in the Diet(Link - J). His view that Abe Shinzo faces a very different political environment in 2014 than he did in 2007. Abe is the quite happy accidental beneficiary of the collapse of a 30-year national program to oust the Liberal Democratic Party. Tossing the LDP bums out, and installing a Democratic Party of Japan-led government in 2009 did not deliver the paradise of responsive and responsible government the Japanese public had hoped for, however. Now the LDP is rivaled in public opinion polls only by the "I don't support anybody/I don't care/I don't like making decisions so please leave me alone" party -- meaning that even if the Second Abe Cabinet enters the traditional death slide of a year of steadily declining cabinet support ratings to 20%, followed by Abe's announcement of his resignation, the only person who can replace Abe will be a member of the LDP (the current likeliest candidates being Ishiba Shigeru, Ishiba Shigeru and possibly Ishiba Shigeru).
- Dr. Adam Posen delivers a very upbeat assessment of Abenomics starting at the 39:50 mark of this PIIE video of its Global Economic Prospects session of 2 October 2014 (Link - video)For the record, 710,000 more women were in the labor force as of August 2014 (the most recent month for which the government has data) than were in the labor force in January 2013, Abe's first full month in office. During that span 230,300 men also entered the labor force -- though that number only returns the number of men in the labor force to the point where it was in February 2013.
- Professor Eugene Gholz, whom I met in Tokyo earlier this year, has produced an easy-to-read paper for the Council on Foreign Relations explaining why Japanese policy makers should continue to remain alert to but should stop making paranoid noises about global rare earth/rare metals supplies. (Link)
- Kasai Yoshiyuki, a Shisaku favorite and the purported maestro of the Second Coming of Abe Shinzo last week saw his grand boondoggle receive the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism (Link). Yesterday, he made his pitch to extend his levitating empire overseas (Link) -- not surprising since the CEO of JR Central has admitted that the Tokyo-Nagoya maglev line will never turn a profit. (Link
Later - Jonathan Soble, formerly the Tokyo bureau chief of the Financial Times, starts out with a bang in his new posting as business reporter for The New York Times with the long list of former American politicians Mr. Kasai has acquired for the new North American Wing of his collection. An absolutely precious photo accompanies the story. (Link)
Hope all you shareholders of JR Central are happy with the way the chairman emeritus Kasai is spending your money.
Showing posts with label Bank of Japan. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Bank of Japan. Show all posts
Thursday, October 23, 2014
Thursday, September 05, 2013
What Could Really Kill Abenomics
My admiration for Yale University professor Hamada Ko'ichi, the acknowledged intellectual father of the first two arrows of Abenomics (Link), has been, for the most part, non-existent.
Until today. (Link)
And yes, my newfound appreciation is based in his seeing the data the same way I do, as unsupportive of a declaration of victory.
By contrast, thanks to reporting by the same financial news service, my faith in the economic reasoning at major financial institutions has plummeted. In a survey of 32 economists at financial giants like JPMorgan Chase & Co and Nomura Securities, 22 thought that Japanese stock markets would suffer a significant fall if Prime Minister Abe Shinzo decides next month to delay or cancel the April 2014 rise in the consumption tax from 5% to 8%. (Link)
Because...
1) It would diminish the capacity of the Bank of Japan to buy government bonds (What???)
2) Because it would reduce the credibility of the reforms in Abenomics growth package (What???)
Unless the 22 economists with a negative view can offer a mechanism that would cause the relative value of owning shares to fall vis-a-vis other investment opportunities -- which would have to be opportunities outside of Japan as the value of the main domestic alternative, Japan government bonds, will likely be crushed by any hint the government will not even attempt to keep its promises on finding a way of repaying the debt -- then those economists should not answer the phone the next time Bloomberg calls.
As for the so-called Abenomics growth strategy (which is not a strategy since strategy involves choice and sacrifice), its vacuity, not a failure to raise taxes, seems the most imminent and likely cause of a crushing of investor sentiment. In response to a massive letdown after the official Third Arrow announcement in June (Link), the government and its advisors seemingly have chosen the paths of least, or possibly no, effort:
a) Canvassing the public for ideas as to what policy changes should be in the growth strategy (Link) -- as if a grab bag of a hundred little ideas, all of which would require regulatory or legal changes, could even be implemented, much less coalesce into coherent programs, and
b) Doubling down on the announced plans, assigning to the Abe government brain trust the task of making the June proposals seem more than what they are (Link - J) -- the infamous recommendation of the "Plan B is to make Plan A work" school of management.
Oh, fabulous...
Until today. (Link)
And yes, my newfound appreciation is based in his seeing the data the same way I do, as unsupportive of a declaration of victory.
By contrast, thanks to reporting by the same financial news service, my faith in the economic reasoning at major financial institutions has plummeted. In a survey of 32 economists at financial giants like JPMorgan Chase & Co and Nomura Securities, 22 thought that Japanese stock markets would suffer a significant fall if Prime Minister Abe Shinzo decides next month to delay or cancel the April 2014 rise in the consumption tax from 5% to 8%. (Link)
Because...
1) It would diminish the capacity of the Bank of Japan to buy government bonds (What???)
2) Because it would reduce the credibility of the reforms in Abenomics growth package (What???)
Unless the 22 economists with a negative view can offer a mechanism that would cause the relative value of owning shares to fall vis-a-vis other investment opportunities -- which would have to be opportunities outside of Japan as the value of the main domestic alternative, Japan government bonds, will likely be crushed by any hint the government will not even attempt to keep its promises on finding a way of repaying the debt -- then those economists should not answer the phone the next time Bloomberg calls.
As for the so-called Abenomics growth strategy (which is not a strategy since strategy involves choice and sacrifice), its vacuity, not a failure to raise taxes, seems the most imminent and likely cause of a crushing of investor sentiment. In response to a massive letdown after the official Third Arrow announcement in June (Link), the government and its advisors seemingly have chosen the paths of least, or possibly no, effort:
a) Canvassing the public for ideas as to what policy changes should be in the growth strategy (Link) -- as if a grab bag of a hundred little ideas, all of which would require regulatory or legal changes, could even be implemented, much less coalesce into coherent programs, and
b) Doubling down on the announced plans, assigning to the Abe government brain trust the task of making the June proposals seem more than what they are (Link - J) -- the infamous recommendation of the "Plan B is to make Plan A work" school of management.
Oh, fabulous...
Saturday, August 10, 2013
The Baddest Bad Bank Of Them All

Over at The Telegraph, Ambrose Evans-Pritchard either did not get the email, or ignored the postscript: "And for Amaterasu's sake, do not let on to what it is that we are doing!" (Link)
Once in an exchange with a noted Japan expert I described Japan Government Bonds as toxic assets. Evans-Pritchard clarifies what I mean.
What is peculiar is the mention of bond vigilantes. More curious still is the mention comes from BNP Paribas chief economist Kono Ryutaro.
What bond vigilantes? Over 90% of JGBs held by domestic investors and most of that, when not by the Bank of Japan, is by Japan's largest financial institutions. Anyone demanding yield -- a.k.a, lower of bond prices - would open up craters in the capital bases of every major participant in the financial system. So everyone has had an incentive to play nice, especially since the financial system has continued to gorge itself on real income (thanks to deflation) producing JGBs long after the national debt-to-GDP-ratio made any sense.
Exit was kept in check by both the lack of reasonable investment alternatives (see the graphs of Japan's equities markets and real estate prices since 1989) and mutually assured financial destruction if any big player tried to opt out of the game.
So no vigilantes. Instead, a genteel Mexican standoff -- no participant having the ability to get out fast enough to make up for the losses on its hoard of JGBs.
What Bank of Japan Governor Kuroda Haruhiko is offering -- and what made the interest rate volatility in May so inexplicable -- is an orderly and gradual exit from the standoff for non-government market participants. The Bank of Japan promises to expand its balance sheet without limit, under the aegis of doing everything it can to create inflation. Japan's financial giants, not working in sync but not being disharmonious either, sell their JGBs to the BOJ, reducing the riskiness of their portfolios.
Of course, if the BOJ is successful in triggering inflation, then the pressure will be on the financial system players to get out of JGBs all the faster -- faster perhaps than the BOJ can buy the securities on offer.
At that point reported increases in government tax revenues had better be spectacular. If they are not, the JGBs in the portfolios of Japan's financial system will indeed be toxic, transformed into poison by the loss of credibility of the ultimate cover story of the Japanese government's being able to pay JGBs off.
So good luck with that asset switchover, everyone.
As for idle cash appearing on the balance sheets of Japanese megabanks and insurance giants, some of it is going to flow into the equities markets and possibly real estate, reinforcing the emerging bubbles there. However, the financial giants, which employ at least a few individuals who remember the 1980s, are going to direct a lot of the BOJ-printed money overseas. Which means global asset reflation and a tumbling yen. Higher import prices, primarily of energy and raw materials, from the lower yen, yes -- but also more competitive export prices and enormous profits for exporters, at least in their debased accounting currency. Which in turn would mean higher government tax receipts.
Where does the virtuous, BOJ-inspired cycle break down? In competing devaluations of the won and the yuan? Too stupid am I to say.
Friday, May 31, 2013
What I Learned At The Economist’s Conference
Yesterday I had the privilege (and indeed it was a privilege) to attend the Economist Group's Bellweather 2013 Japan conference.
My key takeaways from the panels:
Don't Call It Structural Reform
Whatever the contents of the Third Arrow of Abenomics, due for release next week, it will not be a package of structural reforms for various problematic sectors of the economy.
Instead, if the vision laid out yesterday by Parliamentary Vice Minister of Economy Trade and Industry Sato Yukari is accurate, the third arrow is an economic growth plan, light to the point of insult on deregulation and liberalization and heavy on the picking and choosing of winners and losers among industries. The centrality of dirigisme in the presentation almost had me singing La Marsellaise in response.
[Come to think of it, "Allons enfants de la Patrie/Le jour de gloire est arrivé!" pretty much encapsulates the Abe Shinzo message to his people and the world this year.]
This made me wonder:
1) do Abe, the members of his Cabinet and his advisers understand that the rise in the equities markets and the willingness of bondholders to sit tight as the Bank of Japan rampages through the bond market require a faith that structural reform is in the offing, meaning that there will be a real payoff for investing in Japan?
2) Senator Sato started out her political career as an assassin for free markets enthusiast Koizumi Jun'ichiro. Prior to that she was an economist with JP Morgan and Credit Suisse First Boston, presumably in favor of deregulation and the end of protectionism.
Now she does P.R. for industrial policy.
Hmmm...
"Ending deflation" does not mean what you think it means
Until yesterday, I had thought that the Abe Cabinet's and the Bank of Japan's goal of "leaving behind deflation" meant fiscal and monetary policy and maybe structural reform leading to a 2% rate of CPI inflation by 2014.
I was (some would add in an "of course" here) mistaken.
"Leaving behind deflation" is not inflation. It is Inflation+ ™ .
Literally.
As explained yesterday by Bank of Japan Governor Nakaso Hiroshi, simply having 2% inflation in 2015 will not suffice. There has to be
2% CPI inflation + increased corporate profits + increased wages and bonuses
before the standard of what constitutes "leaving behind deflation" will be met.
Again the urge to rise from my seat gripped me, this time in order to shout, "But that's cheating. You're moving the goal posts!"
The core argument of the "Whip deflation now" crowd has always been that deflation was a primary cause of economic malaise. Whip deflation and the country could get on its feet again. (Link)
Now the BOJ activist wing, as represented by Nakaso, seems to saying that no, reigniting inflation does not do the magic trick. One needs more. Indeed you need the items – higher incomes and corporate profits -- that the deflation voodoo skeptics kept saying were the real targets worth the shooting for.
The activists, now that they are in control of the levers of the economy, are admitting that they were being disingenuous. Deflation was not in and of itself a cause of economic malaise. At least part of deflation, perhaps even most of it, was a symptom of decay.
Supporters of the new Inflation+ ™ formula might counter, "It was never a simple end deflation/you will have economic growth" situation. Inflation, were it to return, would always had to had "demand-pull" in addition to "cost push." (Link)
Yes, but that is not how the deflation fighting mantra went, at least not until the deflation fighters seized the reins this past winter.
My key takeaways from the panels:
Don't Call It Structural Reform
Whatever the contents of the Third Arrow of Abenomics, due for release next week, it will not be a package of structural reforms for various problematic sectors of the economy.
Instead, if the vision laid out yesterday by Parliamentary Vice Minister of Economy Trade and Industry Sato Yukari is accurate, the third arrow is an economic growth plan, light to the point of insult on deregulation and liberalization and heavy on the picking and choosing of winners and losers among industries. The centrality of dirigisme in the presentation almost had me singing La Marsellaise in response.
[Come to think of it, "Allons enfants de la Patrie/Le jour de gloire est arrivé!" pretty much encapsulates the Abe Shinzo message to his people and the world this year.]
This made me wonder:
1) do Abe, the members of his Cabinet and his advisers understand that the rise in the equities markets and the willingness of bondholders to sit tight as the Bank of Japan rampages through the bond market require a faith that structural reform is in the offing, meaning that there will be a real payoff for investing in Japan?
2) Senator Sato started out her political career as an assassin for free markets enthusiast Koizumi Jun'ichiro. Prior to that she was an economist with JP Morgan and Credit Suisse First Boston, presumably in favor of deregulation and the end of protectionism.
Now she does P.R. for industrial policy.
Hmmm...
"Ending deflation" does not mean what you think it means
Until yesterday, I had thought that the Abe Cabinet's and the Bank of Japan's goal of "leaving behind deflation" meant fiscal and monetary policy and maybe structural reform leading to a 2% rate of CPI inflation by 2014.
I was (some would add in an "of course" here) mistaken.
"Leaving behind deflation" is not inflation. It is Inflation+ ™ .
Literally.
As explained yesterday by Bank of Japan Governor Nakaso Hiroshi, simply having 2% inflation in 2015 will not suffice. There has to be
2% CPI inflation + increased corporate profits + increased wages and bonuses
before the standard of what constitutes "leaving behind deflation" will be met.
Again the urge to rise from my seat gripped me, this time in order to shout, "But that's cheating. You're moving the goal posts!"
The core argument of the "Whip deflation now" crowd has always been that deflation was a primary cause of economic malaise. Whip deflation and the country could get on its feet again. (Link)
Now the BOJ activist wing, as represented by Nakaso, seems to saying that no, reigniting inflation does not do the magic trick. One needs more. Indeed you need the items – higher incomes and corporate profits -- that the deflation voodoo skeptics kept saying were the real targets worth the shooting for.
The activists, now that they are in control of the levers of the economy, are admitting that they were being disingenuous. Deflation was not in and of itself a cause of economic malaise. At least part of deflation, perhaps even most of it, was a symptom of decay.
Supporters of the new Inflation+ ™ formula might counter, "It was never a simple end deflation/you will have economic growth" situation. Inflation, were it to return, would always had to had "demand-pull" in addition to "cost push." (Link)
Yes, but that is not how the deflation fighting mantra went, at least not until the deflation fighters seized the reins this past winter.
Thursday, April 04, 2013
Flammis Acribus Addictis
Okumura Jun remarked several weeks ago that Kuroda Haruhiko, the new Bank of Japan governor, would have to make "a quick kill" following his confirmation. (Link)
Okumura's post was prescient but it looks as though the timetable has been accelerated. Weak Tankan numbers, softening of the labor demand for labor, unexpected dips in prices and industrial production have made the target of 2% inflation and economic growth look less achievable, leading to some ominous backtracking. (Link)
Kuroda is in a bind. The markets have already priced in the most obvious changes in policy direction, making, for example, a stronger commitment to purchases of longer maturity securities a far more expensive proposition (Link). Coming out of this peculiar "last-meeting-of-the-Shirakawa-term-with-Shirakawa-gone" with no new proposals, just a big dose of anti-deflationary attitude is a possibility -- but who wants to start off the first big public event at one's dream job with "nothing important to say now, please wait until next time"?
Okumura's post was prescient but it looks as though the timetable has been accelerated. Weak Tankan numbers, softening of the labor demand for labor, unexpected dips in prices and industrial production have made the target of 2% inflation and economic growth look less achievable, leading to some ominous backtracking. (Link)
Kuroda is in a bind. The markets have already priced in the most obvious changes in policy direction, making, for example, a stronger commitment to purchases of longer maturity securities a far more expensive proposition (Link). Coming out of this peculiar "last-meeting-of-the-Shirakawa-term-with-Shirakawa-gone" with no new proposals, just a big dose of anti-deflationary attitude is a possibility -- but who wants to start off the first big public event at one's dream job with "nothing important to say now, please wait until next time"?
Thursday, February 07, 2013
Dr. Krugman Expands Upon His Idea
In response to calls for clarification by persons as ignorant as myself, Dr. Paul Krugman has explained his support for Abenomics.
Krugman's argument, and it seems a good one, is that Japan is in a liquidity trap, where the optimum real interest rate, where savings and investment intersect, is negative. Unfortunately, with deflation and nominal interest rates at the zero bound, there is no way for conventional monetary policy to generate the optimal real interest rate. (Link and, as background, Link)
The answer is government-policy driven inflation, with allows the economy to achieve the desired intersection of savings and investment.
Ignoramuses such as myself may still not accept the story, convinced that the Abe program as simply the taking advantage of of the patience of Japan's bond holders. If Japan's debt were held more broadly and domestic financial institutions were not stuffed to the gills on Japanese paper, leaving them hostages to their own capital bases, it is unlikely for any of these fiscal and monetary shenanigans would fly.
Krugman's argument, and it seems a good one, is that Japan is in a liquidity trap, where the optimum real interest rate, where savings and investment intersect, is negative. Unfortunately, with deflation and nominal interest rates at the zero bound, there is no way for conventional monetary policy to generate the optimal real interest rate. (Link and, as background, Link)
The answer is government-policy driven inflation, with allows the economy to achieve the desired intersection of savings and investment.
Ignoramuses such as myself may still not accept the story, convinced that the Abe program as simply the taking advantage of of the patience of Japan's bond holders. If Japan's debt were held more broadly and domestic financial institutions were not stuffed to the gills on Japanese paper, leaving them hostages to their own capital bases, it is unlikely for any of these fiscal and monetary shenanigans would fly.
Labels:
Abe Shinzo,
Abenomics,
Bank of Japan,
economic malaise
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