Plums and early cherries bloom in the Kairakuen, Mito City, Ibaraki Prefecture on March 16, 2012.
Photo credits: MTC
Monday, March 18, 2013
Trees In Bloom In The Kairakuen
Plums and early cherries bloom in the Kairakuen, Mito City, Ibaraki Prefecture on March 16, 2012.
Photo credits: MTC
Things I Know Will Not Happen But I Still Wish Would
- NHK News providing access to even a fraction of its back catalog so that I might determine the exact day when the network's news announcers made the switch from pronouncing the name of the country as "Nihon" in favor of the current, enervating "Nippon."
- Spike reversing his decision to stop writing about his wanderings through down-at-the-heels Japan. (Link)
- Commentators ceasing to worry about how a misunderstanding in between the maritime constabulary forces (I must thank Alessio Patalano for that wonderful locution) of China and Japan could lead to an exchange of gunfire and a military crisis -- and starting to worry instead how the leaderships of China and Japan are using the Senkakus as springboards for their own careers, the needs and interests of their citizens be damned -- i.e., make plain that from the viewpoint of fostering or preserving democracy and prosperity in the region, the prophesied "Senkakus crisis" is already upon us.
- Folks who write up articles and reports about this blessed land doing a little thinking about their sources of anecdotes and comments, along the lines of "if I am talking to a smarter-than-average person about the way his/her society and government work, shouldn't I worry that what I am hearing is not what works but instead how things are supposed to work?"
Call it the yutosei problem, if you need a label for the idea.
Anthropologists have to worry all the time about whether or not what they are hearing from native informants is just a narrative the informant is selling or even worse believes is true.
The antidote is not that difficult to find: just tell the story you heard from Informant #1 to Informant #2, and then ask Informant #2, with the benefit of anonymity if he/she needs it, "OK, now what did Informant #1 get wrong?"
- People reading the new sections of Abe Shinzo's repackaged and expanded Toward a Beautiful Country, now entitled Toward a New Country, in order to get a taste of Abe Shinzo Thought in all its incurious, knee-jerk weirdness and without the filter of his fabulous media management machine he has acquired from Amaterasu-knows-where.
- Commentators about Japan's entering into Trans Pacific Partnership discussions not talking about the recalcitrance of Japanese farmers and starting to talk about the recalcitrance of U.S. light truck manufacturer executives and workers. At least Japanese farmers have the traditional rural environment and culture fig leaves to hide behind.
- Folks making more noise about the role that narratives of national weakness play in driving the countries in the region toward conflict. How is it possible that every single state in the region has a leadership promising greatness through strength and the pressuring of other countries in the region to understand the errors of their past policies and attitudes?
[For those who saw the "in terms of feminine totems of cults of past national weakness, Yokota Megumi is to Japanese political activists as the comfort women are to South Korean political activists" test answer, 100 points. For those who saw "Japan revisionists and Abe Shinzo promise solutions to the abductees problems, Dokdo/Takeshima dispute and the Southern Kuriles/Northern Territories claims because they know that there are no solutions to these issues, only endless opportunities to opine about how Japan must be strong again," 200 points. For those who asked, "How incredibly bad and illegitimate can the Chinese government be that it must beat its breast and swear to reestablish the supposed pre-Opium War borders of the Qing Empire as its own?" -- a seat in the front row.]
Abe Shinzo yesterday crowed about how persons his age (so full of vim!) are now in charge of China and South Korea and how the trio of himself, Xi Jinping and Park Geun-hye can, though vigorous (shikkari to) communication of their respective positions, work for the prosperity and peace of the region (Link - J). How he managed to avoid throwing in an even more nonsensical "and we all three are in no way are caught up fighting dead political battles and the legacies left us by our parents and grandparents" escapes me.
- Spike reversing his decision to stop writing about his wanderings through down-at-the-heels Japan. (Link)
- Commentators ceasing to worry about how a misunderstanding in between the maritime constabulary forces (I must thank Alessio Patalano for that wonderful locution) of China and Japan could lead to an exchange of gunfire and a military crisis -- and starting to worry instead how the leaderships of China and Japan are using the Senkakus as springboards for their own careers, the needs and interests of their citizens be damned -- i.e., make plain that from the viewpoint of fostering or preserving democracy and prosperity in the region, the prophesied "Senkakus crisis" is already upon us.
- Folks who write up articles and reports about this blessed land doing a little thinking about their sources of anecdotes and comments, along the lines of "if I am talking to a smarter-than-average person about the way his/her society and government work, shouldn't I worry that what I am hearing is not what works but instead how things are supposed to work?"
Call it the yutosei problem, if you need a label for the idea.
Anthropologists have to worry all the time about whether or not what they are hearing from native informants is just a narrative the informant is selling or even worse believes is true.
The antidote is not that difficult to find: just tell the story you heard from Informant #1 to Informant #2, and then ask Informant #2, with the benefit of anonymity if he/she needs it, "OK, now what did Informant #1 get wrong?"
- People reading the new sections of Abe Shinzo's repackaged and expanded Toward a Beautiful Country, now entitled Toward a New Country, in order to get a taste of Abe Shinzo Thought in all its incurious, knee-jerk weirdness and without the filter of his fabulous media management machine he has acquired from Amaterasu-knows-where.
- Commentators about Japan's entering into Trans Pacific Partnership discussions not talking about the recalcitrance of Japanese farmers and starting to talk about the recalcitrance of U.S. light truck manufacturer executives and workers. At least Japanese farmers have the traditional rural environment and culture fig leaves to hide behind.
- Folks making more noise about the role that narratives of national weakness play in driving the countries in the region toward conflict. How is it possible that every single state in the region has a leadership promising greatness through strength and the pressuring of other countries in the region to understand the errors of their past policies and attitudes?
[For those who saw the "in terms of feminine totems of cults of past national weakness, Yokota Megumi is to Japanese political activists as the comfort women are to South Korean political activists" test answer, 100 points. For those who saw "Japan revisionists and Abe Shinzo promise solutions to the abductees problems, Dokdo/Takeshima dispute and the Southern Kuriles/Northern Territories claims because they know that there are no solutions to these issues, only endless opportunities to opine about how Japan must be strong again," 200 points. For those who asked, "How incredibly bad and illegitimate can the Chinese government be that it must beat its breast and swear to reestablish the supposed pre-Opium War borders of the Qing Empire as its own?" -- a seat in the front row.]
Abe Shinzo yesterday crowed about how persons his age (so full of vim!) are now in charge of China and South Korea and how the trio of himself, Xi Jinping and Park Geun-hye can, though vigorous (shikkari to) communication of their respective positions, work for the prosperity and peace of the region (Link - J). How he managed to avoid throwing in an even more nonsensical "and we all three are in no way are caught up fighting dead political battles and the legacies left us by our parents and grandparents" escapes me.
Thursday, March 14, 2013
What Is There To Not Understand Regarding The Rikuzankai Case?
I am still trying to understand the High Court ruling on the Rikuzankai case.
I am not confused by Justice Iida Yoshinobu's determination, following his throwing out evidence that could prove the contrary, that the determination made in 2011 by the trial judge had no errors in it. I mean, just look at Justice Iida's face.
Does this face not just scream, "Mind open to the possibility that the National Police Agency concocted this case out of perjured testimony, forced confessions and circumstantial evidence?"
I am confused by the underlined bits in this Yomiuri Online explanation of the appeal ruling:
(Link)
Do you see the problem?
According to the determination of now two courts, Ishikawa committed two crimes.
1) He accepted a 50 million yen secret donation from Mizutani Construction, which he did not properly record
2) He falsely recorded a 400 million yen loan Ozawa made to the Rikuzankai
The problem is he cannot have done both. Because the Monday after Ishikawa supposedly receives a secret donation from Mizutani Construction, he deposits the 400 million loaned by Ozawa in Rikuzankai accounts. He does so by breaking up the 400 million into a number of smaller amounts, this in order, according to his explanation, to camouflage his boss' having 400 million just lying around the house to loan out to anyone without collateral or even a written contract.
One of the amounts of money that Ishikawa deposits is 50 million yen. This the prosecutors insist is not a part of the money that Ozawa loaned the Rikuzankai but is instead the secret donation from Mizutani Construction.
If that is so,
a) are prosecutors not arguing that Ozawa gave only 350 million, not 400 million, and
b) since 400 million was repaid to Ozawa a few years later, why have prosecutors not gone after Ozawa to return the 50 million amount allegedly received from Mizutani Construction?
Note that I am not even considering the glaring inconsistency of the prosecutors simultaneously asserting that Ishikawa was sneaky enough to split the entirely legal Ozawa loan into smaller amounts and too stupid to split up an illegal donation from Mizutani Construction.
No one denies the accounts were a mess regarding the 400 million Ozawa loaned the Rikuzankai, the emergency loan being necessary in order that Rikuzankai could in turn borrow from a bank the money needed to pay for the land for a staff dormitory near Ozawa's residence (the banker's rule being that if one wishes to borrow X amount, one has to show one has the full X amount in collateral).
Was the messed up accounting of the no-interest loan a crime? Only under criteria which, if applied to the loan officers of the country's financial institutions, would put hundreds if not thousands behind bars.
Ozawa, poised to become prime minister prior to the ridiculous arrest of his secretary Okubo Takanori on the charges that led prosecutors to seize the financial records of the Rikuzankai, enabling the discovery amid the tens of thousands of transactions this one bit of victimless funny business, now lords over a tiny rump party on the verge of annihilation. Oh, that and the 400 million.
Sic transit gloria? Not exactly.
The sad joke of the political application of the Political Funds Control Law now goes to a higher but not necessarily better place.
I am not confused by Justice Iida Yoshinobu's determination, following his throwing out evidence that could prove the contrary, that the determination made in 2011 by the trial judge had no errors in it. I mean, just look at Justice Iida's face.
Does this face not just scream, "Mind open to the possibility that the National Police Agency concocted this case out of perjured testimony, forced confessions and circumstantial evidence?"
I am confused by the underlined bits in this Yomiuri Online explanation of the appeal ruling:
The high court endorsed the judgment of the lower court that one motive for the falsification was to prevent secret donations from midsize contractor Mizutani Construction Co. from coming to light.
The judge accepted as credible the testimony of a former Mizutani Construction president that the company gave 50 million yen to Ishikawa to help the company secure a subcontract for a dam construction project.
The judge said Ishikawa falsified the political fund reports of the Rikuzan-kai fund management body of Ozawa, now leader of People's Life Party, in an attempt to conceal 400 million yen he lent to Rikuzan-kai to finance a Tokyo land purchase.
Iida said there were no factual errors in the lower court ruling from circumstantial evidence that the former secretaries deliberately falsified the reports in a conspiracy.
"This is a vicious crime that is against the Political Funds Control Law," Iida said.
The Tokyo High Court's not-guilty ruling for Ozawa, finalized in November 2012, recognized the falsification of the reports by the former aides but accepted that Ozawa may have not been given details of the land deal and may have been unaware of the illegality of the off-the-book treatment of the 400 million yen.
(Link)
Do you see the problem?
According to the determination of now two courts, Ishikawa committed two crimes.
1) He accepted a 50 million yen secret donation from Mizutani Construction, which he did not properly record
2) He falsely recorded a 400 million yen loan Ozawa made to the Rikuzankai
The problem is he cannot have done both. Because the Monday after Ishikawa supposedly receives a secret donation from Mizutani Construction, he deposits the 400 million loaned by Ozawa in Rikuzankai accounts. He does so by breaking up the 400 million into a number of smaller amounts, this in order, according to his explanation, to camouflage his boss' having 400 million just lying around the house to loan out to anyone without collateral or even a written contract.
One of the amounts of money that Ishikawa deposits is 50 million yen. This the prosecutors insist is not a part of the money that Ozawa loaned the Rikuzankai but is instead the secret donation from Mizutani Construction.
If that is so,
a) are prosecutors not arguing that Ozawa gave only 350 million, not 400 million, and
b) since 400 million was repaid to Ozawa a few years later, why have prosecutors not gone after Ozawa to return the 50 million amount allegedly received from Mizutani Construction?
Note that I am not even considering the glaring inconsistency of the prosecutors simultaneously asserting that Ishikawa was sneaky enough to split the entirely legal Ozawa loan into smaller amounts and too stupid to split up an illegal donation from Mizutani Construction.
No one denies the accounts were a mess regarding the 400 million Ozawa loaned the Rikuzankai, the emergency loan being necessary in order that Rikuzankai could in turn borrow from a bank the money needed to pay for the land for a staff dormitory near Ozawa's residence (the banker's rule being that if one wishes to borrow X amount, one has to show one has the full X amount in collateral).
Was the messed up accounting of the no-interest loan a crime? Only under criteria which, if applied to the loan officers of the country's financial institutions, would put hundreds if not thousands behind bars.
Ozawa, poised to become prime minister prior to the ridiculous arrest of his secretary Okubo Takanori on the charges that led prosecutors to seize the financial records of the Rikuzankai, enabling the discovery amid the tens of thousands of transactions this one bit of victimless funny business, now lords over a tiny rump party on the verge of annihilation. Oh, that and the 400 million.
Sic transit gloria? Not exactly.
The sad joke of the political application of the Political Funds Control Law now goes to a higher but not necessarily better place.
The LDP's Latest Electoral Reform Chimera
Cognizant of some voters remembering that in November representatives of the Liberal Democratic Party promised then Prime Minister Noda Yoshihiko that they would cooperate in cutting the number of seats in the House of Representatives if Noda would dissolve the Diet -- and cognizant that some kind of action looking like electoral reform is in order -- the LDP is now proposing to scramble the electoral system worse than ever.
In 2009, the Democratic Party of Japan promised to cut the number of House of Representatives proportional vote seats from 180 to 100. Nominally this proposal sought to reduce Diet expenditure. However this explanation was facetious: the House was to be left with a still extraordinary 400 seats. The actual goal of the proposal was the further cementing of a two-party system, this by starving the mini- and micro-parties of opportunities to win seats. As a such, the proposal never had a chance of being enacted after the losses of the 2010 House of Councillors election, as the DPJ by itself no longer had the votes necessary to prevail in both Houses of the Diet. Had the LDP, the other party desirous of a two-party system, been willing to accept a short term sacrifice for a long-term gain, the proposal could have been passed at any time. However, the LDP had no interest in cooperating with anything the DPJ offered.
So the matter sat, fermenting, until revived to provide camouflage for Noda's reprehensible surrender on every front.
However, with the courts beating upon the doors of Diet demanding reform (Link), the LDP has taken up the promise to reduce House of Representatives seat numbers.
Cutting the number of proportional House of Representative seats has nothing to do with the sort of reforms the courts are demanding. However, better to be seen doing something, no matter how perverse and pointless, than be hounded for doing nothing.
Hence, the latest cockamamie proposal. That, and the desire the LDP has to retain the New Komeito as an ally until the July House of Councillors elections are over.
Here is the LDP's proposed reform of the House of Representatives:
- Retention of the +0/-5 plan for rectifying the disproportionality of districts, a solution which the courts have derided as "nothing but the barest minimal reform meeting the mandatory standards." (Link – J)
- Cutting the number of proportional seats by 30
- Dividing the remaining 150 seats (180-30=150) into two, with 90 seats being apportioned by the current d’Hondt distribution from regional blocs and 60 seats apportioned among the parties other than the top finisher in the proportional bloc vote, with the proviso that greatest number of seats a party other than the top vote getter can win inside a bloc is equal to the number won by the top finisher (Got that?)
- Reducing the number of blocs from the current 11 to 8 (Link – J)
The DPJ has already come out against the LDP proposal, iterating the obvious point that "voters would find this reform hard to understand." (Link – J)
A reform which accomplishes none of the things the public and the courts have asked for, while adding at three new layers of complexity to the existing process is "hard to understand?" Really?
The great thing about having the LDP back in power with Abe Shinzo at the helm? One never needs to knit together tenuous webs of inference and intrigue in order to make plain the time-wasting self-interest at the heart of every ruling party initiative.
In 2009, the Democratic Party of Japan promised to cut the number of House of Representatives proportional vote seats from 180 to 100. Nominally this proposal sought to reduce Diet expenditure. However this explanation was facetious: the House was to be left with a still extraordinary 400 seats. The actual goal of the proposal was the further cementing of a two-party system, this by starving the mini- and micro-parties of opportunities to win seats. As a such, the proposal never had a chance of being enacted after the losses of the 2010 House of Councillors election, as the DPJ by itself no longer had the votes necessary to prevail in both Houses of the Diet. Had the LDP, the other party desirous of a two-party system, been willing to accept a short term sacrifice for a long-term gain, the proposal could have been passed at any time. However, the LDP had no interest in cooperating with anything the DPJ offered.
So the matter sat, fermenting, until revived to provide camouflage for Noda's reprehensible surrender on every front.
However, with the courts beating upon the doors of Diet demanding reform (Link), the LDP has taken up the promise to reduce House of Representatives seat numbers.
Cutting the number of proportional House of Representative seats has nothing to do with the sort of reforms the courts are demanding. However, better to be seen doing something, no matter how perverse and pointless, than be hounded for doing nothing.
Hence, the latest cockamamie proposal. That, and the desire the LDP has to retain the New Komeito as an ally until the July House of Councillors elections are over.
Here is the LDP's proposed reform of the House of Representatives:
- Retention of the +0/-5 plan for rectifying the disproportionality of districts, a solution which the courts have derided as "nothing but the barest minimal reform meeting the mandatory standards." (Link – J)
- Cutting the number of proportional seats by 30
- Dividing the remaining 150 seats (180-30=150) into two, with 90 seats being apportioned by the current d’Hondt distribution from regional blocs and 60 seats apportioned among the parties other than the top finisher in the proportional bloc vote, with the proviso that greatest number of seats a party other than the top vote getter can win inside a bloc is equal to the number won by the top finisher (Got that?)
- Reducing the number of blocs from the current 11 to 8 (Link – J)
The DPJ has already come out against the LDP proposal, iterating the obvious point that "voters would find this reform hard to understand." (Link – J)
A reform which accomplishes none of the things the public and the courts have asked for, while adding at three new layers of complexity to the existing process is "hard to understand?" Really?
The great thing about having the LDP back in power with Abe Shinzo at the helm? One never needs to knit together tenuous webs of inference and intrigue in order to make plain the time-wasting self-interest at the heart of every ruling party initiative.
Tuesday, March 12, 2013
A Look At il diritto c'è, ma non si vede
Blogging in Italian about Japanese jurisprudence, reader Andrea Ortolani. (Link)
Professore Ortolani writes a straightforward style, allowing Google Translate to do a decent job (Pace, il Dottor P. S.) of rendering the original into English.
In a recent post Ortolani examines the two high court decisions handed down this month on the unconstitutionality of the House of Representatives electoral map, and by extension, the illegitimacy of the Abe Government and the sitting Diet:
The pair also at least cast doubt upon the constitutionality of the egregious +0\-5 fudge on rectifying the unconstitutionality of the districts passed by the last Diet in the last week of its existence (Link - J). This opens the door for the Supreme Court to rule in favor of a more meaningful reform of the House of Representatives district boundaries -- not that the Supremes will take advantage of this opening, at least as regards the current round of cases.
[The ruling also casts into doubt upon the +4/-4 rectification done to the House of Councillors district seat apportionments, a question which will come to the fore the closer we approach to the end of the current Diet session.]
As for showing more coraggio, declaring an election invalid is really up to the Supreme Court. After all, the frame for the fight over who has final say on what is or what is not constitutional is Article 81 of the Constitution, where the named actor is the Supreme Court, not the national judiciary. (Link)
The decisions to declare the December 16, 2012 election unconstitutional but not invalid is a headscratcher, to be sure. As a senryu by Tanaka Jiro of Koshigaya City put it:
In my heart I know that when the Supreme Court takes on the issue of whether or not the December 16 election should be invalidated, it will kick the ball to the sidelines, no matter that Japanese government is in a corrosive (and likely, given the contempt the revisionists have for the 1947 Constitution, an entirely willful) state of unconstitutionality.
Professore Ortolani writes a straightforward style, allowing Google Translate to do a decent job (Pace, il Dottor P. S.) of rendering the original into English.
In a recent post Ortolani examines the two high court decisions handed down this month on the unconstitutionality of the House of Representatives electoral map, and by extension, the illegitimacy of the Abe Government and the sitting Diet:
A che servono queste due pronunce, se tanto in pratica non cambia nulla? Sono anni che i tribunali giapponesi lanciano avvertimenti, nella forma di pronunce di incostituzionalità dei collegi elettorali, ma finora nulla è cambiato. Ci sarà prima o poi un giudice che avrà un po’ più di coraggio degli altri?It is perhaps unfair to dump upon the Tokyo High Court and Sapporo High court justices. They did rule without equivocation that the December 2013 election was unconstitutional and not "carried out in a state of unconstitutionality" or some other responsibility-shirking locution.
Which, according to Google Translate, is:
What are these two decisions, both in practice if nothing changes? For years, the Japanese courts speak warnings in the form of rulings of unconstitutionality of the constituencies, but so far nothing has changed. There will be sooner or later a judge who will show a little more courage than others?
The pair also at least cast doubt upon the constitutionality of the egregious +0\-5 fudge on rectifying the unconstitutionality of the districts passed by the last Diet in the last week of its existence (Link - J). This opens the door for the Supreme Court to rule in favor of a more meaningful reform of the House of Representatives district boundaries -- not that the Supremes will take advantage of this opening, at least as regards the current round of cases.
[The ruling also casts into doubt upon the +4/-4 rectification done to the House of Councillors district seat apportionments, a question which will come to the fore the closer we approach to the end of the current Diet session.]
As for showing more coraggio, declaring an election invalid is really up to the Supreme Court. After all, the frame for the fight over who has final say on what is or what is not constitutional is Article 81 of the Constitution, where the named actor is the Supreme Court, not the national judiciary. (Link)
The decisions to declare the December 16, 2012 election unconstitutional but not invalid is a headscratcher, to be sure. As a senryu by Tanaka Jiro of Koshigaya City put it:
違憲でもSource: Tokyo Shimbun of 9 March 2013
選挙有効？
アホかいな
Iken demo
senkyo yuko?
aho kai na
Even though it's unconstitutional
The election's valid?
Do you think I'm a moron?/Are you morons?
In my heart I know that when the Supreme Court takes on the issue of whether or not the December 16 election should be invalidated, it will kick the ball to the sidelines, no matter that Japanese government is in a corrosive (and likely, given the contempt the revisionists have for the 1947 Constitution, an entirely willful) state of unconstitutionality.
Monday, March 11, 2013
A Quiet Anniversary Song
For listening, not watching, on cold day in March: Matsui Yuki playing Hito Yo's 2004-05 megahit "Hanamizuki" - uploaded in the immediate aftermath of the triple disaster. (Link)
Far more hopeful than this day leaves me feeling.
Far more hopeful than this day leaves me feeling.
Nice Touch, Your Majesty
At the official ceremony commemorating the second anniversary of 3/11, his Highness the Emperor just paid tribute to the contributions made by foreign residents of Japan and non-Japanese everywhere to the rescue and recovery efforts in the disaster zones.
Classy gentleman, his Highness.
The Imperial House was one of only three institutions (the others were the Self Defense Forces and U.S. Forces Japan) to have behaved impeccably from very early on in the disasters and in the weeks and months afterward.
Classy gentleman, his Highness.
The Imperial House was one of only three institutions (the others were the Self Defense Forces and U.S. Forces Japan) to have behaved impeccably from very early on in the disasters and in the weeks and months afterward.
Are You Doing Nothing?
There are two Fukushima Dai'ichi nuclear power plant meltdown decontamination stories.
The first is the damn serious one of the decontamination of everything in the immediate vicinity of the Fukushima Dai'ichi reactors. (Link)
The second is the farcical cleanup of areas downwind of the plant, with imaginary unsafe dosage levels, the most irregular of irregular workers and of course, organized crime syndicates playing their parts. (Link)
The real secret of the latter cleanup: the best thing to do would be...nothing.
The major components of the windborne contamination were Cesium 134 and Cesium 137. Cesium 134 has a half-life of 2 years; Cesium 137 has a half-life of 30 years.
By doing absolutely nothing, radiation levels have in two years's time dropped by 25% in the affected areas away from the Fukushima Power Station. In another two years, another 13% of the radioactive material will be gone. After the end of 10 years, only 7% of the original amount of Cesium 134 will be left.
Of course, more than half of the Cesium 137 will be remaining in 10 years' time. However, with Cesiuum 137's low rate of decay, radioactivity will fall below concern level in all but the areas in the band running from Futaba on the coast to Iidate in the mountains.
As we know though, doing nothing does not win one votes in democratic elections. The scatterbrained clean up effort also appeals to the ideology of diligence -- that through hard work and determination, one can make the seemingly impossible, possible.
So the show is sure to go on.
The first is the damn serious one of the decontamination of everything in the immediate vicinity of the Fukushima Dai'ichi reactors. (Link)
The second is the farcical cleanup of areas downwind of the plant, with imaginary unsafe dosage levels, the most irregular of irregular workers and of course, organized crime syndicates playing their parts. (Link)
The real secret of the latter cleanup: the best thing to do would be...nothing.
The major components of the windborne contamination were Cesium 134 and Cesium 137. Cesium 134 has a half-life of 2 years; Cesium 137 has a half-life of 30 years.
By doing absolutely nothing, radiation levels have in two years's time dropped by 25% in the affected areas away from the Fukushima Power Station. In another two years, another 13% of the radioactive material will be gone. After the end of 10 years, only 7% of the original amount of Cesium 134 will be left.
Of course, more than half of the Cesium 137 will be remaining in 10 years' time. However, with Cesiuum 137's low rate of decay, radioactivity will fall below concern level in all but the areas in the band running from Futaba on the coast to Iidate in the mountains.
As we know though, doing nothing does not win one votes in democratic elections. The scatterbrained clean up effort also appeals to the ideology of diligence -- that through hard work and determination, one can make the seemingly impossible, possible.
So the show is sure to go on.
Need Some Numbers On The Post-3/11 Situation?
Need some numbers to toss out on the second anniversary of the worst natural/man-made disaster of the postwar era?
------------------------------------
Percentage of special disaster funds held by the Reconstruction Agency for reconstruction and disaster preparedness actually disbursed by the Agency by the end of September 2012: 51.5%
Percentage of the funds for projects outside the main disaster zone spent: 96%
Percentage of the funds for projects inside the main disaster zone spent: 45.6%
Percentage of the funds for radiation remediation projects spent: 18.4%
Source: Tokyo Shimbun of 4 March 2013
----------------------
Killed in original disasters: 15,881
Missing in original disasters: 2,668
Early deaths traceable to displacement or other disaster-related causes: 2,303
Source: NHK broadcast of 10 March 2013
Early deaths traceable to displacement due to Fukushima nuclear accident: 789
Source: Tokyo Shimbun of 11 March 2013
-------------------
Number of persons displaced from disaster zones: 315,000
Numbers of persons evacuated out of disaster zones in Fukushima Prefecture: 154,000
Source: Reconstruction Agency
"Do you still have strong feelings of sympathy and support for persons affected by the triple disasters?"
Strongly or to a certain extent 84%
Weakening feelings 15%
None at all 1%
"The Abe Government says there must be a revision of the DPJ-led government-passed plan recommending a phase-out of nuclear power over the next 30 years. Do you agree with the Abe Government’s contention that a revision is merited?"
Agree 51%
Disagree: 41%
Source: TBS/JNN poll of 9-10 March 2013
----------------------
Number of communities with plans to be moved to higher ground: 229
Source: Reconstruction Agency
Actual number of communities relocated to higher ground: 0
Source: Tokyo Shimbun of 10 March 2013
Number of persons rendered jobless by the triple disaster: 81,000
Number who have since found work: 45,000
Number of workers reporting loss of income because of triple disaster: 385,000
Number of workers put on leave because of triple disaster: 638,000
Source: Ministry of General Affairs and Telecommunications
Percentage of fishing ports repaired since disaster: 37%
Source: Tokyo Shimbun of 10 March 2013
Number of public housing units deemed necessary in order to house those unable to rebuild their own homes: 23,000
Number of units built to date: 84
Source: NHK News
------------------------------------
"Can you or can you not support the Abe Cabinet?"
All other parties have less 1% support.
Source: TBS/JNN poll of 9-10 March 2013
------------------------------------
Percentage of special disaster funds held by the Reconstruction Agency for reconstruction and disaster preparedness actually disbursed by the Agency by the end of September 2012: 51.5%
Percentage of the funds for projects outside the main disaster zone spent: 96%
Percentage of the funds for projects inside the main disaster zone spent: 45.6%
Percentage of the funds for radiation remediation projects spent: 18.4%
Source: Tokyo Shimbun of 4 March 2013
----------------------
Killed in original disasters: 15,881
Missing in original disasters: 2,668
Early deaths traceable to displacement or other disaster-related causes: 2,303
Source: NHK broadcast of 10 March 2013
Early deaths traceable to displacement due to Fukushima nuclear accident: 789
Source: Tokyo Shimbun of 11 March 2013
-------------------
Number of persons displaced from disaster zones: 315,000
Numbers of persons evacuated out of disaster zones in Fukushima Prefecture: 154,000
Source: Reconstruction Agency
"Do you still have strong feelings of sympathy and support for persons affected by the triple disasters?"
Strongly or to a certain extent 84%
Weakening feelings 15%
None at all 1%
"The Abe Government says there must be a revision of the DPJ-led government-passed plan recommending a phase-out of nuclear power over the next 30 years. Do you agree with the Abe Government’s contention that a revision is merited?"
Agree 51%
Disagree: 41%
Source: TBS/JNN poll of 9-10 March 2013
----------------------
Number of communities with plans to be moved to higher ground: 229
Source: Reconstruction Agency
Actual number of communities relocated to higher ground: 0
Source: Tokyo Shimbun of 10 March 2013
Number of persons rendered jobless by the triple disaster: 81,000
Number who have since found work: 45,000
Number of workers reporting loss of income because of triple disaster: 385,000
Number of workers put on leave because of triple disaster: 638,000
Source: Ministry of General Affairs and Telecommunications
Percentage of fishing ports repaired since disaster: 37%
Source: Tokyo Shimbun of 10 March 2013
Number of public housing units deemed necessary in order to house those unable to rebuild their own homes: 23,000
Number of units built to date: 84
Source: NHK News
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"Can you or can you not support the Abe Cabinet?"
Can support 76%"Which party do you intend to vote for in the 2013 House of Councillors election proportional vote?"
Cannot support 22%
LDP 37.5%
DPJ 8.1%
JRP/JAR 3.6%
Your Party 2.7%
New Komeito 2.2%
Communist 2.2%
All other parties have less 1% support.
Source: TBS/JNN poll of 9-10 March 2013
Saturday, March 09, 2013
Fair And Balanced
Reckless, provocative, incompetent, amateurish!
Uh....no. (Link)
Against the baying of the Hallelujah Chorus, the Democratic Party of Japan never stood a half-a-chance...
Uh....no. (Link)
Against the baying of the Hallelujah Chorus, the Democratic Party of Japan never stood a half-a-chance...
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